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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I examine the religious writings of Thomas Hobbes, primarily as they occur in 
the second half of Leviathan (but drawing from other sources as necessary). My aim is to illustrate 
the continuity between Hobbes' thoughts on religion and other areas of his philosophy, especially 
his political theory. Hobbes' distinctive philosophical position, filtered through the lens of the Bible, 
is what animates the theology of the second half of Leviathan. In short: Hobbes is a materialist, a 
determinist, an empiricist, a nominalist, a political absolutist, and a social and intellectual elitist. He 
came of age in an Anglican-Calvinist context and had a humanist education. He was born on the 
cusp of the scientific revolution, and considered himself a scientist and a mathematician. All of these 
influences affect the views presented in Leviathan. Hobbes approaches the Christianity of his era 
hypercritically, with an eye to excising foreign and irrational influences (Greek, Scholastic 
philosophy, pagan religion, Catholic hierarchy) and replacing them with (ostensibly) Biblically-
grounded and philosophically-robust doctrines.  In effect, Hobbes is attempting to rationally 
reconstruct Christianity on the basis of Scripture and his own philosophical system, and his 
overriding concern is with political stability and the absolute authority of the sovereign. 
 
In Chapter 1, I focus on the first half of Leviathan. My discussion explores issues and controversies 
in the natural theology of Hobbes.  
Chapter 2 draws some parallels between Hobbes' determinist physics and the doctrine of 
predestination most often associated with Jean Calvin.  
Chapter 3 begins the analysis of the second half of Leviathan. I consider Hobbes' position on the 
relationship between reason and revelation. I consider the sources of religious belief from a 
Hobbesian perspective - miracles, prophecy, and scripture. Hobbes subjects all of these to rigorous 
epistemological critiques.   
In Chapter 4, I examine Hobbes' unique account of eschatology, and the purposes to which he puts 
it. Hobbes' account of heaven and hell, the soul and salvation, are startling to the modern reader, but 
actually are an idiosyncratic blend of the radical ideas of some of Hobbes' contemporaries and his 
own philosophical commitments.  I consider some of the potential sources for these innovations in 
his theory, whether direct or indirect.  
Hobbes embraces a vision of the relationship between Church and State that emphasizes their unity 
and absolute subordination to the sovereign.  
In Chapter 5, I analyze this extended argument, highlighting Hobbes' encyclopedic attempt to 
demolish any argument that splits authority into temporal and spiritual realms.  
In Chapter 6 I consider the double question of Hobbes' religious sincerity: both as an individual and 
as the author of Leviathan. I consider the thoughts of the Straussian school as they apply to Hobbes. 
I return to the thoughts of Hobbes' contemporaries and what they believed that Hobbes was saying 
about religion. I compare Hobbes to Machiavelli on a major point of overlap. 
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Leviathan drawn out by i ts  tai l :  The re li g ious  ideas  o f  the  s e cond hal f  o f  Leviathan1 
Jonathan Harmon  
Introduction  
Thomas Hobbes is a colorful figure who lived in exciting times and who profoundly 
influenced the shape of the modern polity. Hobbes today is well known as “the father of 
modern political philosophy”, but his views on religion are often overlooked or dismissed. 
Certainly, there is a outdated feel to Hobbes’ discussions of religion, which makes it easy to 
see them as distinct from and irrelevant to his wider project. Making sense of Hobbes’ place 
in the continuum of religious thought is difficult. Reading him apart from his 
contemporaries makes his religious arguments even more opaque and localized. Is there any 
profit to taking such arcane discussions seriously?  
I believe there is, for several reasons. The first is that understanding what Hobbes 
thought about religion may help us understand other areas of his philosophy better. It will 
also lead us to better understand the depth and erudition of a thinker already acknowledged 
to be a giant.  
I must confess that the strangeness of the times, its remoteness and its strange 
proximity, has its own intrinsic appeal.  
More importantly, the early Modern period was an era torn apart by religious strife: 
the 30 Years’ War ended a mere 3 years before Hobbes wrote Leviathan, and religious 
conflict was at the heart of the English Civil War. Hobbes was at the center of a changing 
                                                
1 My title is an allusion to John Bramhall’s book, “The Catching of Leviathan” (1658) and Alexander 
Rosse’s “Leviathan drawn out with a hook” (1653). Samuel Mintz takes the title of his book, The Hunting 
of Leviathan, from similar considerations.  
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world, and his interventions in Christian doctrine must be understood against the backdrop 
of sectarian violence. His entire political philosophy can be seen as informed by the problem 
of religious diversity in the modern state. Hobbes is fairly unique in that he is an early 
Modern poised between the collapse of Catholic hegemony and the rise of the tolerationist 
solution of thinkers like John Locke. By still insisting on religious uniformity while facing the 
disintegration of old modes of social cohesion, Hobbes presents another solution to the 
problem of Modernity. While his alternative did not gain ascendency, it offers a useful (and 
rigorous) contrast to Locke and others.2  Reminding ourselves why the Moderns took the 
path they did, from the viewpoint of heirs to this tradition, is enlightening.  
Finally, while many authors question the systematicity of the early Moderns, I believe 
reading Leviathan’s meditations on religion to be illustrative of the audacity and the unity of 
Hobbes’ thought. The parts and principles of that work cohere together, and when those 
principles are laid out and examined, one can see how this or that religious principle follows. 
In other words, we should not expect Hobbes’s writings on religion to be divorced from the 
rest of his philosophy, from ontology to epistemology to political and moral theory. 
Like many other great thinkers, Hobbes has a polarizing effect, especially when it 
comes to matters of religion. Scholars have asserted both Hobbes’ religiosity and his atheism 
with equal vehemence, and with equal appeals to evidence.3 In the specific case of Hobbes, 
there seems to be little space for a middle ground: Hobbes either was or was not a sincere 
                                                
2 Hobbes finds himself in the company of Machiavelli and Rousseau (at least of the Social Contract) in this 
approach. 
3 The reoccurrence of appeals to “obviousness” is equally common. 
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Christian; his writings either advocate for Christianity or they do not.4 Thinkers array 
themselves on both sides of this line.  
This problem with reading Hobbes on religion can be neatly illustrated by the broad 
range of responses to a passage like the following: 
For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick; which, 
swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most part cast up again 
without effect. (L32.3/246)5 
The typical modern reader sees the metaphor as crude, and the intention as 
straightforwardly sarcastic, implying a contempt for religion and “blind” faith. Hobbes 
provokes a knee-jerk feeling of atheism in the casual observer of the 20th century.  
But it is important to note that there are rigorous and deliberate opponents to this 
view, both historical and contemporary. For instance, despite his frustrations with Hobbes in 
general, Clarendon reads this passage in a positive light, claiming that Hobbes was “modest 
and prudent” to write that “sober consideration” about the nature of faith, although he 
comments that Hobbes blatantly ignores it later on.6  
A modern writer like Paul Johnson, after conceding the complexity of deciding the 
meaning of this passage, nonetheless concludes that when it is properly contextualized, “it 
can be clearly seen that his comparison of the mysteries for pills to the sick is not skeptical 
                                                
4 The subject of Hobbes’ Christianity, not his theism, seems to me to be the decisive question. 
5 I will refer to Leviathan by chapter and paragraph number, followed by the page in Edwin Curley’s 
edition. Curley’s edition offers several advantages, namely numbered paragraphs, modernized spelling, 
excellent footnotes and supporting materials, and the inclusion of passages from the Latin edition of 1668 
where these diverge significantly from the English text. 
Other parenthetical abbreviations I will use throughout the dissertation will be EL for the Elements of Law 
(cited by Chapter, Paragraph, and page number in the Oxford edition), and DC for De Cive (Chapter, 
paragraph, page in the Cambridge edition). 
6 Clarendon, Survey, 202. Clarendon, who detects irony in a great many places in Hobbes, either does not 
find it here, or thinks the phrasing, on its face, to be unobjectionable.  
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but is part and parcel of a doctrine of salvation and a theory of Christianity which formed 
the mainstream of Anglican development in the seventeenth century.”7  
  If we understood the early Moderns in the terms they used, the argument goes, we 
would see strong evidence for Hobbes’ religiosity. Such arguments teach a lesson. But while 
a historical sensibility is a necessity when trying to understand Hobbes’ thought, historical 
considerations can cut both ways. Many critics who argue for Hobbes’ sincerity do so on the 
basis of historical arguments. But an equal number of critics also point to a tradition of 
“writing between the lines” that educated readers understood, and whose commonplaces 
would have been familiar to a sophisticated audience. So the appeal to history to solve the 
question often gets us no further, and we still have argue our way about. My own 
interpretation of the passage reflects this.  
Such diversity of reasonable, but contradictory, opinion makes for an interesting 
challenge. When treating Hobbes on religion, one must accept that in 350 years since the 
publication of Leviathan, there has been no smoking gun, no admission in a diary or private 
letter that is conclusive.8 One must live with ambiguity, while marshalling evidence as best as 
one can.   
My goal in this dissertation was to examine Hobbes’ religious ideas, primarily as 
presented in the second half of Leviathan, both in detail and in their entirety, looking for the 
principles and purposes that might stand behind them.  
                                                
7 Johnson, Paul, “Hobbes’s Anglican Doctrine of Salvation”, pg. 104. 
8 This is not out of the question. Several texts by Hobbes have appeared I recent years that were previously 
unknown or thought lost – Hobbes’ brief on the law of heresy, for one, or his critique of Thomas Whites’ 
De Mundo. 
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First, I have focused on Leviathan for several reasons. It is Hobbes’ third and final 
statement of his political theory, and arguably his most mature and developed. In tone, it is 
his most radical and unapologetic work.9 It is also his longest and most complete account of 
political theory and revealed religion. Leviathan includes fuller discussions of many issues 
only briefly mentioned in the Elements of Law or De Cive, and it also contains many passages 
that have no equivalent in those earlier works. Hobbes also seems to have change his 
opinions on important matters like ecclesiology and the sacraments in the transition from De 
Cive to Leviathan, moving from more orthodox Anglican views to a vision of Christianity that 
was difficult to classify (or accept). The religious chapters of Leviathan, on their own, rival the 
size of the whole of the Elements or De Cive! There is simply more to work with, and that 
material is simply more interesting.10  
Historically, Leviathan is Hobbes’ most famous work. While De Cive was perhaps 
more influential in Hobbes’ lifetime, Leviathan is the work to which all modern students of 
Hobbes turn to first. Leviathan was certainly more controversial than De Cive: many of 
Hobbes’ royalist associates praised the latter and despised the former. Without a doubt, it 
earned him a reputation as a troublemaker, even an “atheist”.11 
Leviathan is also the occasion of a profound shift in rhetorical style, and in its 
expected audience. The Elements were not published by Hobbes, but merely circulated 
                                                
9 Although, to be fair, the Latin version of 1668 does include appendices which attempt to explain or even 
modify some of Hobbes’ more controversial opinions. The Latin edition also tones down some of Hobbes’ 
more excessive humor and sarcasm, intended as it was for a more educated class of reader. See Skinner, 
Quentin, Reason & Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. 
10 This will not prevent me from pointing out the contrasts when they prove relevant. On almost all counts, 
however, Leviathan marks a step forward in the development of the ideas, and moves them toward 
something distinctly Hobbesian.  
11 “Atheist” was a general term of abuse in 17th century England, with meanings running the full range from 
“denier of the existence of the Christian God” to simply “immoral”. 
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among friends and colleagues.12 De Cive appeared in Latin, the language of the upper, 
educated classes. Both of these works are written in a lively, but sober tone. Leviathan first 
appeared in English, allowing it to be accessible to a far larger population than a Latin 
edition would be. While rigorously argued, Hobbes also indulges in (sometimes crass) humor 
and other literary tropes. The fact that the title of the book is a metaphor is no small 
departure from the style of the earlier two works. This change in style and audience has 
important consequences for how we can read the book. 
Leviathan is both a work about politics and a political act. It represents Hobbes’ 
political ideal of absolute sovereignty, but it is also his attempt to bring that ideal into being. 
Hobbes expressed hoped that “this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a 
sovereign…and by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting public teaching of it, 
convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice.” (L31.41/243–4). He hopes that 
the work “may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities” as a 
textbook (L.R&C.16/496). But aside from kings and dons, Hobbes also sought to widely  
influence public opinion, at least amongst the educated classes.13  
I believe these considerations illustrate why Leviathan richly deserves the special 
attention scholars give it, and why I should focus on it now. 
Leviathan can be meaningfully divided in half. Books I and II form the first half, 
concerned with matters properly considered philosophical, and using reason and experience 
as guides. The second half, consisting of Books III and IV, considers revealed religion.14 One 
                                                
12 Editions were published without Hobbes’ consent in his lifetime.  
13 These in turn will influence the uneducated masses.  
14 For more on this tripartite division of knowledge into experience, reason, and faith, see JGA Pocock’s 
excellent study, “Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes”. 
 7 
must understand the first half to grasp the second, as the philosophical principles and 
political priorities of the first half decisively impact the shape of the second half. I will touch 
upon the theological elements of the first half, but my focus is on the revealed theology of 
the second half.  
Hobbes’ distinctive philosophical position, filtered through the lens of the Bible, is 
what animates the theology of the second half. In short: Hobbes is a materialist, a 
determinist, an empiricist, a nominalist, a political absolutist, and a social and intellectual 
elitist. He came of age in a Anglican–Calvinist context and had a humanist education. He 
was born on the cusp of the scientific revolution, and considered himself a scientist and a 
mathematician. All of these influences affect the views presented in Leviathan. Hobbes 
approaches the Christianity of his era hypercritically, with an eye to excising foreign and 
irrational influences (Greek, Scholastic philosophy, pagan religion, Catholic hierarchy) and 
replacing them with (ostensibly) Biblically-grounded and philosophically-robust doctrines.  
In effect, Hobbes is attempting to rationally reconstruct Christianity on the basis of Scripture 
and his own philosophical system.15    
Hobbes will reject any account of spirit that does not result in a materialist 
explanation, for instance. He will interpret all mentions of spirit as corporeal or as 
epistemological errors. Even God himself will not escape this rampant materiality. The clash 
between materialism and traditional Christian views will be one of many battles that Hobbes 
fought to present his vision.  
                                                
15 I share this sentiment with a number of other students of Hobbes. Perhaps most influential for me in this 
respect is SA Lloyd’s discussion in Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan. 
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But the overriding concern of Hobbes’ masterpiece is politics. Specifically, Hobbes’ 
utmost concern in his religious doctrines seems to be the political implications of those 
ideas. Hobbes’ greatest motivation is the distrust of private judgment to the benefit of the 
sovereign power.16 In general, he doubts that private judgment has intellectual integrity, and 
he denies that a society can be organized in such a way as to give private individuals the 
power to rule. In each case the “public reason” of the sovereign has priority over private 
judgment (and passion), and subordinates it absolutely.17  
I intend to show that every doctrine of consequence in Hobbes’ religious writings in 
Leviathan serves to strengthen the power of the sovereign. Religious doctrines are not 
haphazardly arranged, but tend to a single overarching purpose – stability.  
 
In Chapter 1, I focus on the first half of Leviathan. The first half deals with the use of 
reason and experience to provide us with knowledge. Consequently, my discussion explores 
issues and controversies in the natural theology of Hobbes. Natural theology, Hobbes tells 
us, has little to say about matters of religion, and much of that concerns what we cannot 
legitimately say. Hence, Hobbes neither develops natural theology very far, nor does he feel 
the need to do so. Revelation is far more important to him, as we shall see. 
                                                
16 Private judgment is any judgment not vested with sovereign authority, whether individual or corporate.  
17 This a deliberate allusion to John Rawls in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, who writes, “In each case 
the reasonable has priority over the rational, and subordinates it absolutely” (82). Hobbes uses the term 
“public reason” in a much different context at L37.13/300, but his formulation is similar. SA Lloyd, whose 
interpretation of Hobbes in Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan, takes a Rawlsian approach to 
understanding Hobbes’ views on religions, arguing it was reasonable for him (in the technical Rawlsian 
sense) to ague for religious uniformity as opposed to toleration, given his background culture. See 274–278 
of that work. I am very interested in Lloyd’s approach, and I take great interest in her thesis that Hobbes 
would rather rationalize Christianity than try to reject it, although she and I disagree about Hobbes’ 
sincerity. “Private judgment” as Hobbes’ chief adversary is Lloyd’s formulation. 
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Before launching into Hobbes’ analysis of revealed religion, Chapter 2 draws some 
parallels between Hobbes’ determinist physics and the doctrine of predestination most often 
associated with Jean Calvin. Because Hobbes’ account dovetails so nicely with that of the 
Reformers, I conclude that Hobbes was aware of this overlap and possibly strengthened his 
physical theory with theological insights. While this does not necessarily mean that Hobbes 
would identify as a “Calvinist”, it does illustrate his willingness to draw on intellectually 
sound theological insights into his philosophical project. Using this method, Hobbes often 
yields conclusions his more pious sources would not have accepted.  
After these prefatory discussions, Chapter 3 begins the analysis of the second half of 
Leviathan. I consider Hobbes’ position on the relationship between reason and revelation. I 
consider the sources of religious belief from a Hobbesian perspective – miracles, prophecy, 
and scripture. Hobbes subjects all of these to rigorous, and one might read: fatal, 
epistemological critiques.  I conclude by considering Hobbes’ ideas on freedom of thought, 
and ask whether he might have been closer to the modern idea of toleration than previously 
thought.  
In Chapter 4, I examine Hobbes’ unique account of eschatology, and the purposes to 
which he puts it. Hobbes’ account of heaven and hell, the soul and salvation, are startling to 
the modern reader, but actually are a idiosyncratic blend of the radical ideas of some of 
Hobbes’ contemporaries and his own philosophical commitments. Hobbes’ eschatological 
vision has precise theological targets and distinct political ramifications. Hobbes exposed 
himself to ruthless criticism for these ideas, knowing full well they were controversial – an 
act which testifies to the importance of this eschatological vision to his theory. Hobbes had 
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never written material like this before.  I consider some of the potential sources for these 
innovations in his theory, whether direct or indirect. I also consider Hobbes’ minimalist 
criteria for salvation, and how this fits into his larger political project.  
Unsurprisingly, Hobbes embraces a vision of the relationship between Church and 
State that emphasizes their unity and absolute subordination to the sovereign. In Chapter 5, I 
analyze this extended argument, highlighting Hobbes’  encyclopedic attempt to demolish any 
argument that splits authority into temporal and spiritual realms. Hobbes’ rhetorical powers 
reach an all-time high in his attack here. As with his eschatology, much of this material has 
no precedent in Hobbes’ corpus. Hobbes emphasizes the centrality of the sovereign in all 
aspects of religion. 
In light of the accumulated evidence, in Chapter 6 I consider the double question of 
Hobbes’ religious sincerity: both as an individual and as the author of Leviathan. While our 
answer to the first question must be circumspect, the answer to the second is clearer. I 
consider the thoughts of the Straussian school as they apply to Hobbes. I return to the 
thoughts of Hobbes’ contemporaries and what they believed that Hobbes was saying about 
religion. I compare Hobbes to Machiavelli on a major point of overlap.  
 11 
Chapter 1: Hobbes on Natural Theology 
Theologians often make a distinction between natural theology and revealed 
theology. Natural theology consists of what we can know (or feel justified in believing) about 
God on the basis of unaided human reason. Theoretically, because human beings are 
supposed to be largely similar, these beliefs of natural theology should be accessible to all. 
Natural theology is limited, however, in that it depends on abstract reasoning by fallible 
human beings situated in a particular culture. Its conclusions are necessarily modest, and 
traditionally they are considered incomplete.18  
Theologians who could be considered influential for those in Hobbes’ time ran a 
narrow range of opinions. Thomas Aquinas is cautious: “the truth about God such as reason 
could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the 
admixture of many errors.”19 Jean Calvin is less sanguine about the power of unaided reason, 
writing “it appears that if men were taught only by nature, they would hold to nothing 
certain or solid or clear-cut, but would be so tied to confused principles so as to worship an 
unknown God.”20 Martin Luther argues also an extreme position: “The whole world, human 
reason itself…is obliged to  confess that it never know Christ nor heard of him before the 
gospel came into the world…It must therefore confess, willy-nilly, that by its own powers it 
                                                
18 Some theologians even go so far as to deny that natural reason has any place in justifying belief in God; 
this position is called fideism. 
19 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question I, Article I. (The translation is from  Peter Kreeft, 
ed. Summa of the Summa. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990. p. 36–37)  
20 Calvin, Jean. Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book I. Ch V, §12. The edition I have consulted is ed. 
John T. McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Vol. 1, pg. 66.  
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has been unable either to know or to seek after the things that pertain to the way, the truth, 
and salvation.”21 
By contrast, revealed religion is based on divine revelation, primarily through the 
Scriptures. According to the tradition. revealed religion is superior to natural theology in 
many ways. First, because many important truths “exceed human reason”22 and could not be 
known otherwise. Second, revealed religion can eliminate the human error identified above. 
It can corroborate astute philosophical reasoning, while supplementing its details, all the 
while making it accessible to more than just a few specialists. Rational theologians, like 
Aquinas, argue that the truths of revealed religion may not be apparent to reason, but these 
truths never contradict reason either.   
Natural theology relies exclusively on (finite) human reason. Revealed theology 
employs both reason and faith. Faith picks up where reason leaves off. Again, to use the 
traditional authority on these matters, Aquinas’ way of putting this is as follows: “Although 
those things which are beyond man’s knowledge may not be sought for by man through his 
reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God they must be accepted by faith.”23 
Reason does, however, continue to play a role even with regard to those articles of faith, by 
organizing and interpreting these dogmas. Revealed theology is still theo-logy. 
Thomas Hobbes employs this traditional distinction between natural and revealed 
theology (and between reason and faith) in the composition and in the organization of many 
of his writings. Consequently, my discussion of Hobbes’ work on religion will have two basic 
                                                
21 Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will, part VI. In Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings. Edited 
by Timothy F. Lull. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989. p. 212. Luther’s position is the most fideist of the 
three above. Calvin, however, is closer in spirit than the citation given would suggest.  
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
23 Ibid., p. 37 
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parts, considering each of these two basic aspects of theology in turn.  This of course 
parallels Hobbes’ own analytic framework in his political writings. In Leviathan, to give our 
leading example, the first two Parts (“Of Man” and “Of Commonwealth”) correspond to 
reason (and include the discussions of natural theology), while the latter two Parts (“Of a 
Christian Commonwealth” and “Of the Kingdom of Darkness”) address matters of faith 
and revealed religion.  Along the way, we can see how Hobbes highlights the tension 
between these two modes of belief. We can ask whether he was a thoroughgoing rationalist 
who rejects faith altogether or if he was a kind of fideist, holding faith and reason in distinct 
domains.   
Natural Theology 
There are two aspects of Hobbes’ natural theology to consider: (1) the natural bases 
for belief and (2) the natural modes of worship. With regard to the former, we must distinguish 
arguments for (1.1) God’s (bare) existence from (1.2) discussions about the nature and 
attributes of God. All in all, Hobbes seems confident that God’s existence is amenable to 
rational proof (although there are passages that seem to dispute this). However, he is much 
more skeptical about how much we can meaningfully say about the divine nature. Beyond a 
few vague assertions, all we are entitled to say can be reduced to metaphor, hyperbole, and 
honorifics.    
1. Belief 
A first problem for the reader of Hobbes and religion becomes apparent almost 
immediately. Hobbes describes ordinary religious ideas in extraordinary ways. For instance, 
 14 
Chapter 6 of Leviathan contains the following curious passage amongst a discussion of the 
passions: 
Fear of powers invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, 
RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined is truly such as we 
imagine, TRUE RELIGION. (L6.35/31)  
Clarendon pointed out this definition in his Survey, indicating that “men will probably 
with the more impatience and curiosity, tho with the less reverence” turn to Hobbes’ 
discussion of religion in the third part of Leviathan after reading it.24 
This definition was so bizarre that Hobbes felt compelled to defend it (albeit weakly) 
in the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan of 1668 as not entailing atheism or religious 
skepticism.25 Many modern critics also take this to be evidence of Hobbes’ irreligion, because 
of the use of the words “feigned” and “imagined”26, as well as the use of the word “fear” to 
describe the same emotion in religion and superstition. There are defenders of the innocence 
of the definition as well. For instance, Willis Glover observes, 
Fear…was not a term of opprobrium for Hobbes. Unblessed by the easy optimism of the 
Enlightenment, he saw the fear of God as the beginning of wisdom, and the fear of each 
other as the motive behind the formation of the state.27  
I think this ambiguity of the definition was intentional on Hobbes’ part. In my mind,  
Hobbes even seems to be playing upon the perfectly pious “fear of the Lord” by equating it 
with superstition and phantasms.  
More troubling to readers (both modern and contemporaneous) in this passage is the 
dependence of “Religion” on public authority. Curley notes, “it surely does not bespeak 
                                                
24 Clarendon, Survey, pg. 21. 
25 See the discussion on 542. Hobbes’ response is almost a non sequitur. He does refer to Ecclesiastes as 
saying “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”.  
26 See Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pgs. 50–53. 
27 Glover, “God and Thomas Hobbes”, pg. 162.  
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much genuine religiosity to suggest that the distinction between religion and superstition 
depends on whether the state has authorized the tales causing that fear.”28 
While this is indeed a feature of Hobbes’ political philosophy that only the sovereign 
can declare what is allowable in terms of religion, this definition seems to make what counts 
as “religion” depend on potentially arbitrary fiat. Furthermore, Hobbes seems to leave 
himself open to a charge that a disallowed “superstition” may nevertheless be a “true 
imagination” and yet not count as “true religion.”—in other words, objectively true and 
politically disallowed. In any case, Hobbes uses the word “religion” in wider ways than 
compassed by this passage in other parts of Leviathan, so the definition here seems to be 
incomplete. Throughout the chapter on the passions, Hobbes seems to be exercising his wit 
to create pithy, sardonic definitions. (That dark humor fills Leviathan, making any answer 
difficult to find among the thorns). 
It is worth noting that this definition occurs in the discussion of the passions in 
general, and that specifically it follows immediately after the definition for “Curiosity”, which 
is: “a lust of the mind by that perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable 
generation of knowledge exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure” (L6.35/31, 
emphasis mine). The implication  seems to be that religious belief has a logical or topical 
connection with properly scientific curiosity as well as superstitious reasoning, and we shall see 
how both kinds of curiosity affect Hobbes’ view of religion. 
We can see condensed in this passage several of the pitfalls that confront the 
interpreter of Hobbes. While Hobbes often writes in English, he frequently uses terms in a 
different sense than a modern reader, often relying on translated technical terms from Latin 
                                                
28 Curley, “I durst not write so boldly”, pg. 524.  
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or implicitly using a theoretical model of the universe now considered outdated. If we are 
insufficiently attentive to this difficulty, we can miss (or even reverse) Hobbes’ point. 
Furthermore, Hobbes is a talented prose stylist, not averse to using rhetoric in his writing 
(especially in Leviathan).  Phrases can be used for emotional effect as much as for rigorous 
argumentation. A rhetorical flourish often leaps out from a passage disconnected from 
Hobbes’ main argument on the subject, confusing the reader as to whether it should be 
given weight. Overall, it can be difficult to tell which passages deserve emphasis.  It is one of 
my guiding beliefs that these asides are not throwaway passages that Hobbes later regretted 
or which swerved from his purpose. I believe they are windows into his intentions. I think 
they reveal, at times, a purely instrumental view toward religion. 
We should also consider what Hobbes means by “belief” and “faith”, as opposed to 
“knowledge” or “science”. Science is a “knowledge of all the consequences of names 
appertaining to the subject at hand” (L5.17/25). If we do not start from settled definitions 
we possess only opinion. If a person’s opinion  
beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth and of whose 
honesty in not deceiving he doubteth not, and then the discourse is not so much concerning 
the thing as the person, and the resolution is called BELIEF and FAITH; faith in the man; belief, 
both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions, one of 
the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. (L7.5/36). 
Hobbes is referring to all kinds of faith here, but he clearly has religion in mind. He 
draws the startling conclusion that “it is evident that whatsoever we believe upon no other 
reason than is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether they be sent 
from God or not, is faith in men only.” (L7.7/37). This kind of thinking, while not as 
important for a discussion of natural religion, is vitally important when we come to the 
discussion of sacred texts and prophecy later on. it has the profound effect of shifting all 
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second-hand discussions of truth to the hands of authorities – men who unlike other men, 
are given the full measure of the state’s trust.  
Hobbes has little confidence in arguments from authority. He criticizes those who 
rely too heavily on the opinions of others. Hobbes argues that “those men that take their 
instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation,” are “as much 
below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it.” 
(L4.13/19). He quips, “words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they 
are the money of fools, that value them by the word of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or 
any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.” (ibid.) One might be lead to believe that other 
important books might also be less than credible authorities as well.  
So we have reason to supposes that Hobbes finds fallible human causes for most if 
not all beliefs, fallible both cognitively and morally. That he does not seem to value faith 
very highly from the perspective of knowledge.   
With these cautions made, we can now turn to a discussion of the “seeds of religion” 
and discussion of the grounds for belief in God. 
1.1 God’s Existence 
In Leviathan, there are two ways that human beings come to have beliefs in the 
existence of God, corresponding to passion and reason, respectively. According to Hobbes, 
“reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as 
prudence is, but attained by industry” (L5.17/25). We must work hard to work from proper 
definitions and construct logical connections between using a rigorous method. This is not a 
natural gift of humankind. The average person is ruled by their passions and experiences.  
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Nevertheless, religion is peculiar to the human animal. Hence, in addition to a 
rational basis for believing in God, there must also be a psychological one as well. This basis 
must be sufficiently powerful to account for the overwhelming evidence of primitive 
religious belief of some kind on the one hand; it must also be sufficiently vague to allow for 
the incredible diversity of superstitions on the other. The psychological seeds of religious 
belief must also be defective in some way, because the rational argument serves as a 
corrective to irrational belief.  
Hobbes gives us a psychological argument for belief in the supernatural in four steps: 
1. Humans are naturally “inquisitive” as to the cause of events, but especially so with regard 
to “their own good and evil fortune” (L12.2/63).  
2. Humans naturally suppose all effects have some cause; all things being equal, humans 
will suppose the cause to be directly at hand or immediate. 
3. Many true causes evade the typical human being’s perception, “and when he cannot 
assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune for 
the most part are invisible) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy 
suggesteth, or trusteth to the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, 
and wiser than himself.” (L12.4/63) 
4. “The two first, make anxiety” says Hobbes (L12.5/63). Anxiety is a species of fear. And 
thus, “This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes (as 
it were in the dark), must needs have for object something. And therefore, when there is 
nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil fortune, but 
some power or agent invisible” (L12.6/64). The imaginative power of the human mind 
creates supernatural causes for everyday mysteries and imbues them with strange powers.  
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This is the most basic source of our ideas of the existence of supernatural forces. We 
can call this Hobbes’ “pathological theology”, with deliberate ambiguity.  
The following four observations give us a picture of the nature of “powers invisible” 
via this pre-rational method: 
1. Specious thinking often leads humans to act as if “invisible” meant “incorporeal.” By 
making this leap, humans concoct a spirit world alongside our own, teeming with 
magical forces and ghosts.   
2. Hobbes notes that “…men that know not what it is that we call causing (that is, almost all 
men) have no other rule to guess by but by observing and remembering what they have 
seen to precede the like effect at some other time, without seeing between the 
antecedent and subsequence event any dependence or connection at all; and hope for 
good or evil luck superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it” 
(L12.8/65). Arbitrary connections are made between unrelated phenomena and a host of 
irrational superstitions arises. These forces are not traced back to a unified, central 
power, but are considered to be numerous and diffuse. So much so that “there is almost 
nothing that has a name that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles” (L12.13/67). 
3. Worship towards these invisible entities takes the form of respect that humans accord 
one another. These invisible forces are subject to anthropomorphization. The powers are 
assumed to be like humans and are expected to act in a human way. They can be bribed, 
swayed by emotion, get angry, etc.   
4. Incidental happenings are seen as predictions for the future (“prognostics”). They are 
interpret as real causes. 
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“And in these four things…” writes Hobbes, “consisteth the natural seed of religion” 
(L12.11/66–67), the basis for all prescientific religion. Of these features, none resemble the 
components of a rational theology. They are unsystematic, polytheistic, and emotional. 
The end result of human passions is therefore a crude and primitive fear of “powers 
invisible”, an unflattering picture of absurd superstitions. These outlandish beliefs form the 
backbone of pagan religion. A great portion of Chapter xii is devoted to a seemingly endless 
catalog of the absurdities of pagan belief—“there is almost nothing that has a name that has 
not been esteemed among the Gentiles” (L12.13/67). The critique of pagan religion also has 
strong rhetorical ties to the “ghostly” practices of the Catholic Church, first and foremost, as 
well as other Christian sects. 
Despite the roughness of this “theology”, it seems to be the form of religion most 
natural to human beings, and the most common to find. Thus, it is worth stressing that the 
religious impulse, the belief in higher powers, is impossible to get around. These notions, 
“can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions may again be made 
to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation.” 
(L12.23/71). Such belief arises spontaneously and universally as the result of the natural 
action of our intellect, and so people recognize that this can be exploited. People will be apt to 
believe accounts of the supernatural that sound like this.  
While uncritical minds will naturally conjure up  (or accept tales of ) an array of 
invisible powers, the more scientifically-minded will discover the existence of God by 
another route.  
It does seem likely that both grounds for belief could inhere in the same person, 
thereby overdetermining a belief in God. A more invidious consequence of this 
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“collaboration” is the risk of contaminating rational theology with the disordered mess of 
superstition. To Hobbes, many of the things he found objectionable in the Catholic Church 
can be traced to this kind of contamination.  
In any case, a straightforward reading of Hobbes will suggest that religion is a 
necessary part of human life.  Yet, Hobbes did not intend his pathological explanation to be 
an actual proof for God’s existence. But while it is not strictly rational, it does have some 
rationality to it. After all, it is the pursuit of a chain of causes, however superficially 
conducted. It does support a conclusion (i.e., the existence of powerful divine forces) that 
Hobbes considers warranted and useful. We can rationalize our pursuit of causes into a 
scientific method, building on our natural curiosity to develop a sound theory. Furthermore, 
this religious impulse can be exploited by a sovereign, believer or otherwise. While it poses a 
risk, the religious impulse needs to be embraced by the state as a tool of organization and 
control (more on this later).  The political scientist simply cannot get around it. 
The crudeness of the psychological model, then, is contrasted with the elegance and 
rigor of the scientific-rational bases for belief in the existence of God.  (But it must also be 
said that the fullness and richness of the pathological view also contrasts with the empty 
formality of the rational view). Hobbes’ discussion of rational proof splits up into the two 
aspects we have already highlighted in his psychological theory—grounds for belief, and an 
account of the divine nature. I will address the divine nature in the next section.  
Traditionally, three main arguments for the existence of God have been made—(1) 
the cosmological (or “first mover”) argument, (2) the teleological argument (also called the 
argument from design), and (3) the ontological argument. The first two are a posteriori, 
reasoning from facts of experience (the chain of causes and the order of nature, respectively) 
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backward to the existence of God. The latter is a priori, arguing from the concept of God to 
his existence.  
In his article, “Hobbes’s Grounds for Belief in a Deity,” KC Brown makes the case 
that Hobbes employs both of the a posteriori proofs. 29  Following Brown’s lead, Ronald 
Hepburn cites texts that support the presence of all three of these proofs.30 While these two 
authors agree in substance on many of these issues, there is a degree of controversy about 
which argument is central to Hobbes’ account.  
Even the casual reader will discover several versions of the cosmological proof (1) in 
Leviathan. By contrast with the pre-scientific model,  
…the acknowledging  of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be 
derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several 
virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. 
(L12.6/64) 
This is a straightforward, rather unvarnished version of this proof, common among 
Scholastics and ultimately derived from Aristotle.31  It is the most amenable rational proof to 
our native inquisitiveness. The proof demonstrates the existence of a supreme being, albeit 
one still remote from the personal, Christian God. 
Critics have noted that Hobbes does not seem to have felt it necessary to provide 
more than this basic sketch of the cosmological proof. Sommerville writes, “Hobbes’ use of 
the [cosmological] argument was notable only for its lack of rigour.”32  The proof as-is does 
not specify whether the “first cause” is a temporal one (the beginning of time; a “first 
                                                
29 Brown, KC. “Hobbes’s grounds for belief in a deity”. Philosophy 37 (1962). 336–34. 
30 Hepburn, Ronald. “Hobbes on the knowledge of God.” In Hobbes and Rousseau: A collection of critical 
essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972. 85–108. 
31 In fact, Hobbes notes in the OL that this was obvious to the “sounder ancient philosophers” (64n2). This, 
as Curley notes, is a rare gesture of approval toward Ancient philosophy, specifically Aristotle.  
32 Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political ideas in historical context, pg. 138. 
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mover”) or whether it is a question of priority in terms of simultaneous causes. The latter is 
traditionally the more philosophically defensible, but the former does harmonize with the 
Christian account of Genesis and the Creation story.33 A passage in the Latin Leviathan 
suggests Hobbes might have gestured to the more sophisticated account normally deployed 
by the Schoolmen.34 But in general, Hobbes does not seem to have felt that anything deeper 
was required. 
Brown argues that the cosmological argument as presented is defective, and not just 
incomplete. He offers a passage in De Corpore where Hobbes seems to say exactly that. 
Hobbes argues that since we cannot realistically trace a chain of causes backward in time to 
their real beginning, what we end up doing is assuming that there is a first cause on the basis 
of our inquiry. This assumption is not a “demonstration” and it cannot be said to be 
invulnerable to skepticism thereby. Brown then takes this argument one step further.  
In a move that rebuffs conventional wisdom, Brown argues that despite the textual 
prominence of the cosmological proof, it is, in fact, subordinated to the teleological proof 
(2). Brown claims that Hobbes’ use of the word “cause” was ambiguous to him, but is not for 
contemporary readers. To Hobbes cause can be used in such a way as to have “no necessary 
connection with antecedent motion, or with temporal antecedence at all,”35 and to refer to a 
teleological ordering, whereas the modern reader nearly always makes the connection to 
temporal causation. This ambiguity, and Hobbes’ reluctance to deemphasize the apparent 
“geometric” straightforwardness of the cosmological argument conceals the logical priority 
of the teleological argument in his work. Brown provides three passages to support his claim 
                                                
33 See for instance, Martinich’s discussion in the Two Gods of Leviathan, 192–195. 
34 See Curley, 62, n. 4, where the notion of eternal, i.e. non-temporal, cause is used.  
35 Brown, p. 341. 
 24 
that the teleological argument is (a) present in Hobbes and (b) conceptually more important 
that the cosmological argument. The passage from Leviathan reads: “by the visible things of 
this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there us a cause of them, which men 
call God” (L11.25/62, italics inserted). The other two passages make similar claims.36  
Brown concludes, “There seems, in fact, no reason why the Argument from Design 
should be denied its proper place in Hobbes’s system.”37 That is, at the center of Hobbes’ 
proof strategy. 
But where Brown places the argument from design at the head of the class, Hepburn 
almost dismisses it as “brief, naively presented, and in no way defended against possible 
objections.”38 Referring to the passage Brown uses from Leviathan above (L11.25/62), he 
argues that, “it is hard to see Hobbes as giving any priority to the teleological aspect, since 
many more words, earlier in the same paragraph, are given to the argument from the regress 
of causal dependence.”39 Hepburn falls back to the standard position that the cosmological 
argument is central. All things considered, I am tempted to agree with him. Brown’s 
evidence is not ironclad; the most it does is to show that teleological concerns have a place 
in Hobbes, which Hepburn would not dispute. Certainly, Hobbes repetition of the 
cosmological argument does give it a kind of priority in his system.  
There are even grounds in the text for us to consider the ontological argument (3) as 
a strategy for rational proof employed by Hobbes. Hepburn observes that when Hobbes, 
“includes existence among the divine attributes,” this “carries Hobbes at least to the borders 
                                                
36 Brown, p. 342 
37 Brown, p. 343. 
38 Hepburn, p. 92 
39 Hepburn, p. 91. 
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of the Ontological Argument.”40 He provides the following passage in Leviathan to support 
this claim: “first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him existence. For no man can have 
the will to honor that which he thinks not to have any being” (L31.14/239).  But if Brown 
overestimated the teleology in Hobbes, Hepburn makes a symmetrical mistake here. If a 
charitable reader will admit that there is an ontological proof lurking behind the scenes, it is 
indubitably the case this is the least developed of the three arguments, and it seems to do the 
least work for Hobbes. Even Hepburn is forced to admit that Hobbes “hesitates” from 
giving a full-blown version of this proof. I include it for the purposes of completeness and 
not with any great conviction. Moreover, the passage in question is a practical discussion of 
natural worship, that is behavior toward God, not speculative theology. It is even a little 
humorous. Hobbes certainly knew the theology well enough to allude to the ontological 
argument, but that shouldn’t surprise us. Whether he was actually using it, is doubtful. 
The same textual confidence with regard to a rational proof (and the same terseness 
of presentation) is found in abbreviated form both in Chapter xi of the Elements and Chapter 
xv of De Cive. The latter declares succinctly: “God’s existence can be known by natural 
reason”.41 Elements provides its own sketch of a cosmological proof. 42 
Yet despite their repeat appearance in the political works, none of these proofs are 
novel nor articulated expertly. Nevertheless, “Hobbes constructed his philosophy of religion 
out of a theological materials that had a thoroughly respectable, indeed distinguished 
history.”43 Therefore, what Hobbes says about proving the existence of God was 
                                                
40 Hepburn, p. 90. 
41 De Cive, p. 164. 
42 Elements, xi, p. 64–65 
43 Hepburn, p. 87. 
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conventional enough to omit a complete, rigorous demonstration. In the final analysis, none 
of Hobbes’ proofs are sufficient to move the reader by themselves to believe there is a God, 
not should we assume they were intended that way. They are outlines or placeholders at best, 
referring the reader to more robust statements in the tradition. If Hobbes had any great 
personal interest in the proofs, he does not show it. Either he thinks the arguments too well-
trod, or perhaps he is just half-hearted about the whole project.  
The minor quibbles between the texts we have looked at so far give way to a deeper 
problem amongst interpreters. The account of the straightforward availability of a proof (or 
proofs) for God’s existence is directly challenged by a manuscript finally published in 1973. 
Since the MS had no title, that supplied by its English editors is Thomas White’s “De Mundo” 
Examined.44  This is a Latin work, undisputedly written by Hobbes, which was lost for 
centuries. It is a bona fide instance of that shocking discovery just waiting to be found in an 
archive. Hobbes gave apparently gave it to his friend Pierre Gassendi to edit, and they both 
promptly forgot about it. The book is a detailed, but incomplete, criticism of a work by 
Hobbes’ acquaintance, the Jesuit Thomas White, who was an Aristotelian of sorts. This work 
is commonly referred to in the secondary literature as Anti-White. I will stick to this practice, 
as it sums up Hobbes’ intentions more succinctly than the alternative.  
Aside from its bizarre publishing history, what is remarkable is that in Anti-White, 
which was written in 1643 (a year after De Cive was published, and probably being drafted at 
the same time), Hobbes seems to adopt a full-blown “fideist” approach to the question of 
God’s existence, claiming that natural reason/philosophy and the truths of religion cannot 
                                                
44 Hobbes, Thomas. Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined. Trans. Harold Whitmore Jones. London: 
Bradford University Press, 1976.  
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be reconciled.45 Some truths exist outside the power of our reason to fathom, yet we should 
accept them wholeheartedly and uncritically. Fideism in its strongest form rejects any sort of 
natural theology. There are more moderate forms that embrace a severely constrained 
natural theology along with an account of “mysteries” beyond human understanding. Some 
things must be taken on faith alone. As we have seen Calvin, Luther, and Aquinas all seem to 
fall into this camp. 
There are certainly  passages in Leviathan that have a fideist slant.  
For instance, discussing the miracles of the bible, Hobbes writes: 
When anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate 
our understanding to the words, and not to labor in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, 
of such mysteries as are incomprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. 
(L32.3/246).  
These are allusions to weak fideism, and they do not entirely reject the power of 
reason to discern some truths about God, especially his existence. They specifically occur in 
the context not of natural theology, but in the sphere of revealed religion. Hepburn, writing 
well before the publication of Anti-White, saw fit to observe, “Serious though fideism is as a 
theological approach, Hobbes himself cannot be said to have made strenuous efforts to 
ground and justify his version of it, far less to have succeeded.”46  
Chapter 26 of Anti-White (dealing with De Mundo’s argument for the existence of 
God) contains several statements that caution the would-be philosopher to abstain from 
scrutinizing religious truths, going so far as to suggest that since these philosophical attempts 
                                                
45 For a discussion of 17th Century fideism as it relates to Hobbes, see Richard Tuck, Hobbes, 80–84. Tuck 
cites Hobbes’ acquaintance, the influential Anglican theologian Chillingworth as a possible inspiration for 
Hobbes’ understanding of the relationship between faith and reason.  
46 Hepburn, p. 104 
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to prove God’s existence are doomed to fail, and that all such attempts can do is undermine 
faith.  
For instance, Hobbes asserts that philosophy disenchants faith, and this is inimical to 
religion: 
Therefore as soon as any proposition is demonstrated it is no longer an article of faith but it 
is a theorem in philosophy…as philosophy is acquired, so to the same degree is faith 
eroded…when the articles of faith desert religion for philosophy, religion cannot but be 
gradually weakened.47  
The passage suggests that either (a) Hobbes believes the erosion of religion by 
science is bad and therefore is comfortable building a wall between truths of science and 
dogmas of faith (fideism), or (b) that Hobbes sees the inverse relationship between science 
and religion in neutral or positive terms. Of course, he could not come out and announce his 
support for (b). Certainly, the preponderant opinion amongst his peers would be to see the 
passage in terms of fideism. 
The straightforward confidence Hobbes displays elsewhere (and at the same time as 
this writing) in the possibility of proving God’s existence is rejected, in favor of the 
following: 
Up to now, some have declared that they have demonstrated the existence of God, the 
Creation of the world, and the immortality of the human soul. Their reasonings, however, 
have only lead weak men (such is the nature of the masses) to consider these things false, 
because the people who wished them to be true could not show that they were. 48 
Reason has failed and will fail to provide proof. Adhering to this strategy is 
potentially disastrous for the faithful. A wise man would be best to submit to the proper 
                                                
47 Anti-White, 306. 
48 Ibid., 307. 
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authorities on such a matter, and not air his vain attempts to prove God’s existence in 
public.  
Hobbes also casts doubt on the fruitfulness of unrestricted inquiry, observing that 
when it questions articles of faith it creates an uncomfortable friction between philosophy 
and faith. The latter is certain to suffer in this case, perhaps with dire consequences. A 
philosopher in the course of inquiry 
…will stumble upon a proposition that is now held by the Christian faith and that seems to 
contradict a conclusion he has established earlier…But he cannot conclude that it is false; 
for how can anyone know whether a proposition is true or false that he does not 
understand?  Whoever, then, has flowed this way of proceeding will not impinge upon the 
Church’s  authority…nor, in sum, will he, in his efforts to buttress his creed, have to 
contrive unsuitable arguments, and paralogisms. These two last may cause him to impair 
both his own and others’ faith.49  
All three of these passages seem to be strongly fideist in outlook. They highlight the 
insufficiency of reason when it comes to theological matters. They warn of the dangers of 
vain philosophers. They display a willingness to interrupt free philosophical inquiry in favor 
of stable religious doctrine. The passages do so more explicitly and more forcefully than 
elsewhere in the corpus.  
A discussion from De Corpore (“On Matter”) on the proper domains of philosophy 
and theology respectively is also relevant here. The work was published in 1655, but the 
passage may be much older.50 In Chapter I, Hobbes writes:  
The subject of Philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive 
any generation… and therefore, where there is no generation or property, there is no 
philosophy. Therefore it excludes Theology, I mean the doctrine of God, eternal, ingenerable, 
                                                
49 Ibid., pp. 307–308. 
50 De Corpore was part of Hobbes’ three-part philosophical system (Elements of Philosophy): of matter (1), 
of man (2), and on the citizen (3). Hobbes had been working on the project for years before its publication, 
and many passages may date from the early 1640’s. See Tuck’s discussion in “Hobbes and Descartes” , pp. 
18–26. 
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incomprehensible, and in whom there is nothing neither to divide nor compound, nor any 
generation to be conceived.51 
Since God is not generated or subject to change, the philosopher has no business 
looking into theology.  
Thus, to summarize: In Anti-White, Hobbes seems to say that there is not and cannot 
be a proof for the existence of God. Leviathan definitely says there are such proofs, and it is 
rather easy for a thinking person to come upon them. We have a paradox. Further confusion 
arises when we consider the development of the ideas to proceed in a flip-flop fashion: 
rationalist (Elements, written 1640, De Cive, 1642), fideist (Anti-White, 1643), rationalist 
(Leviathan, 1651), fideist (De Corpore, published 1655).  
How then do we reconcile the explicitly fideist stance of Anti-White and De Corpore 
with the confident natural theology found in the political works, especially when there is 
little temporal (and presumably, intellectual) distance between De Cive and Anti-White? There 
are several candidates for an explanation. 
A knee-jerk response (1) might be to claim that Hobbes simply changed his mind on 
the relationship between natural reason and the belief in God’s existence. This seems 
unlikely, given both the proximity of Anti-White’s composition date to De Cive and the return 
to natural theology in Leviathan. The fideist position, sandwiched as it is between two, 
identical positions that seemingly contradict it, seems to have too little room to breathe. The 
switch back to fideism in De Corpore also seems inexplicable in this light, especially given the 
characteristic stubbornness of this author.  
                                                
51 De Corpore, Ch. i, in Elements, 192. 
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I also dismiss the position that Hobbes simply couldn’t decide what he believed or 
that he didn’t take the question seriously. Hobbes was as a decisive a thinker as we have 
seen, and clearly, he did take the issue seriously enough to spend time thinking and writing 
about it (2).  
By rejecting these two interpretations, another recourse is to simply doubt the sincerity 
of one or both of these positions (3). Curley draws the following conclusion, “I suggest that 
AntiWhite is rather an experiment with a certain kind of position, an attempt to work out 
what sort of position on natural religion it would be best for him [Hobbes] to take when he 
decided to discuss those issues in public.”52 Curley’s argument is that Hobbes did not care 
about which position he adopted, save for how it impacted his wider political reception. This 
claim is part of Curley’s wider thesis that Hobbes cannot be regarded as a devout religious 
believer at all (a position I will consider in greater depth in the next Part). I have great 
sympathy with Curley’s wider position that Hobbes often “wrote between the lines” and that 
his true thoughts about religion are at once hard to determine and probably unkind. I do 
think Curley may have rushed to judgment on this issue, perhaps. Consider an alternative. 
This alternative (4) is found in Arrigo Pacchi’s article, “Hobbes and the Problem of 
God.” Pacchi aims to “reject the supposed contrast between Hobbes’s enunciation of 
arguments for God’s existence, and the fideistic skepticism somehow underlying his 
philosophical thinking”—in others words, to resolve the paradox identified above.53   
Pacchi’s argument begins by showing that for Hobbes, the hypothetical assumption of 
a “primary cause” is a natural conclusion for a natural scientist. In this light, we can see that 
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the “proofs” of God’s existence (or the allusions to such a proof) in the political writings, 
“are not ‘arguments’ in the theological sense, but only remarks about the feelings which a 
student of natural causes of phenomena necessarily inclines.”54 The proofs suffice as 
“reassurance” that our belief in the lawlike system of nature “is really well grounded.”55 On 
their own, they are insufficient for religious belief, and they require supplementation by 
properly theological authority.  
Pacchi’s conclusion is the following: “Hobbes’s philosophy and Hobbes’s theology 
give us two different images of God: the philosophical God is the final, purely supposed 
term of a chain of material causes, the merely hypothetical conclusion at which natural 
reason arrives in its conditional proceeding from experience of facts; on the other hand, the 
God of Leviathan is the biblical God, a physically personal and theologically identified being 
which stimulates and warrants any orderly human society and is the unavoidable reference 
for political theory.”56  
These two pictures of the deity are not mutually reducible; but they are 
complementary. But it is important to note that in the picture Pacchi gives us, one is always 
subordinate to the other. Philosophy fails at a certain point, according to this reading of 
Hobbes,  and faith steps in—“If philosophy refers man to faith, theology picks up the 
hint.”57  
I think Pacchi has shown the way to resolve the apparent contradiction. Hobbes 
would have no trouble believing in an abstract principle that was highly probable (but not 
                                                
54 Ibid., 180 
55 Ibid., 181 
56 Ibid., 186.  
57 Ibid., 186 
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certain) that assured the natural scientist that the universe was well-ordered. Such uncertainly 
is acceptable: “No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to 
come.” (L7.3/35). Calling the probable outcome of a regression of causes “God” is not 
much of a theological statement. Such an argument is quiet on whether such a guarantor is 
an object of worship at all. The thinking man will accept the cold comfort of the 
philosopher’s god.  
Fideism’s proper place in Hobbes’ system is in revealed theology. But here is where I 
think Curley’s intuitions about insincerity again become relevant. I believe fideism sits well 
with Hobbes’ political theory, and becomes an extremely valuable intellectual tool for the 
sovereign. It encourages subjects to swallow contradictions whole should they arise, without 
disturbing the peace. But we will have to consider these issues later.    
1.2 The Divine Nature 
In any case, if we can grant that for Hobbes that a high degree of confidence (but 
not certainty) in God’s existence is warranted by natural reason, there is not much more that 
can be known about God’s nature. While “it is impossible to make any profound inquiry 
into natural causes without being inclined to believe there is one God eternal” it remains the 
fact that human beings “cannot have any idea in their mind answerable to his nature” 
(L11.25/62) Hobbes elaborates:  
For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and 
being brought to war himself by the same, may easily conceive and assure himself that there 
is somewhat there, which men call fire and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot 
imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they that see it; so also, by 
the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a 
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cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. 
(L11.25/62)58 
Recall that for Hobbes, ideas are images derived from sensation, and that there are no innate 
ideas in Hobbes’ empiricist epistemology. Especially as regards natural theology, there is no 
direct experience of God. We must subsist on reasonable conjecture. Martinich sums this up 
nicely, “The reason Hobbes thinks that humans can have no idea of God is that all human 
ideas are analyzable or reducible to sensations and that God cannot be sensed.”59 
Since we can have no proper idea of God, we are forced to be careful when we speak 
of the divine nature. We can say that God exists. But specifying the divine nature is a 
different matter. 
The best statement of this position in Leviathan is the following: 
He that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must either 
use such negative attributes (as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible) or superlatives (as most high, most 
great, and the like), and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is (for that were 
to circumscribe him with the limits of our fancy,) but how much we admire him, and how 
ready we would be to obey him, which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honor him as 
much as we can. For there is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that 
is, I AM; and but one name of his relation to us, and that is, God, in which is contained 
Father, King, and Lord. (L31.28/240)  
It is crucial that, “in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the 
signification of philosophical truth, but the signification of pious intention, to do him the 
greatest honor we are able” (L31.33/241).  By being self-consciously non-literal, we can 
avoid the traps of Scholastic reasoning.  
We can also avoid causing a public scandal, which in its original meaning, is 
“Something that hinders reception of the faith or obedience to the Divine law; an occasion 
                                                
58 The metaphor of the blind man and fire is a recurring one with early roots. It first shows up in Hobbes’ 
objections to Descartes’ Meditations  and makes a repeat appearance in the Elements, Ch xi.2.   
59 Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pg. 186. The argument holds true whether or not Hobbes is read 
sincerely or not.  
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of unbelief or moral lapse; a stumbling-block”.60 Disputing these matters in public, within 
earshot of the multitude, seems to be what Hobbes has most in mind here. He seems to be 
less inclined to regulate the speculative arguments of scientists and philosopher conducted 
behind closed doors. 
This inability to speak meaningfully of God is often referred to as “negative 
theology,” so-called because one is justified primarily in saying only what God is not, as 
opposed to what he is. In one form or another this account of the divine nature runs 
throughout Hobbes’ political works. By taking this position, Hobbes finds himself along 
with many mainstream theologians. AP Martinich notes that this position places Hobbes in 
fairly orthodox company, “to affirm the incomprehensibility of God was standard among 
both medieval and modern Christian thinkers”.61 
But in addition to its orthodox pedigree, 62  the account fits well with what we can 
call Hobbes’ anti-realist epistemology and with his nominalist account of language.63  
“Realism” in the sense I am using it here is an epistemological position which says 
that the sources of our experience (the “things in themselves”) directly resemble our 
experiences of them, under normal circumstances, that is, most of the time. There is a  
regular, lawlike correspondence between the thing in itself and our perception of that thing. 
Aristotle is said to be the chief proponent of this position, and it is the fundamental 
                                                
60 Oxford English Dictionary, online.  
61 Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, pg. 191–2. 
62 It is surprising how many of Hobbes’ materialist positions can be linked to “orthodox” theological 
positions. A whole school of thought exists that interprets Hobbes in an increasingly mainstream Christian 
light. See AP Martinich, Two Gods of Leviathan, for a sustained argument along these lines. We will 
consider the relationship of determinism and predestination in the next chapter, with less optimism about 
Hobbes’ orthodoxy.  
63 See the discussions of Hobbes’ science in Tuck, Hobbes (especially p. 40–50), “Hobbes and Descartes,” 
and in the Introduction to his edition of Leviathan.  
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supposition of pre-modern scientific thought. In fact, it is arguable that the epistemological 
dimension of Modernity first comes about precisely when realism is rejected.64  
 Hobbes, along with thinkers like Descartes and Kant, is an anti-realist because he 
denies the basic tenet of realism. He holds that there is no necessary relationship of similarity 
between the cause of our sensations and the sensations themselves—“the object is one 
thing, the image or fancy is another” (7). By denying the necessity of the autonomous 
universe’s similarity to our own experience, Hobbes opens up a skeptical gap in our 
perception. Even what appears to be indubitable in our experience can be misguided. Our 
impression of God, derived from empirical data, may be flatly wrong. We could very well be 
like that blind man who supposes the existence of fire that Hobbes repeatedly refers to. The 
parallels with Kant and his discussion of the thing-in-itself are relevant here, especially his 
cautions about the impossibility of “intuiting” the noumenal, and the dangers of 
“enthusiasm”—believing one has seen the noumenal.  
A similar skeptical conclusion follows from Hobbes’ nominalist claims about words. 
He argues that there is “nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are 
every one of them individual and singular” (17). He further claims that “true and false are 
attributes of speech, not things” (18). There is a gap, then, between speech and the thing it 
names. There are no “natural kinds”, labels metaphysically printed on things that tell us what 
                                                
64 Tuck, “Hobbes and Descartes”, pg. 28–29. Tuck argues that the birth of Modern philosophy occurred 
when philosophers embraced the skeptical critique of Aristotle’s realism, but sought to move beyond doubt 
into something positive. The answer was to try and find truth in experience, not in the things themselves.  
Tuck argues that many of the early Moderns were anxious to demonstrate that they had discovered this shift 
from things to perception. It may account for some of the acrimony between Hobbes and Descartes. 
Ultimately, Tuck argues that the honor belongs to Galileo.  
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they are and into which category they belong. Names, both particular and universal, are 
human inventions.65 
While the process of assigning names to things is not completely arbitrary, Hobbes 
does seem to allow for the process to be flawed. One false move, and “errors of definitions 
multiply themselves as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities” (19). Words 
are the currency of both the wise and the foolish, without them no one can be exceptionally 
insightful or remarkably daft (19). 
Hobbes’ negative theology is also corroborated by his dismissal of the notion that we 
have an (adequate) idea of infinity. He writes: 
Whatsoever we imagine is finite…When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we 
are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of 
the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us 
conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are unconceivable), but 
that we may honor him. (15)  
This passage does not seem to foreclose the possibility that genuine infinity exists, 
but only that we cannot conceive of it accurately or perceive it directly. In other words, we 
cannot imagine God except incompletely. Hence, since God is outside of human 
understanding, we must be delicate in the way we discuss Him. We must be careful not to 
press too hard on our inadequate conceptions, and project an anthropomorphism onto God. 
But this temptation, as we have seen, is part of our psychic makeup. Perhaps only the 
philosophic few can truly think clearly.  
                                                
65 Hobbes does waver a little on this point, arguing that “The first author of speech was God himself, that 
instruct Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight”, implying that there are natural 
kinds and that humanity had clear knowledge of them at one point. But Hobbes notes he does “not find 
anything in Scripture out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that Adam was taught the 
names of all figures, numbers, measures, color, sounds, fancies, much less the names of words and speech” 
(L4.1/16). Hobbes uses the tower of Babel as a way to return to nominalism, and subsequently never 
returns to the Edenic use of language. 
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Another benefit of the position of negative theology, in my mind far more 
important, is its political implications. By giving us very little to say about God on the basis 
of our individual reason, Hobbes pushes questions about God into the realm of revelation. 
On the face of it, this is a fairly traditional move. But when we consider in detail that 
Hobbes’ account of revelation hinges almost entirely on sovereign interpretation, then 
negative theology only further empowers the position of the sovereign to make rules about 
religion. There is no effective, independent standpoint from which to argue about God with 
the sovereign.  
Therefore, there are sound philosophical reasons native to Hobbes’ system, and not 
just arguments from authority, for him to adopt this stance.  
Nevertheless,  if we adopt Pacchi’s suggestion that there are two “Gods” in 
Leviathan, we need to nuance this account of negative theology. Certainly, the God that is 
warranted by rational inquiry seems to possess certain real attributes, the primary of which is 
the omnipotence to order the universe. Of course, this need only be a methodological 
assumption, a condition for the possibility of doing science, a fact of reason, etc.66 It need 
not be elevated to the position of knowledge. The rules of negative theology apply fully to the 
God of worship, not the God of cosmological order. One seems personal, the other 
impersonal, almost a mere principle. 
The resulting picture inspires Richard Tuck to claim that, “Hobbes’s idea of a natural 
religion can fairly be described as ‘deist’”.67 By “deist” Tuck is referring to the “Divine 
Watchmaker” model, where the Supreme Being orders the universe according to inflexible 
                                                
66 Kant’s observations on knowledge are surprisingly helpful when it comes to Hobbes.  
67 Tuck, Hobbes, 80.  
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natural laws and lets it progress without directly intervening. I agree with Tuck on this. The 
God of Hobbes’ natural theology is omnipotent, but distant—there is no basis from natural 
reason alone to assume that divine intervention has or will occur. Furthermore, as regards 
his revealed theology, Hobbes claims that miracles have ceased, and that the only 
supernatural events to come are those of the Final Judgment, which seems to be a long way 
off. So even with revelation included, Hobbes seems to leave us in an effectively deistic world.  
However, the following passage from Leviathan may dispute the deist interpretation: 
“they who attributing (as they think) ease to God take from him the care of mankind, take 
from him his honor” (L31.17/239). The suggestion is that denying God’s active involvement 
in the affairs of human beings is blasphemous and since a deist interpretation denies 
miraculous intervention, then deism is blasphemous.68  
I think we can deflate the controversy if we note three things about the ambiguities 
of this supposed counterevidence. First, we can observe that saying God cannot intervene in 
history would be attributing a lack of power to Him. This would violate Hobbes’ 
commitment to a negative theology. The deist interpretation could consistently maintain that 
God does not intervene, which is different from claiming he cannot. Since Hobbes argues later 
that miracles have ceased occurring, this interpretation can hold for the present. Humanity 
currently subsists between the time of past miracles and the time of future miracles; physics 
is effectively deist in this age. The fact that this is politically convenient on both theoretic 
and concrete levels for Hobbes should not be surprising. Besides, we must not press too 
                                                
68 See, for instance, the discussion in David Wootton’s “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe”, especially pp. 
84–7. 
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much about God’s nature anyways. Our intention, according to Hobbes, is to honor, not to 
comprehend.  
Second, the passage does not mention miraculous intervention per se, but the “care 
of mankind”. This is more like denying that God cares for human beings at all, which would 
be to declare God unmerciful or apathetic or some other insult. This sort of disparagement 
is ruled out by Hobbes’ theological stance. The universe can “care” for human beings in all 
sorts of non-interventionist, merely supportive ways, for instance ensuring that the universe 
continues to exist and operate smoothly.  Moreover, if God’s role is to sustain the universe 
from instant to instant (as in Descartes’ Third Meditation, to note a leading contemporaneous 
example, later carried into the modern era by Levinas), then God plays an active role in the 
care of the universe (and mankind), even if this care is only according to well-established 
rules of physics, etc. 
Third, the scope of the term atheist in Hobbes’s time most commonly included the 
denial of providence. In fact, “The link between atheism and immorality was believed to be 
so close that it was almost universally assumed that anyone who denied God’s providence 
must be immoral”.69 On could say, that “Someone who admits the existence of God, but 
denies that God has any concern for human beings, will be no better than one who simply 
denies the existence of God.”70 Hobbes might have been anxious in this context to avoid any 
semblance of denying an active providence, because that was such an audacious step. So he 
included a caution against denying providence to spare himself some grief.  
                                                
69 Wootton, David, “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe”, History Workshop 20 (1985: Autumn), 82–100, pg. 86. 
70 Curley, n2, Leviathan, pp. 234–5. 
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One might be tempted to say that “Hobbes never displayed what we might call a true 
religious sensibility, that if he did believe in God, it was in a remote, abstract, intellectualized 
deity who could give little comfort to Hobbes’s contemporaries.”71 Ultimately, I think the 
deist label is more or less accurate when it comes to Hobbes’ primary beliefs about the 
nature of the universe. His attempts to deflect criticism on these matters seem to be 
prudential. 
This reluctance to speak literally of God’s attributes does not prevent Hobbes from 
arguing against the possibility of God doing wrong. God possesses the Divine Right to all 
things. Hobbes argues, 
the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to 
God Almighty, not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent, and though punishment be 
due for sin only (because by that word is understood affliction for sin), yet the right of 
afflicting is not always derived from men’s sin, but from God’s power. (236) 
The Divine Right is merely the Right of Nature coupled with unlimited power.72 
Curley comments on this passage that “Hobbes’ position in this paragraph resembles 
the voluntarism we find in Reformation theologians like Luther and Calvin, who hold that 
God’s will determines what is right.”73  The following passage in Calvin is clear enough: 
For God’s will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the 
very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous. When, therefore, one asks why God 
has so done, we must reply: because he has willed it. But if you proceed further to ask why 
                                                
71 Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, pg. 44. 
72 “The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use 
his own power, as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and 
consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptests 
means thereunto.” (L14.1/79). Now take away fear of death and any other limitations.  
73 Leviathan, pg. 237, n6. In a move consistent with his Anti-Hellenism, Hobbes does provide an answer to 
the question of the Euthyphro, although not the answer Socrates seems to be fishing for.   
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he so willed, you are seeking something greater and higher than God’s will, which cannot be 
found.74 
Of course, this theological voluntarism, where God’s will is primary, rather than his 
intellect or other faculties, when viewed from the correct angle, is just a special case of 
Hobbes’ wider political voluntarism, where the will of the sovereign is chief among all things. 
God is like the sovereign of a country; in the same way the sovereign’s acts of will must be 
followed because he is the sovereign, so, on a much grander scale, God’s will makes law for 
the universe. The sovereign (a Mortal God) can commit no injustice, because his word is 
law; God is the same. The overwhelming force of a worldly sovereign is nothing compared 
to the limitless might of the Deity. Oakeshott situates Hobbes’ political theory under the 
“master-conception” of “Will and Artifice,” drawing attention to this very theme in 
Hobbes.75  
It is no accident that Hobbes’ discussion of the book of Job follows immediately 
after the section on God’s unfettered Right to rule. The undeserved misery of Job has 
presented a conundrum for theologians committed to a belief in God’s benevolence. A 
common response in the Reformation (Luther, Calvin) was to argue that God’s will makes 
an action right, however hardhearted it seems to mortals. Hobbes uses Job’s story in a 
similar way, to bolster the point regarding the justice of any divine action, however 
seemingly cruel or arbitrary. To those who challenge God’s justice, he can ask, “Where wast 
thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.”76 
                                                
74 Calvin, Jean. Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book III, Ch. XXIII, §2. Calvin does goes on to argue 
that God’s reasons for willing in such a way are inscrutable to the mortal mind. Calvin clearly did not have 
Hobbes’ idea of sovereignty in mind, but the two do link up with their emphasis on the role of the (Divine) 
sovereign’s will as primary. 
75 Oakeshott, “Introduction”, pg. 8. 
76 Job 38:4 (King James Version). 
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Hobbes thus advances a cold-blooded theodicy common among theologians of his 
time. There is no evil in the world that comes from God, because God’s will makes an action 
right. Hobbes’ position is unique because it flows from a fully developed theory of 
sovereignty, mapped onto divine power as its paradigmatic example. It serves his political 
ends and his earthly goals.  
While we have emphasized the support that Hobbes’ negative theology draws from 
his philosophical outlook, it should also be clear that there are tensions with the rest of that 
system as well. Here I want to briefly consider two objections arising from other parts of 
Hobbes’ system. The first is a result of Hobbes’ materialist position (a). The second has to 
do with Hobbes’ suspicion towards metaphorical speech (b).  
(a) There are several complications with this figurative, non-literal view of the Divine 
Nature and Hobbes’ explicit commitment to a materialist ontology. The latter seemingly 
forces us by a strict chain of reasoning to envision God as material, and consequently as far 
more limited (and definite) than we would have initially granted.77  
Hobbes observes in the prefatory remarks to Chapter 34 of Leviathan: 
For the universe, being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also 
body, nor anything properly a body that is not also part of (that aggregate of all bodies) the 
universe. (261) 
A passage immediately following this one strengthens this point, and concludes, 
“that the proper signification of spirit in common speech, is either a subtle, fluid, and 
invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination” (262).  In other 
                                                
77 See Curley’s review of Hobbes’ texts in his “I durst not write so boldy”, pp. 582–8.Curley maintains that 
in the Anti-White, Hobbes seems to grant the validity of dualism. 
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words, spirits are either like the air (thin and subtle, but nonetheless material) or they are 
hallucinations, virtual images, etc. with no real existence. 78   
Is God, then, a material thing to Hobbes? Yes. This seems to follow logically from 
what has been said throughout the book, and in fact, Hobbes explicitly draws this conclusion 
in the third Appendix to the Latin Leviathan (albeit through the device of an interlocutor in a 
dialogue).79 The speaker, “B,” claims: “He [Hobbes, presumably] affirms, of course, that 
God is a body” (L.App3.6/540).  B goes on: 
“We all are, and are moved in God”—these are the words of the apostle. Be we all have 
quantity. Can a being which has quantity be in what does not have quantity? God is great, 
but it is impossible to understand greatness without a body. (541) 
Aside from the frankness of the passage, what is truly astonishing is that the stunning 
(supposed) confession of Hobbes’ greatest sin in the eyes of his contemporaries has been 
buried so long in a text that didn’t see English translation until 1991!80 This bold admission 
brings with it attendant difficulties. Among Hobbes’ contemporaries, to argue that the 
universe was solely matter was akin to atheism. God was clearly spirit; matter was not; to 
deny the existence of spirit was to deny the existence of God. Matter was by definition finite, 
localized, capable of alteration and division, etc., properties which were inconsistent with the 
Godhead. Something material could be bounded and limited, which is precisely the inverse 
                                                
78 See Samuel Mintz’s enlightening discussion of Hobbes’ materialism in The Hunting of Leviathan, 
especially Chapter IV.  
79 Curley points this out in the Introduction to his version of Leviathan: “Hobbes makes it difficult to 
ascribe any idea expressed in the Appendix to him personally by writing a dialogue between two characters 
identified in only the most colorless way, as ‘A’ and ‘B.’ Prima facie, we are barred from identifying either 
of these people with Hobbes by the fact that they refer to Hobbes in the third person. Since A is usually 
asking the questions and B is usually giving the answers, it’s natural to think that B must nevertheless be 
Hobbes. But A is permitted to make good points and raise provocative questions. One aim in using the 
dialogue form seem to be to prevent us from being certain which character represents Hobbes, if any does 
(cf. xlvi, 42). It makes a nice puzzle” (Curley, xlvii). One need not be as Straussian in their outlook on 
Hobbes as Curley is to see this; Hobbes the slippery rhetorician seems to lead the reader to this sort of thing 
naturally.  
80 I share Curley’s lamentation of this fact (see xlvi of his Introduction). 
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of God. Bramhall puts it succinctly, “That there is no incorporal spirit, is the main root of 
Atheisme, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up.”81 
Hobbes is willing to bite that bullet, however, remarking of God that “I leave him to 
be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal.”82 
Modern readers also find materialism and theology tough to reconcile. Hepburn, for 
instance, points to an unresolved tension in Hobbes’ account of God’s action in the world: 
“He writes of God as a being whose transcendence of our experience is so thoroughgoing 
that we can only bow the knee and utter words without truth value; but he writes of God 
also as a being whose immanence, whose continuity with the world, is so thoroughgoing that 
he becomes a natural cause among causes.”83 
Curley believes that he identifies a deeper (and more well-defined) problem resulting 
from Hobbes materialism and his account of God, one that gets picked up and repeated in 
other places in the literature. Consider those two passages (mentioned above) from Leviathan 
as premises:  
1. The universe is the aggregate of all bodies (Ch. xxxiv) 
2. God is a body (Appendix iii) 
When brought together, we are apparently faced with a dilemma:   
3. “Therefore, God is identical either [α] with the whole of the universe or [β] with a part 
of it”84 
                                                
81 Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, 121.  
82 Hobbes, An Answer to Bishop Bramhall, EW, IV, 313. I thank Curley for calling this passage to my 
attention.  
83 Hepburn, p. 108 
84 Curley, “I durst not write so boldly”, 587, the brackets are mine; Curley claims to have derived this 
argument from Leo Strauss. 
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If we choose [α], then God is synonymous with the universe (a form of pantheism) 
and the universe has no cause. This, as the argument goes, is equivalent to atheism. If, on the 
contrary,  we choose [β], we seemingly make God finite.  This, also is a form of atheism, a 
denial of God’s omnipotence.  
Hobbes seems to reject the pantheism of alternative [α]: “For by God is understood 
the cause of the world; and to say the world is God is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no 
God” (L31.15/239).  Hence, it seems we must choose [β], an equally unsatisfactory choice, 
and one at odds with Hobbes’ own statements on the matter.  
One way out of the difficulty might be to exploit the ambiguity of “finite” in 
alternative [β]. Finite here can mean “localized in space” or it can mean “less than almighty”. 
“Localized in space” does not necessarily mean “incapable of perceiving the entire universe” 
nor does it mean “incapable of acting on the whole universe” either. Zeus was thought to be 
king of the Greek gods, but he lived in a certain place and inhabited a particular body. If we 
accept the terms of the argument, this seems to be the best we can do: that God is localized 
in space. This is clearly unsatisfactory, given Hobbes’ clear and repeated declarations that any 
attribution of place implies that “whatsoever is in place is bounded and finite” (241)—that is, 
not omnipotent. The way Curley wants out is to reject the existence of God altogether, and 
he reads Hobbes as setting up just this sort of dilemma to lead his more attentive readers to 
water.  
I think an important problem is with the way the argument is framed. We should 
always be careful when trying to talk literally about the divine under the preconditions 
Hobbes sets for us. He maintains that “disputing of God’s nature is contrary to his honor” 
(241).   Quibbling about the extent of God’s infinity is one of those situations where the 
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confident philosopher will crash into a truth of religion (like the passage in Anti-White 
anticipates). Hobbes’ response here is to insist the philosopher stop and concede that he 
doesn’t understand the proposition fully, and to let it lie. It is above our reason. And by the 
way, listen to the sovereign when he tells you that! 
There are other, more rationalist alternatives. Two come to mind. The first is that the 
God of the cold, material universe is merely is hypothetical unity under a scheme of physical 
laws. God is not a person, “He” is a principle. This sits well with Pacchi’s suggestions above. 
Another argument would be to see God as both infinite and material, but so subtle that He 
permeates all other matter. The rest of universe floats in, and is saturated by, the fluid that is 
God.  
(b) The final difficulty I want to consider in negative theology arises when we 
examine the kinds of speech we are supposed to use in reference to God and Hobbes’ 
explicit comments on language in Chaper iv (“Of Speech”) of Leviathan. Early on, Hobbes 
identifies metaphorical speech as one of four abuses to which language is vulnerable, 
because it can easily lead to deception (intentional or otherwise). He repeats this criticism in 
the next Chapter, alluding to “metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures” (25) as the 
cause of “absurd conclusions” (24) in ratiocination. Admittedly, “these are less dangerous” 
than other abuses of speech, “because they profess their inconstancy,” but there is still a risk 
of taking them literally (22).  
But Hobbes is inconsistent in his criticism of metaphor. One needn’t look further 
than the title of his masterpiece to see metaphor at work. Hobbes uses metaphors when he 
wants to, whether to ridicule his enemies or to interpret the Bible. He criticizes them when 
they don’t do what he wants. They seem to lead to abuse only when other people use them. 
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Ultimately, I do think Hobbes accepted the likelihood of some proof for the 
existence of an impersonal God. But I do not think he held this being in greater esteem than 
the wonder and awe a true scientist feels for the natural world (no small amount, of course, 
but short of worship). Hobbes does recognize that religion is much wider than realizing the 
orderliness of the cosmos, and he takes important steps to integrate religion through reason 
alone into his political thought. Religion is as much practice as belief, worship as dogma. 
2. Natural Worship 
We can now turn to Hobbes’ natural theology of worship. The primary loci of 
Hobbes’ account is in Chapter 31 of Leviathan, “Of the Kingdom of God by Nature”. Not 
coincidentally, this is the final Chapter of the first half of the work, closing the “Reason” half 
of Leviathan and leading into the half on “Revelation”. Since worship is about practice, this 
aspect of Hobbes’ theory links up closely with his theory of obligation and other elements of 
his political theory.  
A basic political problem that is a constant focus throughout Leviathan is how to 
describe the relationship between civil and divine authority. All civilized people are under the 
command of a sovereign, but: “Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the 
divine power” as well (L31.2/234). A citizen can easily face the dilemma, where one, “either 
by too much civil obedience offends the Divine Majesty, or through fear of offending God 
transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth” (L31.1/234). Hence, Hobbes now 
moves to clarify what is meant by the “Kingdom of God” within the bounds of reason 
alone, and specify the duties of citizen to both sovereign and to God.  
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Hobbes does not define worship up front, as he normally does, but waits until 
Chapter 45 to offer something like a definition:  
But the inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the 
signs of out honoring, and these go by the name of WORSHIP (in Latin, cultus). Therefore, to 
pray to, to swear by, to obey, to be diligent and officious in serving—in sum, all words and 
actions that betoken fear to offend or desire to please—is worship, whether those words and 
actions be sincere or feigned; and because they appear as signs of honoring, are ordinarily 
also called honor. (L45.12/443) 
Recall that for Hobbes, “Honorable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an 
argument and sign of power” (53). Since God is believed to have limitless power, he is owed 
a high debt of honor and respect. 
Worship is naturally owed to God in an analogous fashion to the way in which 
obedience is owed to a sovereign.85 Both share the same three internal grounds—love of the 
benefits the ruler provides, hope for more, and fear of the wrath of the mighty (L31.9/238). 
These internal grounds manifest themselves in three modes of external worship: praise, 
magnifying, and blessing. Praise and magnifying can lead to words and actions; blessing is 
only words, according to Hobbes (L31.9/238). 
 God differs from the mortal sovereign, however, in possessing a limitless fund of 
power: “The right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that 
break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them (as if he required obedience, as of 
gratitude for his benefits), but from his irresistible power.” (L31.5/235). We cannot escape the 
jurisdiction of God. We must regard Him as the most high, even if we are not Christians, 
because the natural laws are God’s universal gift to all mankind.  
Honor and worship can take many forms. Some of these are natural, understood by 
all people. Some of these are arbitrary, made “by institution or custom of men” 
                                                
85 After all, the sovereign is a “Mortal God”.  
 50 
(L31.10/238). For example, spitting in a sacred place is (probably) universally regarded as 
improper worship, but the choice of Sunday versus Saturday as a holy day is arbitrary.  
Arbitrary worship can be voluntary (“free”), wherein the worship expresses our 
sincere, personal reverence. Arbitrary worship can also be command by a sovereign power, 
and “When it is commanded, not the words or the gesture, but the obedience, is the worship.” 
(L31.11/238, emphasis mine). Some actions cannot be made into worshipful actions even by 
command, because they are inherent disrespectful. But “there be an infinite number of 
actions and gestures of an indifferent nature” (L31.39/242), that the sovereign has wide 
latitude for deciding the modes of worship. 
Paul Johnson notes that the decisions made by the sovereign with regard to 
implementing the natural laws into the form of positive law are analogous to the decision of 
which modes of worship are appropriate. Johnson notes “the natural laws prescribe at best a 
certain form which must be given content  and applicability by positive law…This same 
relationship hold regarding worshipful actions.”86 An abstraction is concretized by the 
actions of authority, and fixes certain elements in place that acquire the force of law where 
they did not have it before and perhaps they do not possess in other jurisdictions. 
Worship can also be private or public. Private worship is that which is done by 
citizens of their own concern, in their own way. When conducted in secret, it is free from 
interference, but “in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some restraint, either from 
the laws or from the opinion of men, which is contrary to the nature of liberty.” 
(L31.12/239). If worship occurs in public, it can and will be circumscribed by public rules.  
                                                
86 Johnson, “Hobbes’s Anglican Doctrine of Salvation”, pg. 117, emphasis mine.  
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“Public is the worship that a commonwealth performeth as one person. Public, in 
respect of the whole commonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men it is not so.” 
(L31.12/238–9). This is important. The commonwealth worships freely, in that the 
sovereign, the commonwealth’s will, choose how to worship as he or she sees fit. It is a 
single person, on Hobbes’ theory. The individuals who comprise the commonwealth, are not 
free in their public worship, because they subordinate their wills to that of the 
commonwealth. Hobbes envisions many will do this without dissent, but even those who 
dissent must observe the rules and keep their reservations to themselves. In the final 
analysis, there is little room for significant religious decisions not controlled by the 
sovereign. 
But a side effect of Hobbes’ externally-based classification of worship is that inner 
thoughts and feelings about religious issues are free from interference by their very nature. 
This has prompted some writers to see signs of a Hobbes who secretly endorses something 
like Lockean toleration. This goes too far. Hobbes does seem to permit secret worship and 
private opinions being free from interference. He is not advocating an Inquisition or an 
Orwellian thought police. And, as we shall see, Hobbes does account for the ineluctable 
freedom of inner thoughts, but he still demands an absolute conformity to external rules. If 
he is a tolerationist, it is more for scientific truth. 
There is, obviously, an important difference between the worship owed to powerful 
men and that owed to God: 
The end of worship amongst men is power. For where a man seeth another worshipped, he 
supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him, which makes his power greater. But 
God has no ends; the worship we do him proceeds from our duty, and is directed according 
to our capacity, by those rules of honor that reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the 
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more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good already 
received from them. (L31.13/239)  
Incidentally, that means that, on the basis of natural reason, we cannot really know 
what God wants, except by analogy to our own condition. We can only hope that our words 
and actions are acceptable. God is inscrutable, and anyone who claims otherwise probably 
has secret designs. 
We have seen that there are two primary ways that natural reason teaches us to 
worship God, the first corresponds to our beliefs about him, our publicly-stated “words”, 
the second to “actions of divine worship” (L31.29/240). Regarding the former, we are 
obligated to hold the negative theology outlined in the first part of this chapter. We are 
commanded to maintain first and foremost that God exists, and that he is the cause of the 
world, the Creator, infinite, incomprehensible, impassible, etc. We are to do these things in 
public and in the ways commanded by the authorities. These commands are less cognitive 
beliefs than expressions of devotion, both to God and to the state. When speaking in public, 
we need to take especial care.  
Hobbes identifies eight aspects pertaining to the actions of worship, many of them 
conventional and traditional: (1) prayer, (2) thanksgiving, (3) gift giving, (4) swearing by God 
(and God alone), (5) speaking respectfully of God (while not disputing his nature), (6) “that 
prayers and thanksgiving be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor plebian, 
but beautiful and well composed” (L31.34/241), (7) “reason directeth not only to worship 
God in secret, but also, and especially, in public, and in the sight of men” (L31.35/242), and 
finally, (8) obedience to divine law: “the greatest worship of all” (L31.36/242). These final 
three, however, deserve special mention. 
 53 
Hobbes is placing himself on the side of the conservative Anglican expression of 
faith, through things like the Book of Common Prayer, when he emphasizes the nature of 
prayers. One of the conflicts in liturgy is Hobbes’ time was between those who rejected a 
uniform set of prayers and preferred to sermonize spontaneously, and those who preferred a 
shared body of prayers and ceremonies. Hobbes falls into the latter camp both because he 
was conservative with regard to most institutions, and because the sermonizing of “godly” 
preachers struck him as potentially dangerous demagoguery. Spontaneous, unbounded 
sermonizing placed the preacher at the center of the congregation, establishing him as a 
charismatic figure who could mislead the people away from the rule of law. Emphasizing 
preaching over ritual was associated with the Independent movement.87 
The special place of collective, public worship is another occasion for Hobbes to 
drive home his absolutist theory of sovereignty:  
But seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to God but one 
worship, which then it doth when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men publicly. 
And this is public worship, the property whereof is to be uniform; for those actions that are 
done differently by different men cannot be said to be a public worship. And therefore, 
where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private 
men, it cannot be said that there is any public worship, nor that the commonwealth is of any 
religion at all. (L31/37/242)88  
By being “but one person” the commonwealth exhibits one will. Because Hobbes 
does not have a theory of democratic representation, a General Will, the will of the 
commonwealth must be the will of an individual, the sovereign. This top-down expression 
renders Hobbes incapable of tolerating external deviance from a common standard.89  
                                                
87 For a discussion of some of these issues, see Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England, 
1547–1603, 2nd edition, especially pp 69–73.  
88 The marginal caption for this section reads “Public Worship consisteth in Uniformity”. 
89 See Manent, Pierre. “Hobbes and the New Political Art” in An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Trans. 
Rebecca Balinski. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995. 20–38, especially p. 28.  
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Hobbes, in the same place, but almost as an aside, asserts “And that which is said in 
the Scripture, ‘It is better to obey God than men,’ hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, 
and not by nature.” (L31.39/242). Clarendon saw fit to highlight this mention of the 
Scripture in his Survey, expressing his displeasure at Hobbes’ all-too-quick dismissal of a 
passage “which he could not but find did press him very hard and was worthy of a better 
answer” than the one Hobbes gave.90 Bramhall mentions it as well, arguing “nature it self 
doth teach us that it is better to obey God, then men.”91 Hobbes meant that unless we are 
directly covenanted to God, as the Israelites were, or the future subjects of God’s earthly 
kingdom as the elect are believed to be, we are always to obey the commands of God’s 
“intermediary” on earth, the sovereign. We cannot go outside the chain of command, so to 
speak. His contemporaries saw the skepticism entailed by this position. 
How does the God of natural religion fit into Hobbes’ theory of obligation, if at all? 
One might be tempted to say, “not at all”. Hobbes, after all, is famous for arguing moral 
positivism “Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, no 
injustice.” (L.13.13/78). He also stakes a relativist position: “Good and evil are names that 
signify our appetites and aversion, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of 
men are different; and diverse men differ not only in their judgment on the senses…but also 
what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life.” (L15.40/100). 
But, to many critics, Hobbes’ account of the natural laws is a statement of God’s 
commands. In a striking passage early on (Ch. 13) in Leviathan, Hobbes makes the following 
observation about the natural law: 
                                                
90 Survey, pg. 188. 
91 Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, pg. 133. 
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These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are 
but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of 
themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over 
others. But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by 
right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws. (100) 
This passage is crucial in certain early 20th-century interpretations of Hobbes, notably 
those of AE Taylor and Howard Warrender. Taylor, and Warrender after him, argue that 
Hobbes has a strong, deontological theory of obligation and that the theory derives from 
divine command, arguing that “A certain kind of theism is absolutely necessary to make the 
theory work.”92 Without the element of divine command, Taylor argues, Hobbes cannot 
truly be said to have a theory of obligation at all.  Taylor saw himself as preserving the only 
viable shred of Hobbes’ theory, but was forced to reject the entirety of Hobbes’ psychology 
in order to do so.  
The resulting theism is not very strong, and not very Christian. Taylor argues that 
“Hobbes’s religion…consisted, as Kant’s did, almost exclusively in the discharge of everyday 
morality with an accompanying sense of their transcendent obligatoriness. It is clear that he 
was not ‘religious’ in any deeper sense of the word”.93 
The interpretation has fallen into disrepute, however, for precisely the reason that it 
leaves so much behind. Taylor’s Hobbes is a naked skeleton of Hobbes’ theory, stripped of 
the egoistic flesh that defines Hobbesian theory to so many minds. It distills a theory of 
binding moral obligation out of Hobbes that he perhaps never intended nor would have 
preferred.  
But we can agree with Warrender and Taylor on at least this much, Hobbes sought 
to fortify his account of natural law by an appeal to divine command, at least on the surface. For 
                                                
92 Taylor, “The ethical doctrine of Hobbes”, in Hobbes Studies, pg. 50. 
93 Ibid., pg. 53. 
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those who were unable to accept his purely natural, rational incentives to obedience, the 
additional motivational force of divine authority was helpful. Lloyd argues, that “Hobbes is 
intending to provide people with reasons – with considerations that they, given their 
interests and allegiances, can regard as reasons – for adhering to the principle that one is to 
obey one’s existing effective political authority unconditionally”.94 
By claiming that the natural laws are a version of God’s command, Hobbes resolves 
the issue with which we opened this section: the potential conflict, in the natural kingdom of 
God at least, between the sovereign and God. The sovereign is given full powers to interpret 
and codify the natural laws. On this interpretation, all the sovereign is doing it putting divine 
law into effect. In such a situation, the sovereign can never conflict with the commands of 
God. Thus, there is no conflict, in the kingdom of God by nature between our earthly rulers 
and God. The matter would be easy, if there were not another source of God’s commands, 
themselves potential powder kegs. The second half of Leviathan  addresses the potential 
conflict between the rules of the sovereign and revelation. 
All crimes deserve punishment. Since God can see and punish all crimes, the 
violation of divine laws must necessarily lead to natural punishments. Hobbes observes: “For 
seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws, natural punishments must be 
naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore follow them as their 
natural, no arbitrary effects” (L31.40/243). The argument is that sin does not profit the 
sinner, and that in spite of what may seem to be the case, there are always attendant 
                                                
94 SA Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Leviathan, pg. 267. I think Lloyd is correct in the basic argument, but I 
disagree with her that Hobbes argued in this multifaceted way because he himself was convinced by 
religious reasons. I do not think it necessary for him to do so, nor do I think that he was being sincere. But 
that quarrel will occur later on. 
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punishments for evil acts. We can see some of these effects clearly, as when a heavy drinker 
suffers health problems later in life. Others are more occult, and occur at the end “of so long 
a chain of consequences as no human providence is high enough to give a man a prospect to 
the end” (243). Despite this, the consequences are real and their connection with violations 
of the natural law is strongly maintained by Hobbes in this section. Again, I think this is 
another example of an ideological move by Hobbes. Hobbes grants that we cannot always 
see the connection between our misdeeds and our punishments, but he insists that it is real. 
Someone on the fence about violating a natural law might think twice if they believe they 
would inevitably be punished for it, much like the modern person who behaves morally out 
of fear for “bad karma” or “what goes around comes around”. The argument seems to fly in 
the face of our experience of the prosperity of the wicked, but Hobbes is at home with such 
a paranoic argument, because it serves his purposes. A realistic state couldn’t police its 
citizens comprehensively, at least as Hobbes could see it. Tricks like this pick up some of the 
slack, shifting the burden to the conscience of the would-be offender. If reason doesn’t 
convince, Hobbes is happy to rely on fear. 
According to Richard Tuck, this notion of necessary natural punishment for sins was 
something that Hobbes derived from Selden, and which he shared with writers of the Tew 
Circle among others.95 By doing this, Selden “moved to a completely individualistic and 
hedonistic view of moral obligation, the development if which in later English moral 
philosophy was to be of central importance.”96 Tuck explains that this is because the linkage 
between immorality and punishment puts the matter entirely in the hand of the utility-
                                                
95 Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, pg. 92. Sommerville also discusses this issue in Political Ideas in 
Historical Context,  pg. 141 
96 Ibid. 
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calculating agent, and ensures that no obligation can exist without sanction. While this is not 
the place to explore this suggestion at length, I am a little skeptical of Tuck’s conclusion. I 
believe that there is more to Hobbes’ ethics than the calculation of risk and reward, and that 
obligation have something to do with education and internal conditioning, and not just fear 
and hope. 
Conclusions 
Natural reason can tell us very little about the nature of God, according to Hobbes. 
He keeps orthodox company in maintaining this. But I believe his motivations are different 
than those of the Doctors of the Church and the Reformers. The inherent vagueness and 
minimalism of natural theology is remarkably convenient for Hobbes’ political theory. By 
restricting natural theology to the point where it can say nothing meaningful without the 
consent of the sovereign, Hobbes is building a theoretical bulwark against any dissent 
predicated on an independent interpretation of God’s nature or intentions. I do not think 
that this theoretical overlap is pure coincidence. 
I will grant that Hobbes probably maintains the belief in a God who is probably not 
personal, but who serves as the linchpin of physical laws, a mere postulate of reason should 
it attempt scientific enquiry in the first place. This God, if we could refer to it in those terms, 
is most likely not an object of worship as far as Hobbes is concerned, at best an object of 
admiration and wonder.  
While presenting a position that is defensible in broad strokes, Hobbes is not always 
consistent in the fine details of his natural theology. This should not surprise us, if we 
assume that a perfectly consistent theological account was not his overall intention. I believe 
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that political concerns were more important to him than anything else, with the sole 
exception of unrestricted scientific investigation.  Thus, we should expect to find Hobbes’ 
natural theology confirming his theory of obligation. And we do. 
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Chapter 2: Hobbes and Predestination 
“If Hobbes set out to ground the early modern nation state on the New Science, this was 
religiously motivated as well, for the New Science represented an anti-metaphysics.”97 
Many modern readers tend to assume that Hobbes’ thought is without precedent in 
early modernity, that his ideas “had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms”98 without 
any influences. Certainly his lack of approving citations of other authors supports this 
impression. Least of all, it is believed, theology could not have any real effect on his thinking. 
One of the things I want to argue here is against this uncritical and historically naïve 
interpretation, by drawing a comparison between Hobbes’ thought and the account of 
predestination as propagated in Reformed Churches.  
Hobbes’ relationship to the idea of predestination is undoubtedly a complex one. 
There are clear and sometimes striking resonances between parts of his philosophy and that 
of Calvinist soteriology, most noticeably in his theory of freedom and in his account of 
human nature. These similarities have not gone unnoticed in the recent literature on Hobbes. 
For instance, A. P. Martinich observes of Hobbes that “theological concepts, 
especially those of English  Calvinism, are an inextricable part of his philosophy, especially 
his moral and political views.”99 He gives the observation a finer point slightly later on:  
“Hobbes’s determinism…is logically tied to Calvin’s doctrines of pre-destination and belief 
in the omnipotence of God.”100 For Martinich, the issue of predestination is part of his larger 
overall argument to prove that Hobbes was an unusual, but “orthodox” Calvinist. Edwin 
                                                
97 Springborg, “Hobbes and Bellarmine”, pg. 510.  
98 De Cive, XIII.1, pg. 102. Mushrooms, along with many other things in the age before the microscope, 
were thought to arise spontaneously without “generation”.  
99 Martinich, pg. 1 
100 Martinich, pg. 3 
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Curley notes the overlap in several places in the editorial apparatus of his Leviathan. Vere 
Chappell also agrees that “Hobbes’s view of freedom and necessity was quite similar to that 
of the Protestant Reformers, Luther and Calvin among others.”101  
Leopold Damrosch’s article, “Hobbes as Reformation Theologian” focuses on 
Hobbes’ debate with Bishop Bramhall, concluding, “Hobbes’ determinism, just as much as 
Calvin’s, represents an act of faith, though his faith is in necessity rather than in a beneficent 
deity.”102 Jürgen Overhoff also discusses Hobbes’ relationship to predestination in a chapter 
of Hobbes’s Theory of the Will, concluding that Hobbes “acted as an apologist, not as a zealot, 
of radical Protestant predestinarianism, and his interest in a public defense of Reformation 
theology was inextricably combined with the wish to render his scientific determinism 
acceptable to those who questioned his piety.” Hobbes gave his readers “a recognizable, and 
above all, credible seventeenth century theological defense of his scientific determinism.”103 
Thus, while several authors have done work assessing Hobbes’ debt to Calvinist 
theology on the issue of determinism, I believe that much work can still be fruitfully 
accomplished in this area. My goal here is to make these connections explicit between 
Hobbes’ scientific and philosophical doctrine of necessity and his view of human nature and the 
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dominant theological opinion of his time, as well as to account for why these similarities are 
present.  
The plan of this chapter is to explore these resemblance along with their attendant 
motivations. Prior to this comparison, it is necessary to offer a sketch of the doctrine of 
predestination as it existed in Hobbes’ time, along with a discussion of its chief theological 
and political rival, Arminianism (I). Next I will explore biographical reasons that may 
account for the overlap of Hobbes’ philosophy with predestinarian thinking (II). Next I will 
analyze the philosophical bases of the sympathy (III). The following section will explore 
reasons of politics (with an eye to his larger theory) that may have motivated Hobbes (IV). It 
is my belief that Hobbes had personal, scientific, political, and most importantly, 
philosophical reasons for laying out a theory of freedom and physical laws that resembled 
Calvin’s theory of predestination, and that the overlap is not coincidental. While I believe 
that Hobbes drew what might be called inspiration from Calvinist theory, I do not think 
Hobbes was (or needs to be) a devout Christian in order to do so.  
I. 
The idea of predestination is central to understanding the intellectual climate of 
Stuart England and the Civil Wars. Predestination was a widely shared view, to such an 
extent that historians have referred to a “Calvinist consensus” on the issue.104 To the 
Jacobean mind, Jean Calvin is the clear theological inspiration for these ideas, but Calvin 
himself was inspired by Luther, St. Augustine, and most fundamentally, St. Paul (especially 
                                                
104 See MacCulloch, Diarmaid, The Later Reformation in England, 1547–1603, 2nd edition. New York: 
Palgrave, 2001, pp. 60–65; as well as Marshall, Peter. Reformation England, 1480–1642. London: Arnold, 
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the Letter to the Romans). Calvin’s successor in Geneva, Theodor Beza, also exercised an 
important influence by making explicit the doctrine of “double predestination” among other 
things. The theological movement known as Arminianism, and the predestinarian backlash 
to it embodied in the Canons of the Synod of Dort are critical as well. But the English also 
had their own idiosyncratic ideas on the subject. All of these various sources have subtly 
different accounts of predestination. 
Predestination is thus a complex idea, and various points are disputed. Even Calvin 
and Beza didn’t see eye-to-eye!105 Nevertheless, many basic premises were uncontroversial, as 
both making sense of God’s unlimited power and as following from Scripture. The following 
summary should prove useful. It confines itself to a general analysis of the main themes of 
English Calvinism on the eve of the Civil War.106 
Loraine Boettner’s The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination articulates, possibly for the 
first time in this form, that predestination can be understood in terms of the famous 
acronym, TULIP: 
1. Total inability 
                                                
105 RT Kendall. Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
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the other sources mentioned.  
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2. Unconditional election 
3. Limited atonement 
4. Irresistible grace 
5. Perseverance of the saints107  
Human beings, on their own, are totally unable (T) to achieve salvation. After the Fall 
of Adam, humans became tainted with original sin, which renders them absolutely incapable 
of righteous action, or even of realizing that they are sinners. “Adam was made not only the 
father but also the representative of the whole human race.”108 He was humanity’s best 
chance, and his sin left its indelible mark on the human race. If Adam falls, we all fall.  
The Scriptures play a role in introducing the sinner to his or her sin; unassisted 
human reason is not up to the task, it is sheer vanity and pride.  
Left to their own devices, humans would do nothing but sin. Humans are spiritually 
dead. They sin necessarily, but voluntarily. They inevitably choose sin, but they are 
responsible for it because they do so without external compulsion. This necessity of human 
evildoing accomplishes two things. First, it makes the general condition of humankind 
worthy of punishment. Hence, God in his infinite Justice rightfully punishes the reprobate 
because they voluntarily earn His displeasure. Second, it prevents God from being 
considered the author of sin, or for being morally responsible for it in any way. To say 
otherwise would be to blaspheme God’s perfect goodness.  
                                                
107 Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination., pg. 60. TULIP, in the final analysis, is only a 
helpful reformulation of the five Canons issued at Dort.   
108 Boettner, pg. 77. See also 72–78. 
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Calvinists believe that before the creation of the world, God chose (“elected”) some 
people to be saved, and others to be damned (the “reprobate”). This predestination of saved 
and damned at the same time is commonly called “double predestination”. The number of 
elect and the number of reprobate is fixed, and encompasses all souls. There is no middle 
ground between salvation and damnation (no purgatory, etc.). A fundamental belief, thus, is 
that all humans beings are not destined for salvation.  
God has foreknowledge of all events that will come to pass. This is a crucial 
component of God’s omniscience. 
Humans are saved (“justified”) by faith alone, which issues forth good works, not the 
other way around. Humans can do nothing to merit the gift of grace which ushers in an 
abiding faith. Even this faith and the willpower to act upon it is a gift from God. Faith is 
given freely, it is not something that is owed to the human being or that could be demanded 
of God. Hence, all the elements of salvation come from God and God alone. To give 
humans a real role in their salvation would be to challenge the omnipotence of God. By 
conceding that humans beings are rightly punished, and that they are saved only by God’s 
free gift of grace, God shows the faithful his infinite mercy. Humans do not deserve to be 
saved, and the fact that any of them are is a testament to God’s mercy. By having salvation 
be decided before the creation of the world and solely on the basis of God’s free choice, we 
have the doctrine of unconditional election (U). 
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A further belief is that the death of Jesus was made to save the elect only—Jesus did 
not die for all mankind (another of Beza’s innovations).109 Christ’s death was accepted by 
God as a sufficient sacrifice to pardon some of the reprobate. This is limited atonement (L).  
Saving grace abides. Human will cannot resist the power of grace to transform the 
sinner, to literally regenerate him from spiritual death. This is the meaning of the term “born 
again”.110 Saving grace cannot be lost once given, although the elect will still be subject to the 
temptations and trials of their human nature, and hence must be vigilant.  This, again, 
testifies to God’s omnipotence. This is irresistible grace (I). 
Finally, the elect are supposed to be aware of their election.111 This gave rise to a 
controversy between what are called “Experimental” and “Credal” predestinarians.112 The 
former, many of whom called themselves the “godly” and whom history has labeled  
“Puritans”, believed that the elect could have clear experiential signs of their salvation 
(“experience” is root of “experimental” here), and that they should distance themselves 
from, if not completely shun, those not so marked. Credal predestinarians rejected that there 
were unambiguous signs of election, some on theological grounds, but also strongly for 
reasons of political order. A self-conscious elect could create a public disturbance on the one 
hand, and could lead the allegedly reprobate to abandon all sense of morality and order on 
the other. It is no surprise, then, that conservative thinkers like Hobbes tended to espouse 
the credal variety.  
                                                
109 See Marshall, pg. 128  
110 See Boettner, 164–171. 
111 Nevertheless, RT Kendall shows the absolute anxiety that some of the faithful felt concerning their 
election, because coexisting alongside the sense of security the blessed were supposed to have was the 
awareness of some faith that was not enduring, or that could come very late in life. Antinomianism was 
closely related to those who thought they were saved and were above the laws.  
112 See Marshall, pp. 129–30 
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The truly elect, on this doctrine, will persevere (P) in the face of temptation, and can 
trust to their salvation.  But “As long as the believer remains in this world his state is one of 
warfare.”113 He will be surrounded by temptation and wicked people. But “those who 
become true Christians cannot totally fall away and be lost, -- that while they may fall into sin 
temporarily, they will eventually return and be saved.”114 
Boettner argues that the five principles form a systematic unity, with each part 
logically implying the others. He writes, “these are not isolated and independent doctrines, 
but are so inter-related that they form a simple, harmonious, self-consistent system”.115 We 
should be able to grasp the interconnectedness at this point.  
Predestination struck many observers as harsh or unjustified. Even Boettner agrees,  
if we consider humanity’s sinful nature and future punishments, that “This side of the 
picture is dark; very dark indeed; but its supplement is the glory of God in redemption.”116 
Obviously, the Catholic Church rejected the doctrine. But even on the Protestant side, there 
were dissidents. The most important for our purposes is Jacob Harmenszoon (1559 or 
1560–1609), commonly known by his Latinized name, Arminius.117   
Arminius was a Dutch theologian, whose works were collected in a book entitled the 
Remonstrance (his followers, consequently, became known as Remonstrants). His primary 
arguments were, “that election to eternal life is conditional upon good works in this life, that 
                                                
113 Boettner, pg. 186. The Hobbesian resonance is clear.  
114 Ibid., pg. 182. 
115 Boettner, pg. 59.  
116 Boettner, pg. 80. 
117 Bangs, Carl. “Arminius, Jacobus.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. Detroit: 
Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 492-493. 15 vols. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Thomson Gale. 
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grace can be resisted and lost, that Christ died for all men.”118  He thus rejected the hard-
edged and unconditional nature of predestination in the Calvinist doctrine, but not without 
provoking a controversy. The view nevertheless attracted followers at home and abroad.  
The Remonstrants were condemned at the Synod of Dort (Dordrecht) in 1618. The 
Synod was the closest thing the Reformed Churches had ever had to a General Council. The 
English sent an approving delegation, and while the Canons of the Synod never became the 
official doctrine of the Church of England, they exercised an important influence on 
thinking in that institution for several years. Hobbes would have been 30 at the time the 
Canons were issued, and he could not have been ignorant of the controversy.  
In spite of this, with the promotion of William Laud to Archbishop of Canterbury in 
1633, an ascendant, but minority, faction of Arminians in the Church of England assumed 
power. Technically, the name “Arminian” is a misnomer for the English movement. English 
Arminianism adopted many of those fine points of theology repudiated at Dort, but had 
been doing so before Arminius had begun writing. Furthermore, English Arminianism was 
also far more concerned with issues of liturgy and church decoration than Arminius had ever 
been. Nevertheless, the name has stuck both with contemporaries and historians, and thus it 
is useful to contrast English Arminianism (simply “Arminianism” from here on) with the 
dominant view among both citizens and divines on the eve of the English Civil War. 
Scholars argue that this shift among the clerical elites from Calvinist assumptions to 
Arminian doctrines was at the very least an accelerant (if not one of the principle causes) of 
                                                
118 Chadwick, Owen. The Reformation. New York: Penguin Books, 1972. pg. 220. There is a long summary 
of the Remonstrant’s position in the Introduction provided to the Canons of the Synod of Dort, as well as 
what can be gleaned from the body of the text  in the Documents of the English Reformation. 
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the unrest that lead to the Civil Wars.119 The Arminians insisted on what were commonly 
viewed as idolatrous church decorations: church rails, vestments, altars, etc. and mandated 
the use of the old Book of Common Prayer. Both of these moves brought the English 
Church closer to what were perceived as older, Catholic practices. A common perception in 
prewar England was of an incomplete Reformation, a Reformation that was slowly fine- 
tuning itself, but nevertheless still moving forward. Arminianism for many represented a step 
backward for many observant Protestants.  
Hobbes was directly and personally engaged in longstanding controversies with John 
Bramhall, an Anglican bishop also in exile in France at the same time as Hobbes. Bramhall 
was an Arminian, famous for his temper (he died of a stroke in the midst of an argument) 
and his acidic wit.120 His debate with Hobbes was not intended for publication, but it 
attained an intensity that boiled over into print. As we will soon see, Bramhall was to 
become a dogged pursuer of Hobbes, sniffing out the hint of irreligion and other vices in 
him. 
There were state security concerns over Arminianism as well. In the context of an 
England constantly worried about a Catholic takeover, the Arminians seemed far too close 
to Roman doctrine to be trusted. Keep in mind that it was a commonplace at the time to 
regard the Pope as a literal Antichrist. England had been the subject of several Catholic-
influenced aggression over the past century: ranging from the Spanish Armada (1588) to the 
                                                
119 See for instance: Tyacke, Nicholas. “Puritanism, Arminianism, and counter-revolution” in The English 
Civil War. Edited by Richard Cust and Ann Hughes. London: Arnold Press, 1997. 136–159; and Morrill, 
John. “The religious context of the English Civil War.” Also in Cust and Hughes, 159–181. Morrill 
famously asserts “The English Civil War was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars 
of Religion” (176).  
120 For the circumstances of Bramhall’s death, see Bowle, Hobbes and his Critics, pg. 116.  
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Guy Fawkes’ “Gunpowder Plot” (1605) to the Irish Rebellions of 1641, so any paranoia 
seems justified.  King James’ attempt to marry his son to a Spanish Infanta (the so-called 
“Spanish Match” controversy) was viewed in a similar light.121 It was widely feared that 
Arminianism was the vanguard of a Catholic takeover from within.  While Hobbes explicitly 
rejected the doctrine that the Pope was the Antichrist, he was fully aware of the prevailing 
antipapal and anti-Roman sentiment and engaged in it himself.122 
II 
Of all the explanations for the intersections between Hobbes’ writings and those of 
the predestinarians, the most trivial is the biographical. It is worth mentioning briefly, if only 
because it does seem consistent with Hobbes’ character to hold a grudge.  
In 1646, Hobbes was appointed as a mathematics tutor to the Prince of Wales in 
exile. We have reason to believe that Hobbes was only allowed to teach mathematics to the 
prince, as opposed to a wider course of study.  Hobbes did not remain tutor for long, losing 
the post in 1648. There is evidence to suggest that Hobbes was not fully paid for his 
teaching services, either. Part of the explanation for this may be the meddling of a clerical 
faction personally opposed to Hobbes. In a letter from March 7, 1649, Robert Payne, an 
Oxford theologian wrote to his friend Gilbert Sheldon mentions a rumor that Hobbes “had 
lost the reward of his labours with the Pr[ince] by the sinister suggestions of the clergy as to 
                                                
121 See Lake, Peter. “Anti-popery: the structure of a prejudice” in The English Civil War. Ed. Richard Cust 
and Ann Hughes. London: Arnold, 1997. 181–210  
122 The entirety of Ch. 42 in Leviathan is essentially an antipapal screed. It is the longest chapter by far in 
the book. The rejection of the pope as an Antichrist occurs at L42.87–88/376–8. Hobbes positively 
lampoons the Papacy at L47. 
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their purpose”.123 The letter implies that Hobbes was aware of the efforts against him. (The 
prince, for his part, seems to have displayed some fondness for Hobbes later on). 
The basis of the antagonism was probably the publication of De Cive, which was 
received by the Anglican clergy as an attack on the iure divino (divine law) basis of priestly 
power, and instead argued that the basis of ecclesiastical power derived directly from the 
sovereign. Hobbes was aware of the hostility, and took the machinations against him 
personally. Leviathan’s increased rancor towards the episcopacy (among other things) reflects 
this emotion, and can in some ways be seen as a retort to the group that forced his ouster 
from the royal presence. The argument which placed clerical authority under the supervision 
of the sovereign can be seen as a rejection of Laudian Arminianism in general. Hobbes’ 
explicit adoption of a more traditional Calvinist view of freedom can therefore also be seen 
in this light, as a explicit reaffirmation of this theology in contradistinction to the incumbent 
clerical faction at the time.124 But I do not think this animosity on its own is sufficient to 
motivate Hobbes. 
III 
Philosophically, there are at least  three points of contact between the Calvinist 
picture of predestination and Hobbes’ views: (1) his scientific account of necessity, (2) his 
notion of human nature, and (3) similarities between salvation and the structure of the 
commonwealth. 
                                                
123 Payne, Robert, Letter 127, cited in its entirely in Pocock, Nicholas, “Illustrations of the state of the 
Church during the great rebellion”, Ecclesiastic, Volume 6, 1848. Pp. 161–175. The citation is from page 
170. This letter is mentioned by Collins, Tuck, and Sommerville.  
124 See Collins, Jeffrey R. The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005, especially 
Chapters 2–4; Mintz, Samuel. The Hunting of Leviathan. Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1962. p. 12–13.  
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III.1 
Hobbes’ theory of natural science has clear points of contact with the Calvinist 
notion of predestination—rooted in his account of liberty, his notion of cause and motion, 
and his theory of the will. And while it seems that Hobbes, for the most part, has an 
independent basis for these findings, he seems perfectly willing to invoke standard Reformed 
theology in his defense when it proves helpful. Far from being contemptuous or dismissive 
toward religion in general, Hobbes’ work demonstrates a thorough familiarity with the finer 
points of contemporary theology.  
In this section, I will explore this overlap and consider the possible reasons for it.  
Writing on human “freedom,” Calvin declares that: 
God whenever he wills to make way for his providence, bends and turns men’s wills even in 
external things; nor are they so free to choose that God’s will does not rule over their 
freedom. Whether you will or not, daily experience compels you to realize that your mind is 
guided by God’s prompting rather than by your own freedom to choose.125  
In Leviathan, Hobbes describes “LIBERTY, or FREEDOM” (he makes no technical 
distinction between the two) generally, as “the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean 
external impediments to  motion)” (L21.1/136). The physicalist and reductionist tendencies 
of Hobbes are clearly evident when he offers the liberty of water in a river as the illustration 
of his definition. 
With regard to human beings, a free person is “he that in those things which by his strength 
and wit he is able to do what he has a will to do.” (L21.2/136)  In other words, freedom consists in 
being able to do what the will decides, not the conditions of the choice itself. Freedom thus, 
                                                
125 Calvin, Institutes, II.4.7, 315 
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is a property of actions or individual acts of will, not faculty of mind. It does not require the 
subject to stand outside of ordinary causation. By extension, animals are also free in this 
sense when they can effect what they will.126  
In De Corpore, Hobbes offers a general account of causation. There, he defines a 
cause (or “entire cause”) as “the aggregate of all the accidents both of agents how many 
soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be 
present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant”127. If 
anything is absent, the effect will not be produced. Given the cause, the effect will follow. 
There is nothing at all to chance, as in the Aristotelian scheme.   
A few paragraphs later, he claims: “For whatsoever is produced, in as much as it is 
produced, had an entire cause, that is, had all those things, which being supposed, it cannot be 
understood but that the effect follows; that is, it had a necessary cause.”128 All effects, therefore, 
have necessary causes.  
As is well known, Hobbes is a materialist: “For the universe, being the aggregate of all 
bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body, nor anything properly a body that is 
not also a part (that aggregate of all bodies) the universe.” (L34.2/261)129 Hence, all psychic 
phenomenon are, to him, instances of matter in motion. Unlike the dualist Descartes, 
Hobbes does not need to keep track of two distinct causal pathways, nor does he have to 
provide a way to account for the interaction of two distinct substances, a difficulty that 
                                                
126 For an interesting discussion of Hobbes’ theory of freedom, focused more on its philosophical 
coherence, see Quentin Skinner’s “Thomas Hobbes on the proper signification of liberty,” Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 40 (1990): 121–41.  
127 De Corpore, in EW I, 122. In the original, the entire text is italicized, I have added italics for emphasis.  
128 Ibid., pg., 123; the emphasis here is mine. 
129 See also the detailed discussion in Mintz, Samuel. The Hunting of Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge, 
1962. See especially, Ch. IV. 
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would bedevil later dualists like Leibniz. Hobbes does not offer a satisfactory explanation of 
consciousness, which the more subject-centered dualists seem at least better equipped to 
analyze.   
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the will is no different from any other entity in 
being subject to necessary causes. It is merely a special case of a more general physical 
theory. Hobbes attempts to demonstrate the determinism of the will in a five stage 
argument. (1) Hobbes defines will as “the last appetite in deliberating.” (L6.53/33)130 Actions 
proceeding from the will, he labels as voluntary. Voluntary actions even include actions 
under duress and motivated strictly by fear. (2) Deliberation he defines as the “alternate 
succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears” (L6.51/33) that are “continued till the 
thing be done or thought impossible” (L6.49/33). (3) Hobbes notes that since: “going, 
speaking, and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, 
which way, and what, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all 
voluntary motion.” (L6.1/27) (4) Imagination is defined as “decaying sense”, where sense 
(direct sensory perception) is caused by “the external body, or object, which presseth the 
organ proper to each sense, either immediately…or mediately” (L1.4/6). (5) This process of 
sensation results in action processed through the mechanism of the heart: “when the action 
of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real 
effect there is nothing but motion or endeavor” (L6.9/29).131 All of which is handled as 
                                                
130 The last appetite can also be the first, in which case we are referring to “spontaneous” or impulsive 
actions. Voluntary actions are those which follow from the action of the will in a trivial, definitional sense, 
but they are also those actions for which we are morally responsible. Even if they are wholly determined by 
physical forces, voluntary actions are still my responsibility, because the choice originates internally.  
131 We can read “sense” in this passage as either direct sensation or imaginative recollection. It is tempting 
to read “heart” in the passage as the (strictly metaphorical) seat of the power of the will, but this is 
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gross, physical motion by Hobbes, perhaps more subtle and complex than most, but the 
same in kind as all other forms of motion.  
Therefore, as regards the will, “to him that could see the connexion of those causes, 
the necessity of all men’s voluntary actions would be manifest.” (L21.4/137) This is one of the 
key assertions of scientific determinism, but it is also a critical component of the 
predestinarian account of God’s foreknowledge. To a Calvinist, God can see the “connexion 
of those causes” and confirms the necessity of their causation. 
In spite of his ironclad determinism, Hobbes asserts the compatibilist thesis that 
“Liberty and necessity are consistent”. (Ibid.) Given Hobbes’ definitions, this seems to be 
unproblematic. When actions are executed after proper approval by the will of the actor, 
they are free, even if the will itself is determined by necessary causes.  The definitions seem 
strange, but they are consistent with one another.  
However, there are also (apparently) theological reasons at work behind these 
definitions. We can observe a similar tension between voluntary, culpable actions by fallen 
humanity and the totalizing nature of God’s power. Hobbes observes in a passage that 
sounds as if it could have been penned by Calvin himself: 
For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore the 
author of them, yet they can have no passion nor appetite to anything of which appetite 
God’s will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of man’s will, and 
consequently of all that on man’s will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction 
and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. (L21.4/137) 
                                                                                                                                            
misleading. Inspired by Harvey, Hobbes has in mind the heart as a mechanical system like any other, that 
responds to sensation by pumping blood to the appropriate  members. There does seem to be some 
deliberative mechanism, whereby the actor can be pushed one way or the other while she makes up her 
mind what to do. The effects of sensation are thus delayed and organized side-by-side, while they are 
weighed. Hobbes does not comment on how raw sensation is processed into a form where deliberation is 
possible, although from the use of “imagination” in the discussion he seems away of this issue.   
I thank Richard Cobb-Stevens for drawing this passage to my attention.  
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Hobbes is walking a tightrope here, one well-trod by predestinarians as well. He 
needs, on the one hand, to maintain the omnipotence of God, His absolute dominance over 
all things in his creation, even the human will.  
On the other hand, Hobbes must avoid making God seem like He is the author of 
sin, which is universally regarded as rank blasphemy. In his debate with Bramhall, Hobbes 
was accused of precisely that mistake on the basis of his account of necessity. In his 
response to the accusation, Hobbes cites Luther, Calvin, and the Canons of the Synod of 
Dort, and he invokes “all the famous doctors of the Reformed Churches,” as well as St. 
Augustine to reach the conclusion that: “None of these denied that God is the cause of all 
motion and action; and yet they were never forced to say God is the cause of sin.”132  
Hobbes places himself in good company here! Nevertheless, Bramhall rejected these sources 
as authorities, given his Arminian position. But aside from his invocation of standard 
Calvinist authorities, Hobbes’ unique reasons for maintaining this position are worth noting.  
Recall that Calvin and other predestinarians blamed the reason for sin being the 
sinner’s fault (and not that of the Creator) on the corruption of human nature. God does not 
forcibly compel the sinner to sin, even though his defective nature makes it impossible that 
he will not. The lack of compulsion to sin exculpated the deity, because it made the sin 
voluntary. Sin is rightfully punished because it is evil. Calvin expresses it thusly:  
man, as he was corrupted by the Fall, sinned willingly, not unwillingly or by compulsion; by 
the most eager inclination of his heart, not by forced compulsion; by the prompting of his 
own lust, not by compulsion from without. Yet so depraved is his nature that he can be 
                                                
132 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, pg. 80  
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moved or impelled only to evil. But if this is true, then it is clearly expressed that man is 
surely subject to the necessity of sinning.133 
Hobbes’ approach is notably different, incorporating aspects of his theory of 
sovereignty and his negative theology. First, Hobbes writes, “Whether men will or not, they 
must be subject always to the divine power.”(L31.2/234) 
He elaborates on this as follows, 
To an omnipotent nature, which cannot be resisted, both reign and dominion over the 
whole human race naturally belong. And this is the foundation of the right by which God 
afflicts whom he will and pardons whom he will, not, as many have thought, the sins of 
men.(OL31.5/236–7)134 
Later on he adds, “The right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, and 
punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them (as if he 
required obedience, as of gratitude for his benefits), but from his irresistible 
power.”(L31.5/235) God’s rule over humanity is not by pact or other form of covenant. 
Humans in the state of nature relinquish the right of nature to the (human) sovereign 
because their inherent equality and fragility renders them vulnerable to violent death. 
Federation is the only way to ensure survival. Since God is irresistible and invulnerable, it 
follows that he need never relinquish the right of nature to all things. Consequently, 
whatever he wills he does by right. 135 Hobbes makes this explicit in his debate with 
                                                
133 Calvin, Institutes, II.3.5, 295–296 
134 The Latin variant is listed in Curley’s note 6 on those pages.  
135 There are obviously parallels in the Calvinist tradition, but they are tempered. The following betrays a 
voluntarist bias akin to that of Hobbes: “For God’s will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that 
whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous…But if you proceed further to 
ask why he so willed, you are seeking something greater and higher than God’s will, which cannot be found.” 
(Calvin, Institutes, III.23.2, 949) 
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Bramhall: “This I know: God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just and 
consequently no sin”.136  
Effectively, all humanity remains in the state of nature with respect to God, and can 
suffer no injustice as a consequence. God is thus at the extreme limit of Hobbes’ theory of 
sovereignty, the only being who can secure obedience in the total absence of explicit 
consent. Hobbes goes so far as to maintain that all Christians are slaves of God, and this is 
quite literally true given the precise definition of “slave” in Leviathan.137  
Hobbes’ reading of the Book of Job in Leviathan (which occurs almost word-for-
word in De Cive as well) attests to this.  Job suffers not because of any sin, but because God 
wills it. Despite Job’s indubitable uprightness, God commits no injustice towards him when 
he afflicts him with torments. In response to Job’s pleas for an explanation of his 
predicament, God replies, “Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth”?138 
Hence, there is no crime when the innocent suffer at the hand of God.  
We can infer, then, that because all human action is the result of God’s activity, that 
God causes even those actions which are sinful. This seems like a more honest inference 
than the predestinarian hairsplitting designed to avoid this conclusion, and it seems an 
obvious (although muted) conclusion for Hobbes to draw from these premises.  
                                                
136 Chappell, pg. 23.  
137 See Skinner “Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty”, pp. 125, 126. Skinner cites Hobbes 
discussion at L45.13/443, “we are God’s slaves”. In his discussion of despotic dominion in Ch. 20, Hobbes 
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138 Quoted by Hobbes in Leviathan, L31.6, originally from Job 38:4. Job is also used in this context in the 
debate with Bramhall—see Chappell, pg. 22. 
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Hobbes thus seems willing to bite the bullet and accept that, conceptually, God is the 
cause of sin, but also at the same time he argues that speaking of this is a dishonor to God and 
should be avoided. He in fact, leaves the obvious conclusion unsaid, and explicitly denies 
that “God is the author of sin” should be declared.  
Hobbes’ Latin Leviathan also agrees that God is the cause, but not the author of sin. 
He relies on a distinction that his interlocutors seem to miss: 
If they had been subtle, they would easily have discovered the difference between the cause and the 
author of a deed. The author of a deed is he who commands that it be done; the cause is he through 
whose powers is it done. God does not command that anyone do (or attempt) anything contrary to 
the laws; but whatever we do, we do by powers given us by God. Why, then, if God is in the cause, 
are we condemned? If you ask this, tell me why, from eternity, God has elected some, and rejected 
others, and how he condemned to eternal and most severe punishments those who had not yet done 
(or thought) evil, and who (unless God was willing and gave them that power) could not do or think 
evil? Tell me also whether it is not lawful for the potter to decide whatever he wishes concerning the 
vase he has made. Show me, finally, where Scriptures plainly say that all those who are excluded from 
the kingdom of God will live without a second death, to be tortured to eternity. (OL46.22/476).  
God’s is indeed the cause of sin, but he is not it’s culpable author. That role devolves 
to the sinner. Hobbes does defend God’s right as master of all creation, to discard those 
things he does not love, like the potter in letter to the Romans (which itself resonates with 
Job). However, Hobbes does mitigate God’s awful rage by pointing to the merciful brevity 
of the lot of the damned: the second death that will end their suffering. 
III.2 
There is a considerable degree of overlap regarding human nature between the 
Calvinists and Hobbes. Both have what could be termed pessimistic accounts of human life, 
emphasizing both human pride, selfishness, and incompleteness. The Jesuit Thomas Higgins 
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remarks that Hobbes “was imbued with the Calvinistic notion that man is naturally selfish 
and corrupt and amenable only to coercion.”139 
Human vanity (or pride) is what drove Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit and 
engender the Fall. Pride is the characteristic of human nature, even in its highest expressions: 
“we can see that the reason of our mind, wherever it may turn, is miserably subject to 
vanity.”140 Calvinists take a strong view of original sin, seeing it as stamped on human nature 
and not removable by baptism. Boettner, perhaps with a touch of hyperbole, exclaims, 
“Only Calvinists seem to take the doctrine of the fall very seriously.”141 
Hobbes shares this strong notion of the place of pride in human nature, and seems 
to echo the moral criticism of it as well. In Leviathan, while discussing human equality, 
Hobbes observes that a rejection of this thesis is the product of a “vain conceit of one’s own 
wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, 
than all men but themselves and a few others” (L13.2/75). He also refers to the three 
sources of conflict in the state of nature: competition, diffidence, and glory, the latter arising 
from the fact that “every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate 
he sets upon himself”(L13.5/75–6), that is, very high indeed. Later Hobbes observes that, in 
contrast to bees and other social creatures, “men are continually in competition for honour 
                                                
139 Higgins, Thomas, SJ. Man as man: The science and art of ethics. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing 
Company, 1949. Pg. 228. 
140 Calvin, Institutes, II.2.25, pg. 285 
141 Boettner, pg. 72.  
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and dignity” (L17.7/108).142 Elsewhere, he speaks of the “Darkness from Vain 
Philosophy”143 and the need to move beyond the ideas of the Ancients.  
Leviathan, both in the Bible and as leitmotif of Hobbes’ masterpiece, is the “King of 
the Proud”.144 A power so strong as to be monstrous is required to hold benighted humanity 
in check.  
The emphasis on the vanity of human nature is perhaps more pronounced in the 
Elements and De Cive, a fact to which Leo Strauss drew considerable attention.145 The Elements 
of Law, for instance, places Glory (of which Pride and Vain Glory are species) at the head of 
its list of Passions.146 A few Chapters on Hobbes notes that “men by natural passion are 
divers ways offensive to one another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see 
the same in others”.(EL.14.4/78) De Cive, lacking the chapter on the passions of the other 
two works, nonetheless asserts damningly regarding human interactions that “By nature…we 
are not looking for friends but for honour or advantage” (DC.1.2/22). What people 
“primarily enjoy is their own glory and not society.”147 Hobbes even goes so far as to say that 
“every voluntary encounter is a product either of mutual need or of the pursuit of glory” 
because “every pleasure of the mind is either glory…or ultimately relates to glory” 
(Ibid./23).  
                                                
142 See also Strauss, Leo. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis. Translated by Elsa M. 
Sinclair. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1963, pg 11. The argument occurs in all three statements of the 
political theory, in much the same form. In all three versions, pride and glory is the first difference given 
between the human being and properly “political” animals.   
143 Taken from the chapter title for Leviathan, Ch. 46. 
144 This is Hobbes’ paraphrase of the passage from Job 41 in L28.27/210 of Leviathan. 
145 See Strauss, Leo. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Chapter II, where he argues that vanity is the 
abiding and fundamental moral vice underlying Hobbes’ political philosophy, a fact that the geometrical 
presentation of Leviathan obscures. One needn’t subscribe to Strauss’s entire thesis to admire the extent to 
which he highlights the repeated references to pridefulness at the heart of Hobbes’ theory.  
146 See Elements of Law, IX.1/50–51. 
147 Ibid. 
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III.3 
There also seems to be a third way that Calvinist soteriology exerted an influence on 
Hobbes’ philosophical thinking, albeit indirectly. Hobbes’ account of the movement from 
the natural condition of mankind to the commonwealth and his depiction of the might of 
the sovereign parallel the acceptance of Christianity and the almighty power of God, 
respectively.  
The violence of the state of nature is akin to the eternal death of hell. One condition 
is the worst natural reason can imagine, the other is the worst a believer can conceive. Both 
result from fundamental flaws in human nature, flaws that remain insoluble to the unassisted 
individual. Both are resolved by embracing an all-powerful third party. Although Hobbes 
claims that a covenant with God is impossible in a literal sense, the acceptance of faith in 
Jesus Christ is similar to erecting a sovereign (or perhaps, even better, to submitting to a 
conqueror in exchange for your life).  
The sovereign is a “mortal god” (L17.13/109). 148 Like the divine, he is supposed to 
be irresistible in power. The sovereign and God are both the objects of unquestioned 
obedience, without any reciprocal obligations or need to justify their will. In exchange for 
obedience, both powers grant life—commodious living for the temporal sovereign, eternal 
bliss in the case of God.  
Obviously, there are differences, but the coincidences are strong enough to merit 
consideration in the literature. Martinich refers to this parallelism as “secular salvation” and 
                                                
148 I have removed the italics of the original. 
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claims that Hobbes explicitly “transmuted the religious paradigm and applied it to a secular 
issue.”149 Hobbes’ contemporaries quite likely could have seen the resemblance, too.  
III.4 
To summarize, Hobbes’ philosophical position overlaps with predestinarian theology 
on the following points: 
1. Both agree that all human actions are necessitated, even the will. If the will is 
necessitated, it is nevertheless not compelled, and hence, it is responsible for its actions.  
2. In both cases, a powerful intellect could perceive this necessity (“foreknow” it in other 
words). 
3. Both agree that any freedom from this necessity would be a challenge to the 
omnipotence of God, and both advocated a strong interpretation of God’s authority 
over his creation. In secular terms, Hobbes is advocating the supremacy of physical laws 
that admit of no deviation – ironically, this overrules the super-natural, e.g. the miraculous.  
4. Both agree that human nature is flawed. Pride is a chief sin. The individual requires an 
irresistible power outside of itself to attain peace.  
5. Both employ a similar notion of salvation in the respective domains, although Hobbes’ 
political salvation is a metaphorical recapitulation of the religious concept to a secular 
context. The latter adaptation does not preclude acceptance of the former model as true, 
of course.  
                                                
149 Martinich, Two Gods, pg. 271. See also the discussion on pg. 336 of the same volume.  
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We can now clearly see the parallels between the Calvinist account of predestination 
and Hobbes’ deterministic philosophy. Hobbes and the Calvinists reach many of the same 
conclusions, and Hobbes seems to share many of the same theological premises as the 
Calvinist. Hobbes does, however, make significant departures from orthodox Calvinist 
theory. Moreover, he also attempts to find an independent basis for his conclusions outside 
of Scripture and religious authority.  
What is the relationship between Calvinist predestination and Hobbes’ theory of 
determinism? Is it one of direct inspiration? Is it mere coincidence or accident? I think we 
can dismiss the latter option. Hobbes seems to be too well versed in predestination literature 
to be unaffected by it. He intentionally employs predestinarian theology in his discussions of 
liberty and necessity where it is frequently unnecessary for him to do so. Nevertheless, 
Hobbes is not merely copying the tradition. He adds his own views that parallel, but do not 
ape, the theology of his time. Furthermore, Hobbes seems willing to seek out more than one 
basis for his views, to “overdetermine” them so to speak, with arguments from both natural 
science and Scripture (a process his repeats several times in his work)150. It is probably 
overenthusiastic to claim that Hobbes saw no disjunction between his scientific theory and 
the prevailing Calvinist theology of his time, but it does seem clear that Hobbes’ sincere 
philosophical interests151 were not completely at odds with Protestant theology, in fact, there 
are key areas of sympathy.  
                                                
150 Most notably in his discussion of the Scriptural basis for the natural laws and for his theory of absolute 
obedience to the sovereign.  
151 No one seems to doubt that Hobbes believed much of what he wrote on politics and physics; it is his 
personal religious views that are the subject of heated debate.  
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Should we agree, then, with AP Martinich, who boldly claims that “One of Hobbes’s 
chief projects was to create a new theory for Christianity, a theory that would make it 
compatible with the modern science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey”152 and that 
“Hobbes was a Calvinist”?153 The answer to this question depends, in part, on whether 
Hobbes was a genuine Christian.154  
I cannot adequately answer this question here, but my suspicion is that Hobbes was 
not a passionate believer. Calvinist predestination represents a rigorous, internally-consistent 
formal system. Calvinism proper places an omnipotent God as the keystone, but we can 
easily imagine other forces occupying that same formal place. Hobbes seems to have done 
just such a replacement. Hobbes embraced the conclusions but substituted a different first 
principle. In this case, Hobbes seems to have adopted two first principles: the system of 
physical laws on the one hand, and the unquestioned authority of the sovereign on the other. 
In fact, all of Hobbes’ encounters with religion seem to have a political edge. We can 
consider such a dimension now, although not in this case from the vantage of philosophy 
proper.  
                                                
152 Martinich, AP. The Two Gods of Leviathan, pg. 7. This is by no means a settled question even if Hobbes 
is seen as a devout Christian.  
153 Ibid., pg. 334. 
154 Damrosch, for instance, notes Hobbes’ affinity with Reformation theology but only to a point. 
According to Damrosch, Hobbes’ determinism is so effective it nudges the divine out of its necessity. See 
“Hobbes as reformation theologian”.  
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IV 
While Hobbes’ debate with Bramhall and the Leviathan argue for necessity in plain 
language, neither the Elements of Law nor De Cive make the case for determinism so strongly 
or explicitly. Why might this be the case?  
Of the many reasons Hobbes could have given for this switch in emphasis, 
considerations of public policy are important. The specific doctrine of the Arminians and its 
divisive effects on English history are important enough for Hobbes to reject them in favor 
of an earlier, predestinarian thinking. The earlier books were not written in the midst of a 
rebellion grounded in part on religious friction. 
In a striking passage from The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, part of 
his debate with Bramhall, Hobbes draws a parallel between the latter’s Arminian155 position 
and the Roman Church on one hand, and the civil war on the other. After noting that 
ancient philosophers discussed much of chance and necessity, but nothing of free will, 
Hobbes adds:  
Saint Paul…never uses the term of ‘free-will’; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that 
which is now called the doctrine of free-will, but derives all actions from the irresistible will 
of God, and nothing from will of him that runs or wills. But for some ages past, the doctors 
of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will of 
man…And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this 
opinion was cast out; yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and 
his followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting 
those that held the contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which 
troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris.156  
A lot is going on in this paragraph. Hobbes notes first that the early Church did not 
maintain the belief in the freedom of the will, and cites Saint Paul as his authority. The 
                                                
155 Chappell notes this in his Introduction, pg. xi.  
156 Chappell, pg. 70. Chappell notes the troubles are the English Civil War. John Bramhall held the title of 
Bishop of Derry.  
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Roman Catholic Church nevertheless adopted this doctrine, apparently under the influence 
of pagan philosophy and without scriptural warrant. The leading theologians of the 
Reformation rightly rejected this doctrine. Hobbes demonstrates with great rhetorical 
flourish that it is easy to see why—if neither philosophers nor Scripture gives it any support, 
what can justify it?  Yet Arminius revived the idea of free will among Protestants. In 
England, adopting the doctrine became politically efficacious for career-minded clergy (note 
the argument ad hominem). This lead to strife in England between the predestinarians and the 
advocates of free will. This conflict was a contributing cause of the English civil war.   
This represents a clear linkage in Hobbes’ mind between the Arminian doctrine and 
the catastrophe of civil war, a clear reason to retrench his views on predestination, because 
that doctrine is one of the key disputes between the populace and the Arminians.  
Conclusion  
Hobbes’ Grew up in an environment that made him familiar with the teachings of 
predestination. He was not tone deaf to the insights of theologians in general, and in the 
specific matter of predestination, he listened intently. Hobbes saw the resonances between 
predestination and determinism. His encounter with the theology of Calvinism bore much 
fruit. As Overhoff notes, it also provided somewhat of a religious smokescreen for his 
secular motivations. We will see Hobbes return again and again to a wide range of religious 
ideas, straining out that which he finds at cross purposes to his philosophical agenda, and 
retaining what is useful to him, often regardless of its pedigree. Such appropriation doubtless 
strengthened Hobbes arguments, and he was not ashamed of his borrowing.  
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Chapter 3: Belief, Revelation, Miracles, Heresy, Toleration 
Before considering ecclesiology proper, I consider what might be called the sources 
of belief: the performance of miracles, the nature of prophecy, and the content of the Holy 
Scriptures. After examining Hobbes’ argument for the supremacy of the sovereign in matters 
of civil and religious law, I conclude by looking at the subject of heresy from a Hobbesian 
perspective – a subject of much personal as well as intellectual interest to Hobbes. Hobbes’ 
discussion of heresy detours into the territory of self-preservation as much as it addresses 
questions of political importance.  
Hobbes’ discussion of the foundations of belief is a blend of familiar epistemological 
and anthropological concerns for Hobbes, all of which entail political conclusions.  
The Relationship between Reason and Revelation  
Hobbes provides us with his vision of the relationship between reason and revelation 
at the very beginning of Part III, Chapter 32. Hobbes announces that he is going to make a 
shift from discussing principles drawn only from nature and reason, to those drawn from 
supernatural sources—the discussion of the “prophetical” Word of God, specifically Judeo-
Christian revelation (L32.1/245). 
 While the shift does entail some different thinking, Hobbes cautions his audience 
that “we are not to renounce our sense and experience, nor (that which is the undoubted 
word of God) our natural reason.” (L32.2/245). Religious revelation will add things 
inaccessible to reason, but “though there be many things in God’s word above reason (that is 
to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated or confuted), yet there is 
nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful 
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interpretation or erroneous ratiocination.” (Ibid./246, emphasis mine). We are not to leave 
rational thought, “folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith” (Ibid./245). There are two 
valid, complementary interpretations of the “Word of God”, the natural and the 
supernatural. 
 “God’s word”, in the sense of supernatural revelation, therefore will only increase 
our knowledge. However, some of the truths it adds will be beyond reason’s ability to 
explain. Nevertheless, nothing added by God’s word will contradict what  we already know. 
We need to keep two things in mind about “God’s word”. 
 First, Hobbes clarifies what it means to say that God’s word can be “above reason”. 
He resorts to a version of the fideism he utilized in his natural theology, urging the skeptic to 
be patient, humble, and most importantly, obedient. Famously (or infamously), Hobbes 
remarks: 
…when anything written therein [in God’s word] is too hard for our examination, we are 
bidden to captivate our understanding to the words, and not to labor in sifting out a 
philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any 
rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for 
the sick. Which, swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most  part 
cast up again without effect. (L32.3/246) 
So, when a religious truth is too hard for us to understand, we must accept it, and “captivate 
our understanding” to an authoritative interpretation. 
As should be familiar, Hobbes argues that our judgment cannot be controlled, but 
our (public) words and actions can be. We are obligated to submit our will (not our intellect) 
to that of the “lawful authority”, and accept its interpretation of the passage in question. Just 
as the sovereign is empowered to decide all secular controversy, so the religious authority is 
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empowered to make declarations of this sort on matters of faith.157 So for Hobbes, religious 
truths enjoy a certain independence from experience and reason, as they do not rely on these 
latter for confirmation, but only corroboration.  
As we shall see a little later on, Hobbes will end up the “Word of God” in a 
restricted sense. After discussing prophecy, Hobbes will declare that the time of prophets 
and miracles is over. All we have to guide us as to God’s special revelation is Sacred 
Scripture. To put a finer point on it, nothing in Sacred Scripture will contradict our reason.  
This means that anything argued for in the first half of Leviathan must be consistent 
with the whole of (the admittedly constrained space of) Sacred Scripture. Not only must 
there be a sort of negative compatibility between Leviathan and Scripture (where nothing said 
in the first part Leviathan contradicts scripture), but we can also see the philosophy of 
Leviathan (and elsewhere) in a positive way as well—as an interpretive guide to understanding 
the Scriptures themselves. Hobbes operates throughout the second half with this strategy. It 
may not always work, because some truths are above supposedly reason, but we can 
“humbly” attempt such a reconciliation. Hence, we should expect principles in the first half of the 
book to be mirrored in the second half. As I will show, this is indeed the case.  
Hobbes’ account of revealed theology will be materialist and skeptical, it will take a 
dim view of human nature, and it will support his theory of absolute sovereignty. It will take 
the truths of philosophy for granted and read them into Christian theology, tendentiously at 
times. But Hobbes, in my opinion, is only feigning the pious reconciliation he attempts. His 
                                                
157 See xviii.11 of Leviathan, (page 114), where the sovereign is given the right “of hearing and deciding all 
controversies which may arise concerning law…or concerning fact.” It turns out that the sovereign and the 
lawful religious authority are one and the same, and that there is a limited form of freedom of conscience in 
Hobbes as well. Judgment cannot be coerced, but our actions can. We are bound to orthodoxy only in the 
latter.   
 91 
real concern is not to dovetail Scripture with Modern philosophy intact and harmoniously, 
but to conform religion to his philosophy.  
Hobbes will vigorously employ just such a strategy in his reading of the Scriptures, 
leaning back on his philosophical principles to manipulate difficult interpretive cases. In 
doing so, Hobbes will constantly expose and reject other exegetical schemes (Scholasticism 
especially), in effect starting from scratch with a new (and depending on who you consult, 
either a revolutionary or a heretical) perspective.  
Belief and Faith 
For Hobbes, all knowledge begins with the senses: “there is no conception in a man’s 
mind which hath not first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.” 
(1.2/6). The use of words to describe our conceptions introduces further complications: the 
range of our knowledge is potentially expanded, but we expose ourselves to the risk 
insignificant speech, speech for which there is no sensory referent.  
Science proceeds from sound definitions to certain conclusions. But unfortunately, we 
are not always able to begin at first principles. In which case, we trust to our own opinions or 
we believe in the opinions of another person.  Recall that when someone’s ideas are 
grounded in “some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth and of whose 
honesty in not deceiving  he doubteth not, and then the discourse is not so much concerning 
the thing as the person and the resolution is called BELIEF and FAITH; faith, in the man; belief, 
both of the man, and of the truth of what he says.” Hence, “in belief are two opinions, one of 
the saying of the man, the other of his virtue.” (7.5/36). 
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This idea has an immediate application to religious belief, since the phrase, “believe 
in” is primarily used in a religious context. In Christianity, “when we believe the Scriptures 
are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, 
and trust is in the church whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.” (7.7/37) All belief is a 
belief in the human sources that relay this information to us. We are not doubting God 
himself when we are skeptical about reports of the supernatural, because we have no 
privilege access to the facts of the matter to determine, in an epistemologically rigorous way, 
whether the facts support the conclusion. Hence, “whatsoever we believe upon no other 
reason than what is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether they be 
sent from God or not, is faith in men only.” (7.7/37) 
Since no human institution is above suspicion, and many are downright suspect, this 
allows Hobbes to turn a critical eye to sacred Scripture while maintaining the appearance of 
piety. The move also smuggles in a deep, and in my opinion deliberate, skepticism about the 
independent authority of any sacred history or text. Any account will require a sovereign 
authority, here and now, to add literal force to the text, and give it currency. 
The very terms of Hobbes’ epistemology seem to propel a healthy skepticism and to 
in turn require a political dimension of authority to settle these controversies.  
Revelation: Miracles, Prophets, and Scripture   
We can gather much information about God’s wishes from our natural reason, 
“which is the undoubted word of God” (32.2/245). But natural reason is necessary, but not 
sufficient for our understanding of God’s plan for humanity. A complete picture requires 
revelation, as we have seen. Natural reason is enough for basic ethical behavior, good 
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government, and unsophisticated piety. But knowledge sufficient to lead men to salvation 
requires something more.  
We can acquire a supernatural understanding of God’s message in one of two basic 
ways: (1) direct, first-order experience, or (2) by hearing about it from someone else. Of the 
latter, we can acquire this from the alleged source second-hand, or through further 
intermediaries, including the written word.   
Hobbes talks as if it is extremely unlikely that one of his contemporaries will have a 
direct and immediate experience of God. He most likely believes it to be impossible. Before 
we can conclude that God has spoken to us, we must carefully consider a wide range of 
skeptical objections to the phenomenon, not the least of which is old Cartesian saw, “was I 
dreaming?”.   
Hobbes is skeptical on a variety of grounds of the concept of a private 
communication from the divine. He takes on the evangelical notion of “inspiration” as his 
primary target. In fact, three related concepts are relevant to our discussion here: inspiration, 
enthusiasm, and conscience. 
Hobbes mentions inspiration is “called commonly ‘private spirit’” (L8.22/42). For 
Hobbes, this couldn’t create a clearer contrast between private inspiration and public reason, 
and this basic opposition will frame the argument.  
He notes “It hath been…commonly taught That faith and sanctity are not be attained by 
study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion” (L29.8/212). The effect of thinking 
this way is “to make men think that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together.” 
(ibid./213). Hobbes, the rationalist, disagrees, “Faith and sanctity are, indeed, not very 
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frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, 
and other natural ways, by which God worketh them in his elect at such time as he thinketh 
fit.” (ibid., emphasis mine). Hobbes asserts both the rationality of the process, but more 
importantly, he emphasizes the publicity of the acquisition. A purely private “inspiration” is 
immune to criticism. 
Inspiration is commonly held by Christians to come from the Holy Spirit, so the 
terms “spirit” and “inspiration” are related in the popular mind. Hobbes obviously has 
serious metaphysical misgivings about such concepts. He writes 
On the signification of the word spirit dependeth that of the word INSPIRATION, which must 
either be taken properly (and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and 
subtle air or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath) or if spirit be 
not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, then it is nothing but the blowing in 
of a phantasm (which is improper to say, and impossible; for phantasms are not, but only 
seem to be somewhat). That word [“inspiration”], therefore, is used in the Scripture  
metaphorically only (L34.25/270) 
So inspiration amounts to being filled with air like a balloon or flowery language, 
nothing else. “For the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an 
abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be 
poured into men as into barrels.” (ibid./271). All instances of “inspiration” in the Bible are 
metaphors, from the visions of the prophets to the visitation of the Apostles by the Holy 
Spirit.  
“Enthusiasm” is a word Hobbes associates with historical, predominantly pagan 
accounts of demonic possession (L12.19/68–69). The Greek root expresses possession by a 
God. Thomas Blount’s Glossographia of 1654 defines enthusiasm as, “an inspiration, a 
ravishment of the spirit, divine motion, Poetical fury.” Blount defines enthusiasts as “a Sect 
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of people that thought themselves inspired, with a Divine spirit, and to have a clear sight of all 
things they beleeved [sic], etc.”158  
On the one hand, enthusiasm in the literal sense is clearly impossible on Hobbes’ 
metaphysics. There are no real demons, and there is no such thing as possession. The idea is 
the product of human curiosity coupled with human inability to discern psychological 
mechanisms at work. It is ludicrous at best, potentially disruptive. On the other hand, 
enthusiasm closely resembles the Christian phenomenon of inspiration. If the former is 
untenable and destabilizing, then perhaps we must believe the same thing about the latter. I 
believe Hobbes is operating with the two terms as synonyms. Hobbes seems comfortable 
utilizing examples from pagan religion to demonstrate absurdity, and seems often enough to 
imply that Christian rituals and ideas are often not much different, at least not where it 
counts. 
Conscience is a related idea, and is particularly difficult to remove because it has 
evolved into a self-authenticating concept that fits with the vanity of human nature. Hobbes 
writes, “men vehemently in love with their own new opinions (though never so absurd), and 
obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of 
                                                
158 Blount, Thomas, Glossographia: or A dictionary, interpreting all such hard vvords, whether Hebrew, 
Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonick, Belgick, British or Saxon; as are now used in our refined 
English tongue. Also the terms of divinity, law, physick, mathematicks, heraldry, anatomy, war, musick, 
architecture; and of several other arts and sciences explicated. With etymologies, definitions, and 
historical observations on the same. Very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read. 
London: Tho. Newcomb, 1654. [Accessed at Early English Books Online: http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home 
]. The emphases in the citations are mine (except for the “etc.”).   
Abigail Williams’ article,  “The poetry of the un-enlightened: politics and literary enthusiasm in the early 
eighteenth century” History of European Ideas, Volume 31, Issue 2, 200. 299-311, brought this source and 
the entry on “enthusiasm” to my attention, although Williams misidentifies Blount as “Charles” Blount. I 
include a contemporary definition to give a clearer idea of the meaning that Hobbes had in mind. The  
associations would have been similar.  
For example, in his discussion of “RAGE and FURY” at L8.17/41, Hobbes argues that “excessive opinion of 
a man’s own self, for divine inspiration” is a cause of the “madness” of fury.  
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conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them” 
(L7.4/36). 
Given this ideological use of conscience, Hobbes writes that a chief “doctrine 
repugnant to civil society is whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin” (L29.7). This belief 
is flawed because “a man’s conscience and his judgment is the same thing; and as the 
judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous.” (ibid.).159 While such a reliance on 
private judgment is all a person can have in the state of nature, matters are different in the 
commonwealth, where “the law is public conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be 
guided.” (ibid., emphasis mine).   
But Hobbes has a qualified understanding of conscience that should interest us. 
Obedience “concerneth actions and words, for those only are known, and may be accused. 
And of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all but God, that knoweth the 
heart.” (L42.80/373). Hobbes argues that it is a mistake “to extend the power of the law, 
which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by 
examination and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their 
speech and actions.” (L46.37/466).160 Hobbes argues it is against the law of nature to accuse 
a person based on his private opinions. We will take up this thread later on in the discussion 
of toleration. 
So, by way of conclusion, Hobbes has an embarrassment of reasons for rejecting the 
idea of inspiration. It is bad science, bad epistemology, and most importantly, bad politics. It 
                                                
159 See also L30.14/225, where Hobbes mentions disruptive subjects operating by “their own consciences 
(that is to say, by their own private judgments)”, making the connection between the two concepts clear.  
160 The reference to “inquisition” is surely not accidental, even if it is not capitalized.  
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is important to keep in mind that in Hobbes’ day a chief form of religious disobedience was 
to deny the sovereign’s power over conscience, and to cite private inspiration as the rule of 
behavior. This lead to a range of behaviors from internal doctrinal disagreement in the 
Anglican church, to the Independents, to the unbridled madness of Antinomians, all of 
which represented to Hobbes at least, a destabilizing force in the commonwealth. This 
religious ideology made the reasons for acting occult, unassailable, and individual. Such an 
ideology was too dangerous to tolerate, at least in public.  
By rejecting inspiration as a source for divine contact, Hobbes puts communications 
from the divine into a bottleneck. Only a  small minority of prophets will receive messages 
from God. The rest of humanity will be subject to the epistemological constraints of “belief” 
(a concept shot through with difficulties as we have seen). This solution reduces the 
complexity of the political problem for Hobbes, by limiting the sources that can generate 
ostensibly divine inputs of potentially destabilizing force in the commonwealth.   
Hobbes also constrains the nature of the communication, as we shall see. Messages 
from God will not be subrational, mystical infusions, but rather words – spoken directly or in 
dreams or visions, things liable to be written down. Once written they can be shared, and 
once shared they can be interpreted.  (And not just interpreted, scrutinize to the point of 
downright doubt). 
A real epistemological question arises when someone claims to have spoken with 
God. How can we be sure the experience is true? Hearsay, especially of the miraculous, is 
inherently dubious. “For if a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally 
and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what kind of argument he 
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can produce to oblige me to believe it.” (32.5/246) In another place, Hobbes notes, “how a 
man can be assured of the revelation of another without a revelation particularly to himself, 
it is evidently impossible. … And therefore, no man can infallibly know by natural reason 
that another has had a supernatural revelation of God’s will, but only a belief (every one, as 
the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser, a firmer or weaker belief)” (L26.40/186–7).  
I can legitimately ask: Is the speaker a messenger from God, a prophet, or is he 
simply mistaken? Perhaps even a fraud? If someone believes themselves to have had a 
personal communication from God, Hobbes argues that we have sound reasons to disregard 
their assertions. No one can force us to accept (in our heart of hearts at least) that something 
we have not directly perceived, clearly and distinctly, is true. Hobbes writes “So that God 
Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration, yet he obliges no 
man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends it, who (being a man) may err, and 
(which is more) may lie.” (L32.6/247). Furthermore,  
it sufficiently appeareth that in a commonwealth a subject that has no certain and assured 
revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the 
command of the commonwealth; for if men were at liberty to take for God’s 
commandments their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men, 
scarce two men would agree on what is God’s commandment; and yet in respect of them 
every man would despise the commandments of the commonwealth. (L26.41/188).  
Scripture, Hobbes writes, provides us with two criteria to discern the true prophet 
from the false. A true prophet (a) works miracles, and (b) only preaches in favor of the 
established religion. Both conditions must be met, for there are many false prophets who 
can work wonders, but who preach against the righteous faith. 
What, then, is a miracle (a)? Miracles are “admirable works of God” (37.1/293) 
which cause a sense of wonder. Men wonder at things which are so “strange…the like of it 
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hath never or very rarely been produced” and such things that “we cannot imagine it to have 
been done by natural means” (37.2/293). The end of a miracle is to afford credibility to 
“God’s messengers, ministers, and prophets”, and then only among God’s elect (37.6/295).  
In sum: “A MIRACLE is a work of God (besides his operation by the way of nature, 
ordained in the creation), done for the making manifest to his elect the mission of an 
extraordinary minister for their salvation.” (37.7/296–7, italics removed) 
But, strangely, what causes the wonder of a miracle is relative to the observer. Hence, 
we have the curious (one might again say, “skeptical”) result that “the same thing may be a 
miracle to one and not to another.” (37.5/294) This depends on whether the observers have 
the appropriate knowledge to discriminate between objective conformity to the laws of 
nature or not. While I am not sure if Hobbes intended it, this passage has the effect of 
undermining confidence in the nature of miracles as a whole. The implication is that a well-
educated scientist will live in a world with a shortage, perhaps even an absence of miracles. 
The ignorant multitude, however, will live in a world abounding with them. 
Even further, Hobbes cautions that we must guard against false miracles, that is, 
apparent miracles that are the direct result of deception. There are many who can work 
wonders, but who have not be given a mission by God. Hobbes hesitates to ascribe 
supernatural power to enchanters and the like, because this gives mortals powers akin to the 
deity.  
Humanity can already be mislead without a true break with the laws of nature. This is 
no surprise: 
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For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all mankind (but especially of 
them that have not much knowledge of natural causes and of the nature and interests of 
men) as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. (37.12/298)  
One person alone can wreak havoc, but “if we look upon the impostures wrought by 
confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to 
believe.” (Ibid./298–299) 
The existence of false “miracles” is the reason for Hobbes’ insistence on the second 
hallmark of a true prophet (b). Importantly: “how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tends 
to stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the king’s authority, he that doth 
such miracles is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make a trial of their 
allegiance.” (32.7/248). The motive for deceivers to promise their own unique path to 
salvation is obvious,  
For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity pretends to govern them (that 
is to say, to rule and reign over them), which is a thing that all men naturally desire, and is 
therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture (36.19/290). 
Hobbes counsels us to heed the words of the Old Testament, “that we not take for 
prophets that teach any other religion than that which God’s lieutenant (which at that time 
was Moses) hath established, nor any (though he teach the same religion) whose prediction 
we do not see come to pass.” (37.13/299). We are to subordinate our private judgment to 
the “public reason” (37.13/300).161  
The danger, for Hobbes, is very real and very clear: 
For when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God’s prophet, they must 
either take their own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the tumor 
[sic: a swelling of pride or passion] of their own hearts for the Spirit of God, or they must 
suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince or by some of their fellow subjects that 
can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into rebellion (without other miracle to 
                                                
161 Hobbes defines public reason here as “the reason of God’s supreme lieutenant” (ibid.).  
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confirm their calling than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity), and by this 
means destroy all laws, reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of 
violence and civil war. (36.20/293)162 
A difficulty, one of many here, emerges. Only those alleged miracles which reinforce 
the current religious regime are valid, no matter how amazing and wondrous the effects we 
observe are. We must search for a naturalistic explanation for any “miracle” attached to a 
dissenting viewpoint. Furthermore, the sovereign has the absolute right to determine what is 
and what is not a miracle, which while not logically entailing a problem, seems to leave that 
discretion open to abuse.  
In any case, as Hobbes sees it, the question of who counts as a prophet is of little 
practical value to his contemporaries, since he maintains that “miracles now cease…since the 
time of our Savior.” (32.9/249). No new revelation is forthcoming. All that is left is the 
Scriptures, which are more than adequate for the needs of the Christian. This is a critical 
point for Hobbes: that the time of miracles is over, at least until the Last Judgment. But 
Hobbes provides virtually no evidence to support this claim, although it dovetails nicely with 
his political commitments. Pocock highlights precisely this issue, that Hobbes’ thoroughly 
ordinary present was squarely presented as being between a miraculous past and an 
eschatological future. For Hobbes’s politics and his theology, “The present…is a time of 
remembering past prophecies and expecting the future which they foretell.”163 
                                                
162 The reference to Parliament and Cromwell here should be apparent. It is hard to see Hobbes as endorsing 
the new regime, as it is sometimes argued he did, on the basis of this searing passage! 
163 Pocock, “Time, history, and eschatology”, pg. 169. I differ with Pocock in that he takes Hobbes 
essentially at his word. I view the temporal division of Hobbes’ sacred history as an ideological device to 
pay homage to religious conventions, while effectively eliminating the miraculous from present 
consideration. 
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So in the place of ongoing miracles, we have the Scriptures as our reference. What 
counts as canon there? Hobbes is (apparently) no radical: “I can acknowledge no other 
books of the Old testament to be Holy Scriptures but those which have been commanded to 
be acknowledged for such by the authority of the Church of England.” (33.1/250) And “As 
for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all 
Christian churches” (33.2/251). 
Yet Hobbes’ critical and skeptical tone continues into his reading of the Old 
Testament.  Hobbes applies textual criticism to demonstrate that Moses was not author of 
the Pentateuch. For instance, in Deuteronomy, Moses’ tomb is described as lost “to this 
day”. This must have been written by someone other than Moses, “For it were a strange 
interpretation to say Moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by prophecy) that it was not 
found to this day where he was yet living.” (L33.4/252).164 
Hobbes utilizes the same methodology to conclude the same about the authorship 
(multiple, after-the-fact) of several other books of the Old Testament. Among his other 
conclusions is that Job may have been written by as many as three different people, and not 
as a historical account, but rather as an exploration of the question of why the innocent must 
endure evil. These ideas were both novel and unorthodox, they emphasize the human, 
historical qualities of the Scripture as opposed to praising their divine authorship.  
On the basis of these innovations, Hobbes is thought by many to be the first 
modern, critical interpreter of the Bible. There are medieval Jewish practitioners of a similar 
                                                
164 The insertion of “though by prophecy” seems a calculated to deflect criticism of what was surely an 
outrageous idea to Hobbes’ audience. One might as well argue that the earth revolved around the sun! 
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approach (of which Hobbes was likely ignorant), but Hobbes was certainly creating a new 
approach among Early Modern Christians.165 
Hobbes insinuates that Ezra was responsible for the final form of the Old 
Testament, either as editor, or even as author. Ezra collected the books of the Old 
Testament after the return of the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity. Hobbes 
dispassionately cites two passages from Esdras that insinuate that the law was destroyed, and 
Ezra reconstructed it by “inspiration”.  
Likewise, the books of the New Testament can only be authenticated from the time 
of the Council of Laodicea, AD 364!166 Hobbes observes that by this time, “ambition had so 
far prevailed on the great doctors of the church as no more to esteem emperors, though 
Christian, for shepherds of the people, but for sheep” (33.20/257). Nevertheless, 
I am persuaded that they did not therefore falsify the Scriptures (though the copies of the 
books of the New Testament were in the hands only of the ecclesiastics), because if they had 
had an intention to do so, they would have surely made them more favorable to their power 
over Christian princes and civil sovereignty than they are. (33.20/257) 
Hobbes concludes with an apparent non sequitur: “I see not therefore any reason to 
doubt but that the Old and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of 
those things which were done and said by the prophets and apostles.” (33.20/257)  
This leap should give us serious pause, however.  Hobbes has spent the last several 
pages showing us that the authorship of the Bible is more complex than it commonly noted, 
that various authors intervened in the text over time. He has also further identified certain 
                                                
165 Spinoza’s approach shares much with Hobbes. It seems likely there is an influence there, although Spinoza 
was almost certainly aware of the medieval Jewish tradition as well. See Curley, “I durst not write so boldly”, 
556–571. 
166 See Leviathan, 33.20/256–7. 
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historical choke points where the Scriptures were left, alone essentially, in one person’s 
hands. After confessing that this would be a golden opportunity to distort the texts, he 
altogether abandons the idea. Curley draws a red circle around this disavowal of any 
wrongdoing. 167 
I am sympathetic to the skeptical interpretation that Curley provides, but one needn’t 
call Hobbes an atheist to see a problem here. Even if we accept that Hobbes is ignoring the 
skeptical implications of his own argument so far, he has certainly painted himself into a 
corner, so to speak. If we aren’t to resort to Curley’s position, we must say that Hobbes has 
disenchanted the Bible significantly. He has emphasized its human origins (while not 
precluding a divine influence) and its historical progress. The canon is not written on stone 
tables, it is the work of human beings. And human beings have provided ample testimony to 
their imperfections. We should expect the Scripture  to need human hands to interpret it. 
We should perhaps expect some points of confusion. These conclusions are thoroughgoing 
and dangerous to a system of belief that places the Bible as the infallible anchor of belief.  
This is why Hobbes rushes to plug that hole in the dike by saying:  
But it is not the writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a book canonical. And 
although these books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the writers were all 
endued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is 
the setting forth of the rights of the kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. 
(33.20/258).  
But what is it that gives the books of the Bible their authority? We can ask this 
question in various ways. No one, Hobbes says, disputes “that the first and original author of 
them is God” (33.21/259).  
                                                
167 See the discussion on 567–70 of “I durst not write so boldly”. This is a clear instance of “suggestion by 
disavowal”.  
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For Hobbes, this question of authority is equivalent to, “By what authority are they 
made law?” (33.21/259, italics removed).168 Hobbes distinguishes three possibilities here: (a) 
private judgment, (b) the judgment of a commonwealth and its national church, or (c) a 
universal church headed by a universal sovereign.  
He dismisses the first as absurd, arguing if it obtained, “it were impossible that any 
divine law should be acknowledged” out of the mess of human “pride or ignorance…or out 
of ambition” (33.24/260). The question, then, evolves into the following: 
Whether Christian kings and the sovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths be 
absolute in their own territories, immediately under God, or subject to one vicar of Christ, 
constituted over the universal Church, to be judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, 
as he shall think expedient or necessary for the common good? (33.24/260–1) 
Which question we will consider in the next section of this chapter, but it is 
important to note, along with SA Lloyd, that Hobbes is substituting a concrete, political 
answer where it might seem more natural to attempt an abstract, epistemological one. The 
former has the advantage in Hobbes’ system of being unambiguous, and enforceable. Lloyd 
effectively argues that Hobbes is arguing for what is reasonable as opposed to what is true, 
and “By transforming the question of what religious beliefs are true into the question of 
whose judgment we should take to be authoritative, Hobbes has raised the level of the 
dispute to a much more general and formal level.”169 One, that certainly seems more 
manageable for a political theorist.  
Stepping back for a second, there is a logical circle in Hobbes’ account of what is to 
be admitted as divine revelation. Scripture tells us what our responsibilities are, and we trust 
                                                
168 Hobbes is here referring to the public acceptance and observance of the Scriptures. Their power over the 
human conscience is God’s alone.  
169 Lloyd, Ideals as interests, pg. 110. The Rawlsian language is intentional both on my part, and in Lloyd’s 
writing. Rawls, after all, did direct the thesis that was developed into Lloyd’s book. 
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Scripture  because it is the word of the prophets. But we only know what counts as an 
acceptable prophet on the basis of those same Scriptures. Curley makes a point of this in his 
argument for Hobbes’ atheism. This wouldn’t be the first time an early Modern philosopher 
was accused of intentionally putting a circular argument into his work!170 I think Hobbes, 
also, was aware of his circle. 
In summary, we can see how Hobbes’ account of what me might call the “elements 
of faith” is heavily structured by his skeptical epistemology and by his authoritarian political 
theory. We can also witness his suspicion of human nature at work as well. But the principles 
extend deeper than mere parallel placement. The immeasurable capacity of humans for 
ignorance on the one hand, and fraud on the other, when it comes to the question of 
miracles and revelation particularly, demonstrates vividly the interconnections between 
Hobbes’ anthropology and his epistemology. The corruption found by the former drives the 
skepticism of the latter.  
Heresy  
In 1666, Parliament, under the direction of Hobbes’ once-friend Clarendon, 
threatened to launch an inquiry into atheism, with Hobbes as a chief target.171 The attempt 
                                                
170 I am referring, of course, to the infamous “Cartesian circle” in Meditation III of the Meditations on First 
Philosophy. Whether Descartes intentionally inserted circular reasoning into his argument for the purposes 
of undermining his conclusions, or whether he was not in fact committing a circle, I leave to better 
interpreters of Descartes. I do agree with Strauss that such schoolboy blunders are extremely unlikely in an 
intellect such as Descartes’, especially in print. 
171 See Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, 41–43. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon and Hobbes had been 
friendly before the Civil Wars on the basis of their mutual royalism and (at least apparent) Anglicanism. 
Hobbes’ return to England in 1651 (9 years prior to the Restoration), as well as his defense of the legitimacy of 
surrendering to a conquering power (L. R&C.6–8/490–492) alienated Clarendon and many of Hobbes’ former 
royalist friends. The candid, biting, and unorthodox religious views of Leviathan did not help Hobbes’ case one 
bit. 
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was repeated in 1674, 1675, and 1680 under the initiative of bishops personally hostile to 
Hobbes. They sought the ultimate sanction. Aubrey records it thus: 
There was a report (and surely true) that in parliament, not long after the king was settled, 
some of the bishops made a motion to have the good old gentleman [Hobbes] burnt for a 
heretic. Which he hearing, feared that his papers might be searched by their order, and told 
me he had burnt part of them.172 
The matter of heresy, was, thus, to Hobbes of great personal import later in his life, 
after he had penned Leviathan. Much was at stake for him.  
The question of heresy occupied much of Hobbes’ later life, both practically and 
theoretically. Although Hobbes briefly mentions heresy and its cognates in the Leviathan of 
1651, he devotes an entire Appendix to it in the Latin Leviathan of 1668. To this, he adds 
sections of his Historia Ecclesiatica  and A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the 
Common Laws of England173 (both 1666), as well as a “An Historical Narration Concerning 
Heresy, and the Punishment Thereof” (written in 1668). Finally there is a short legal brief, 
dating from 1673, which also addresses these matters.174  Many of these arguments overlap, 
but it is worth expanding our discussion here past the pages of Leviathan alone in the name 
of greater detail because sometimes the arguments are clearer in the other sources.175 
                                                
172 Brief Lives, 153. 
173 I am using the A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England edited by Joseph 
Cropsey, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. As per my usual practice, I am modernizing the spelling.  
174 Mintz, Samuel I. “Hobbes on the law of heresy: A new manuscript”, Journal of the History of Ideas 29:3 
(1968), 409–14. Mintz presents and introduction, followed by the 3 pages of the brief. This is another incidence 
of new Hobbes material being unearthed fairly recently.  
175 For convenience, I will refer to these works in the text as follows: Historia Ecclesiatica as Historia; A Dialogue 
between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws as Dialogue; “An Historical Narration Concerning Heresy, 
and the Punishment Thereof” as “Narration”; and “Hobbes on the law of heresy: A new manuscript” as the 
“Brief”. 
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Patricia Springborg writes that Hobbes’ works on heresy “were written to absolve 
himself of the charge that his was a heresy to end all heresies.”176 But while there are obvious 
personal concerns to attend to, Samuel Mintz cautions us that “it would be wrong to assume 
that his researches into the law of heresy were prompted by self-interest alone. …Hobbes, 
fearful though he was of his life, viewed the danger to himself as an assault upon principles 
he had upheld all his life.”177 Hence Mintz, and others, argues that there is also a philosophical 
motive worth pursuing here.  
Hobbes’ conclusion regarding heresy, in short, is the following: 
So as at this day there is no Statute in force, nor any Law in England whereby to punish a 
man for any matter of Doctrine in Religion, nor ground for any Writ to authorize such 
punishment but only the Ordinaries have such power to excommunicate178 
In other words, heresy is not a crime. We should not be surprised by this. Hobbes 
argues, “To err, to be deceived, to have unfortunate opinions, this is not, by its nature, a 
crime.” (L.App2.30/527). 
Heresy by implication is also rejected. Writing on the Nicene Creed, Hobbes notes 
that only explicit rejection of the creed was grounds for heresy. In general, this should hold:  
For it is inequitable to say that the faith is denied by implication, and that someone should 
be punished for that reason. Is it equitable to seek a man’s life by cleverness in drawing 
consequences? Or to put it at risk against adversaries (or even a judge) skilled in the art of 
logic? Shall the law, which requires nothing but obedience, take vengeance on faulty 
reasoning? (L.App2.52/533).  
The same line of reasoning would be thrown up to defend Hobbes against the 
charge of atheism by implication, with perhaps the same self-serving intent.  
                                                
176 Springborg, Patricia. “Hobbes on Religion” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Tom Sorrell ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 346–380. pg. 351.  
177 Mintz, “Hobbes on the law of heresy”, 410 (Mintz writing). These principles had to do with the legal 
supremacy of the sovereign (over common law arguments and the independent action of the bishops). 
178 Mintz, “Hobbes on the law of heresy”, 414 (Hobbes writing). Spelling modernized and Americanized.  
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A citizen cannot be punished in present day England for heresy. The most that can 
be done is to be excommunicated by the Church of England, which carries only a spiritual 
danger (and to an unbeliever, no danger at all). In order for heresy to be a crime, a statute 
must be passed that clearly specifies what heresy is and how it should be dealt with. How, 
then, does Hobbes reach this conclusion?  
Hobbes makes his argument on both legal and historical grounds. His theory of law 
is informed by his theory of sovereignty. His account of history is colored by both his 
political theory and his account of human nature. In neither case is he simply arguing the law 
or the facts of history, but always at the same time he is informed by his wider speculations.  
It is also worth noting that Hobbes is no stranger to the methods of either history or law as 
disciplines. Hobbes both translated (Thucydides) and wrote (Behemoth) history. His legal 
argument, while clearly idiosyncratic in the context of the English Common Law traditions, 
is an informed one.   
Hobbes’ legal argument is best stated in the Dialogue, but the case work is succinctly 
laid out in the “Brief”. Before launching into a discussion of the chapter of the Dialogue that 
deals directly with the law of heresy, it is perhaps best to review what Hobbes says about law 
in Leviathan and earlier on in the text of the Dialogue itself. 
Unsurprisingly, given its title, the Dialogue frames itself as a discussion between a 
Lawyer and a Philosopher.179 The Lawyer, following the lead of Lord Edward Coke, tries to 
                                                
179 It is not a very literary dialogue. Hobbes developed a taste for writing dialogue later in life: Behemoth and the 
Appendices to Leviathan are also in the form of dialogues. Even the verse-form Historia Eccelesiatica is a dialogue! 
All four lack dramatic power and seem to depict fairly static exchanges, but I think Hobbes was less concerned 
with theater than with rhetoric at this point. Hobbes is a master stylist, but  an uninspiring dramatist. (And 
given the Gondibert controversy, Hobbes’ aesthetic judgment may have been questionable in places anyway).  
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argue for the existence of a common law behind and above the statutory law.  Common law, 
as one might recall, is unwritten law, a series of principles built up out of the series of judicial 
decisions over a long period of time. Statutory law, sometimes called “black letter” law, is 
written, positive law enacted by the legislature. For the Lawyer, as for Coke, the collective 
decisions of judges embody “an artificial perfection of reason…because by so many 
succession of Ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of Grave and 
Learned Men.”180 
Hobbes argues the contrary, that there is no common law situated against the rule of 
statutory law; there is no independent source of law other than the sovereign.181 
He concludes, through the mouth of the Philosopher:  
I say, that the King’s Reason, when it is publicly upon Advice and Deliberation declared, is 
that Anima Legis [Soul of the Law] and that Summa Ratio [Perfect Reason], and that Equity 
which all agree to be the Law of Reason, is all that is, or ever was Law in England, since it 
became Christian, besides the Bible.182 
In Leviathan, Hobbes makes a similar point: 
                                                                                                                                            
A dialogue frames itself as an argument, with alternating sides that approaches an ideal model for teaching, and 
given Hobbes’ interests in education, the didactic form of the dialogue is well suited to his ends. Hobbes 
definitely appreciated the value of the mode of presentation of his arguments when he began composing 
Leviathan. See Quentin Skinner’s excellent book, Reason and Rhetoric in the Work of Thomas Hobbes.  
Secondly, the dialogue model was a common style among Renaissance humanists and some early Modern 
thinkers, even Galileo wrote dialogues. Tuck notes this “interesting return to a deeply humanist practice” in 
Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, 44. So Hobbes’ had contextual reasons for adopting the form.  
Finally, dialogues have the advantage of authorial obscuration. One cannot necessarily finger Hobbes as the 
author of a certain opinion, should these prove controversial. After some of his experiences with the responses 
to the English Leviathan, Hobbes may have felt the need for this kind of distancing.     
I will capitalize “Lawyer” and “Philosopher” to make it clear I am referring to the characters in the dialogue.  
180 Dialogue, 55. Cropsey tells us that the passage is a close paraphrase of Coke’s own words.  
181 One might be tempted to pitch the distinction as the contrast between natural and positive law, as well. 
This can be granted with some important qualifications. For Hobbes, the natural laws frame the issues for 
the sovereign to enact positive law. Natural laws only have independent, pragmatic force in the state of 
nature. They have no independent power in the commonwealth because the positive laws concretize, and 
for all practical purposes, replace them. The natural law is the skeleton upon which the positive laws of the 
sovereign are supposed to hang. They have no life apart from the flesh in Hobbes’ theory. To give them an 
independent authority is to side with Coke and the common law (and the rest of the medieval natural  law 
tradition, of course).  
182 Dialogue, 62 
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In all courts of justice, the sovereign (which is the person of the commonwealth) is he that 
judgeth; the subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason which moved his 
sovereign to make such law, that he sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his 
sovereign’s sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one. (L36.11/177) 
Hobbes’ definition of law is:  
A Law is the Command of him, or them that have the Sovereign Power, given to those that 
be his or their Subjects declaring Publicly, and plainly what every one of them may do, and 
what they must forbear to do.183 
(Compare this to Aquinas, where law is “an ordinance of reason for the common 
good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated.”184)  
An essential feature in Hobbes’ account of law is its public promulgation. 
Promulgation gives law a public face. It keeps law from constant and disorienting fluctuation 
by disconnecting law from arbitrary whim. In a word, a promulgated law stabilizes 
expectations. 
Coke tries to outline the common law criteria for the prosecution of heresy, 
providing five guidelines to determine the crime. But this misses the point entirely in 
Hobbes’ mind. “The principle thing to be considered,” Hobbes notes dryly, “which is the 
Heresy itself, he leaves out; viz. What it is, in what Fact, or Words it consisteth, what Law it 
violateth, Statute-Law, or the Law of Reason.” Coke wants to argue for the criminality of 
heresy on the basis of custom, tradition, and precedent, a line of reasoning which Hobbes 
                                                
183 Dialogue, 71. 
184 Summa I–II.90.4. As can be seen, Hobbes and St. Thomas concur on several features of their definition. 
Absent in Hobbes is the emphasis on the rationality of the law and its aim towards the common good. Both of 
these are implied in what Hobbes says. The sovereign’s reason makes law, and it is in his best interest to ensure 
the wealth and prosperity of his people. Hobbes and Aquinas differ on the availability of an objective standard 
by which to judge the rationality of a sovereign’s decision or what constitutes the common good to which the 
sovereign must subordinate their decision. There is no such objective standard in Hobbes’ decisionism.   
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repudiates, “but Precedents prove only what was done, not what was well done.”185 Statutes 
are the only thing that counts in Hobbesian jurisprudence.  
1 Eliz. [1] cap. 1 “revived” the early acts of Richard 2, Henry 4, and Henry 5, 
effectively abolishing the crime of heresy in England.186 If black letter law is all that matters, 
then any heretic is no liable to formal state (or non-state/ecclesiastical) coercion, at least as 
matters now stand. Before we can tie all of these strands together, we must consider another, 
related issue. 
Toleration? 
One of the natural questions that arises from all of this self-defense against the 
accusations of heresy is to wonder where Hobbes stood on the question of religious 
toleration. If Hobbes is lenient towards heresy, is he tolerate of publicly-avowed opposing 
viewpoints on matters of religion? One thing for sure is certain, Hobbes was not John 
Locke, who maintained that: “the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these 
civil concernments [life, liberty, external property]; and that all civil power is bounded and 
confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any 
                                                
185 Dialogue, 129 
186 In statutes earlier than 1963, when a simpler system was adopted, the naming convention was as follows: 
year of the reign of the monarch (the “regnal year”), abbreviated name of the monarch, number of the Act. So 
1. Eliz. 1 cap. 1 is the first Act of the first year of Elizabeth I. I use square brackets around the 1 to 
acknowledge that Hobbes knew of the existence of only one Queen Elizabeth.   
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manner to be extended to the salvation of souls”.187 (Although there are some who argue 
that the two are closer in thought than has been appreciated.)188  
Certainly, Hobbes considers the relation of science to religious doctrine in more than 
one place, and seems to be of two minds on the subject.  
We find in Anti-White, for instance, Hobbes writing the following words: “I say that 
the philosopher is indeed free to enquire into the nature and cause of motion”.189 Hobbes 
does subject this inquiry to limitations, however. When the natural scientist happens to 
“stumble upon a proposition that is now held by the Christian faith and that seems to 
contradict a conclusion he has established earlier,”190 the scientist must confess his lack of 
understanding. He cannot assert that his statement is correct and that Church dogma is 
incorrect, because he is then overstepping his bounds. He has “been allowed to advance as far 
as correct reasoning leads him” and must submit to Church authority.191 The public words 
and deeds of the scientist-as-citizen must submit to authority, as Hobbes has reiterated over 
and over again. 
Yet Hobbes does not always see the Church as drawing a valid limit on science. In 
Leviathan, we find an allusion to Galileo, whom Hobbes met in 1634.192 
                                                
187 Locke, John, “A letter concerning toleration” in Two treatises of government and a letter concerning 
toleration, Ian Shapiro, ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 215–54. pg. 218. Hobbes may have met 
Locke late in life, see Tuck, Hobbes: A very short introduction, 45. 
188 See Tuck, Richard. “Hobbes and Locke on Toleration” in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. Ed. 
Mary G. Dietz. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1990. 153–171. Tuck makes a historical 
argument that Locke and Hobbes shared many of the same policy interests regarding toleration, and may 
have met in person. 
189 Anti-White, Ch. 26.7 (307).  
190 Ibid. 
191 Anti-White, Ch. 26.7 (308).  
192 Curley brings this to the attention of the reader in his edition of Leviathan. 
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And every day it appeareth more and more that the years and days are determined by 
motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have in their writings but supposed such 
doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for an against it, have been punished for it 
by authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are 
contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true. (46.42/468) 
These religious authorities “neither by lawful authority nor sufficient study are 
competent judges of truth,” and this arrogation of power “is but usurpation.” (ibid.)  
At first, we might be tempted to find an aporia between these two texts, one 
endorsing limits on inquiry in the name of Church doctrine, one endorsing the removal of 
limits against Church doctrine. To navigate between these two passages, we need to keep in 
mind that on the one hand, the Anti-White is discussing a genuine conflict between a 
scientific discovery and a Church doctrine, and the mindset of the scientist involved. The 
defense of Galileo, on the other hand, seems to be accusing the Church censors of 
incorrectly identifying a conflict where there is none. Moreover, the passage in Leviathan 
seems directed toward specifically Catholic overreaching.  
So Hobbes accuses censors of taking the role of experts, but without the “sufficient 
study” to be “competent judges of truth”. Blinded by the doctrines of Scholasticism, priests 
stand in the way of the truth. Hobbes further accuses Galileo’s persecutors (as stand in for 
this mindset in general) of lacking “lawful authority”. The Catholic Church is arrogating to 
itself powers over science and scientists it only possesses in its legal domains. Hobbes 
implies that an educated sovereign, freed from the intellectual shackles of Catholic–
Scholastic influence, would endorse the kinds of natural-scientific inquiries Galileo was 
punished for, especially given their practical benefits for the sovereign’s nation. Furthermore, 
recall that Hobbes maintains that there cannot be any conflict between the laws of nature 
and the Word of God; any contradiction is only apparent. We have recourse to metaphorical 
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interpretations of Scripture should the literal meaning contradict a confirmed scientific 
finding.  
Hobbes, as both a practitioner and student of the sciences, seems to have come close 
to Kant’s idea in “What is Enlightenment?”, at least a far as scientific inquiry goes. In that 
essay Kant imagines a ruler speaking to his people: “Argue as much as you want and about 
what you want, but obey!”193 One can easily imagine Hobbes endorsing this statement for 
scientists, especially those who would later come to be known as physicists.  
But outside of scientific inquiry proper, Hobbes seems to be far less interested in 
promoting religious toleration or freedom of thought in general. Recall that the laws of 
Nature specify that it is the sovereign’s uncontested right  
to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing, to peace; and 
consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in 
speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before 
they are published. (L18.9/113) 
Because, “the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth that can be does 
never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war.” (ibid.) 
Yet Hobbes does leave to the subject a personal space. “In cases where the sovereign 
has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear, according to his 
own discretion.” (L31.18/143) In fact, Hobbes counsels sovereigns to provide only the bare 
minimum of laws, because “Unnecessary laws are not good laws” (L30.21/229) and  
where there are more laws than we can easily remember and where they forbid things which 
reason by itself does not forbid, men must necessarily fall afoul of the laws as they fall into 
                                                
193 Kant, Immanuel, “An answer to the question: What is enlightenment” in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, 
translated by Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983, pg 45 [volume 8, pg. 41 of the 
Academy edition]. In the original, the text is presented in quotes and it is in italics.  
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traps, through ignorance and without any bad intention; and this is incompatible with the 
innocent liberty, which sovereigns are obliged by natural law to preserve for their citizens.194 
This is because “the good of the sovereign and people cannot be separated.” 
(L30.21/229). Laws are like hedges (or the banks of a river), they exist to guide not to 
restrict entirely.195 
As regards religion, recall that Hobbes argues that reason tells us that since “a 
commonwealth is but one person, it also to exhibit to God but one worship, which it doth 
when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men publicly.” (L31.37/242). A 
commonwealth without uniform worship is a commonwealth without public worship, and 
exhibits no religion whatsoever. 
But worship is an external act demanding conformity. It is far more difficult to 
control the patterns of our own private thoughts. While we are commanded to “captivate 
our understanding” to the observances the sovereign issues, Hobbes notes he does not mean 
here 
a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man, but of the will to 
obedience where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion 
are not in our power to change, but always and necessarily such as the things we see, hear, 
and consider suggest to us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We 
then captivate our understanding and reason when we forbear contradiction, when we so 
speak as (by lawful authority) we are commanded, and when we live accordingly; which, in 
sum, is trust and faith in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable from any notion 
at all from the words spoken. (L32.4/246) 
Perfect control of our thoughts is impossible (although some is to be expected or 
even required), but perfect external compliance is well within our power. Mind control, on 
the model of Big Brother in 1984 is not on the table. The intellect is possibly too “slippery” 
for this to work, at least as Hobbes understood it, in the era before brainwashing.  
                                                
194 De Cive (13.15/151) 
195 See DC, ibid., L21.1/136, L30.21/229 
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Hobbes argues it is natural and right for a person to seek out his or her own private 
opinions on matters of religion. “For who is there, that knowing there is so great a danger in 
an error, whom the natural care of himself not to his soul upon his own judgment, rather 
than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?” (L46.37/466). Elsewhere 
Hobbes reiterates, “it is unreasonable (in them who teach there is danger in every little error) 
to require of a man endued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of any other man, 
or of the most voices of many other men (which is little better than to venture his salvation 
at cross and pile).” (L47.20/482).196 
So we can say with confidence that Hobbes advocates something like a freedom of 
conscience, or freedom of thought, but only in the sense that it does not break out into 
public words and deeds. Which is to say, not a very strong account of the freedom of 
thought. If kept private, probably extending to the company of friends, thought is no 
danger, and should not be the subject of coercion. I might add, that what holds for religion, 
also holds even more truly for science. But he is walking a fine line here. Leaving thought 
“free” invites its exposure to the light of day in words and deeds. But we have no realistic 
alternative, as Alan Ryan (see below) would contend as well. In the privacy of our own 
minds, we are free to be damned. 
Alan Ryan’s informative article, “Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life” presents a 
detailed examination of the arguments for a more tolerant Hobbes. Ryan considers whether 
Hobbes adopts one of three possibilities regarding the “inner life”, or private religious belief: 
(1) an doctrine of absolute thought control, taken to its logical extreme involving 
                                                
196 “Cross and pile” is the equivalent of “heads and tails”. 
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brainwashing and programming, (2) a liberal doctrine of free toleration, or (3) a pragmatic 
position between the two. Hobbes, settles, according to Ryan, on the middle path, where we 
“conjoin private liberty and public regulation.”197 In fact, Ryan thinks Hobbes is fairly hands 
off when it comes to private thoughts, “Security would be threatened by much prying, so 
much prying is condemned.”198 
Hobbes clearly sees the limits of coercion, because the sovereign power “cannot be 
maintained by any civil law or terror of punishment.” (L30.4/220) Proper education is 
required, education that teaches the sound, rational foundations of the sovereign’s power. 
Lloyd has highlighted this often neglected aspect of Hobbes’ thought.  
Ryan’s approach is similar in many respects to my own, emphasizing the skeptical 
and political dimensions of a Hobbesian account of toleration, and asserting that “religion is 
a matter of law and not truth” for Hobbes.199  
But making sense of this latter claim can give us fits, as we have seen before. Ryan 
brings out the obvious question for Hobbes’s thought: If the sovereign’s power extends to 
all doctrines, what happens if the sovereign were to declare an obvious truth illegal? Hobbes 
does his best to isolate one person as the judge of acceptable and unacceptable doctrine, and 
by placing this person in sole possession of final political power, he ties that act of judgment 
closely to the pragmatic needs of a domain. But could the sovereign really deny something 
incontestably true, like the truth of 2+2=4? This seems a difficult position to maintain, 
especially given Hobbes’ evident love of the precision of geometry.  
                                                
197 Ryan, Alan, “Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life” in The Nature of Political Theory edited by David Miller 
and Larry Sidentop. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 197–218. The quote is from page 208. 
198 Ryan, 208.  
199 Ryan, 210. 
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We must first be aware that Hobbes had no knowledge of propagandistic 
totalitarianism like that of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, or 1984, and the idea that the 
sovereign might be able to make truths whole cloth would not be familiar to him. To 
Hobbes’ mind, 2+2 could never equal 5. 
Hobbes explicitly tells us, “arithmetic is a certain and infallible art.” (L5.3/23, 
emphasis mine). Nonetheless, even in addition, “unpracticed men must, and professors 
themselves may, often err and cast up false” (L5.2/23) and a controversy may ensue. So the 
decision as to who is right in a controversy of this nature is to have an arbitrator decide what 
is “right reason”; that arbitrator is the sovereign. The Hobbesian response here must be that 
no longstanding controversy, sufficient to make humans “come to blows or be undecided” 
(L5.3/23), will be found in matters so trivial. The sovereign’s influence is not over truth 
simpliciter, but over truth as the stake in a controversy of sufficient weight to interest the 
person of the commonwealth. It seems reasonable, at least in many places, to place the 
results of science (especially physics) in this domain of non-controversial thought.  
Hobbes famously links science to human utility, “reason is the pace, increase of science, 
the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end.” (L5.20/26) The benefits to humankind as 
Hobbes sees them are avoidance of the summum malum, violent death, and the promotion of 
commodious living. The laws of nature benefit humankind with peace, and are thus eternal 
laws, because “it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.” 
(L.15.38/100)   
The following passage from De Cive may also shed some light on the relationship 
between sovereign fiat, truth, and controversy:  
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…men’s reasonings are sometimes correct, sometimes mistaken, and accordingly their 
conclusions and what they hold to be true are sometimes truth and sometimes error. Now 
even errors about…Philosophical questions sometimes do public mischief, and give scope 
for great seditions and injuries. Whenever, then, a controversy arises about these matters 
which threatens the common good and social peace, there must be someone to a judgment 
of the reasoning, i.e. whether the inference is good or not, so that the controversy can be 
stopped. Christ gave no rules for this…The only thing left therefore is that the judges of 
such disputes be precisely those whom God has already instituted by nature, namely those 
appointed in each commonwealth by the sovereign. (DC.17.12/215) 
Much like Constantine’s intervention in the language of the Nicene Creed, the 
sovereign steps into philosophical issues and settles them with finality only when the flare up 
and threaten the social order. Hobbes does seem to consistently maintain, at least on issues 
of science and natural philosophy, that objective truth exists.  
But the set of ideas, doctrines, beliefs, etc. that are conducive to peace (or 
commodious living, for that matter) are not exhausted by these laws of nature. There is a 
doctrinal remnant left over that needs to be specified. Unfortunately, as we have seen, 
Hobbes’ epistemology has difficulty in accepting the principles of revelation as indisputable. 
Unlike the other two elements of his epistemological trinity, reason and experience, there are 
no objectively and independently verifiable criteria for validating revelation. Hence, the 
sovereign must intervene to specify what is admissible within the commonwealth.  
Ryan argues similarly, that for Hobbes, “truth and utility cannot for long diverge, and 
that where there is no question of truth (or the truth is impossible to ascertain) the sovereign 
must simply lay down conventions.”200 Theology is just one such domain where axiomatic 
reason runs into difficulties, and hence “Hobbesian natural theology is extremely 
agnostic.”201 This leaves plenty of space for the sovereign to impose his decisions in matters 
of doctrine. Hobbes’ emphasis on the minimal requirements of salvation hedges his bets, so 
                                                
200 Ryan, 206.  
201 Ryan, 208. 
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to speak. The loyalty of a believer skeptical of the sovereign’s interpretation is secured, 
because her eternal salvation, on Hobbes’ account, is not jeopardized by potential 
inaccuracies in publicly-approved doctrines. One suspects the sovereign might even permit 
doctrinal disputes, provided it was understood only pride, and not salvation, that was at stake 
in the debates. His writings on heresy also support this claim.  
Ryan also points out another, related issue: “Hobbes seems to be asserting both that 
what he writes is true and that it would be usefully imposed as an orthodoxy”, all the while 
granting that he is willing to withdraw this claim should the sovereign rule against Hobbes.202  
This is not the contradiction that it appears to be. Hobbes always preaches that 
submission to the sovereign’s will is paramount, even in matters of truth, because the 
sovereign is positioned to gauge whether or not those truths are potentially disruptive. I 
think any reasonable sovereign would see such suppression of true ideas as a temporary 
measure until peace could be restore.  
Hobbes, is claiming an exception for himself in the public domain. Of course, he 
doesn’t want to grant his opponents “air time” in the Universities. The Schoolmen have it 
dead wrong, and shouldn’t be given their public platform.  We can all see where their ideas 
lead, says Hobbes. So there is no contradiction in pleading for special place to your own 
ideas, while desiring to see other ideas suppressed, as long as you are convinced you are right. 
Hobbes reserves the right to be intolerant in matters of science and philosophy, where our 
ideas can be checked against reality and/or built up from unshakeable definitions. Others 
can be convinced, and if not, they can resort to their own private grumblings.  
                                                
202 Ryan, 205.  
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Ryan’s conclusion is that, “the sense in which Hobbes has principled reasons for 
toleration must always and only be that he has epistemologically principled reasons, never 
morally principled reasons. There are things we cannot get people to think, and where we 
cannot we ought not to try.”203 I am largely in agreement with him. A good sovereign will 
furthermore give people intellectual leeway, out of his own self interest. When that freedom 
erupts into civil disorder, or even threatens to, the sovereign must intervene to decide the 
case, even if it means stopping the flow of truth for a little while.  
Conclusion: The “Freedom” of a Christian  
Hobbes argues that heresy is not illegal, nor can it be punished under the current law 
of the land. He grudgingly concedes a least a form of private freedom of conscience. How 
are we to square these elements of Hobbes’ argument with his demand for uniformity of 
worship and total obedience to the sovereign? 
Part of Hobbes’ rationale against heresy is to deprive Church authorities of any 
independent claim to enforce belief. Only the explicit commands of the sovereign count. 
Only the sovereign can administer the law. 
The discussion of heresy and toleration must also be seen in the light of Hobbes’ 
advocacy for salvific minimalism. As witness to the strife that can erupt from doctrinal 
pettifoggery, couple with the ultimate sanction, Hobbes is making a plea to deemphasize the 
role of formal theology and orthodoxy to the Christian faith. Minimalism also serves to 
eliminate some of the anxiety over an individual’s salvation, of course. But it also presents 
convoluted theological hairsplitting as unnecessary, even counter-productive, especially when 
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it is accompanied by the sword and the stake. It undercuts the potential threat of a clever or 
charismatic thinker being able to sway the popular imagination.  
By arguing against heresy, Hobbes is more properly arguing against the traditional 
requirement of orthodoxy, at least as far as certain arcane discussions. This does not change 
the need for the sovereign to decide appropriate words and deeds for worship, nor does it 
mean that the sovereign cannot ban certain counterproductive opinions. It does loosen some 
of the bonds on belief, and hopefully lubricates the performance of the polity.   
Hobbes is keenly aware of the limits of force to inculcate belief. In the Historia, 
Hobbes204 writes 
If once thy Brother from the Gospel stray,  
Instruct, and gently lead him in the Way;   
All tender Marks of Love, and Duty, show;  
No lasting Converts from Compulsion flow (Hist. Eccl., 90) 
I think this verse neatly sums up Hobbes’ attitude toward doctrinal disputes and 
violence. In the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan, Hobbes renders a similar sentiment in 
prose thusly, “no one is accepted by Christ who has been compelled to him by fear of 
death.” (L.App2.66/537).  
Deemphasizing the gravity of heresy, as with almost every one of Hobbes’ 
controversial opinions, has irenic intent. 
 
 
                                                
204 It seems that the translator of the poem was not Hobbes himself, but I will ascribe the verses to him. His 
Latin original was at least the prototype for the expression in English. 
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Chapter 4: Hobbes’ Idiosyncratic Eschatology  
Hobbes’ retelling of the Christian story of the end times, his eschatology, is 
idiosyncratic. Although it has precedents, as we shall see, it is a unique hybrid of his 
philosophical concerns and Christian Scripture. Hobbes presents an eschatology that is at 
once brutally materialistic and authoritarian, while at the same time claiming to be loyal to 
Scripture  alone. JGA Pocock calls it a “political eschatology” and Jürgen Overhoff refers to 
it as a “materialist eschatology”, each emphasizing their favorite aspects of Hobbes’ 
apocalyptic vision, both of which are borne out by the text.205 
Not only is this distinctive vision of the end times one of Hobbes’ most original 
contributions to theology in Leviathan, it is one of his most controversial. Hobbes anticipated 
at least some of this controversy, and alludes in several places to the “novelty” of his 
doctrine.206 As an illustration of how shocking his account was to his contemporaries, 
consider the third Appendix to Leviathan. Written in 1668, it was intended as a defense of 
certain “paradoxes” discovered by his readers in the 1651 manuscript. The third Appendix 
defends Hobbes’ eschatological position four times. Considering that the total objections 
Hobbes addresses in the Appendix number only thirteen, nearly a third of them concern 
eschatological themes!207  
                                                
205 Insert references. 
206 See the references to the ongoing civil war in 38.2 and 38.5. Hobbes advances his theory of eternal life 
in the uncensored context of the civil war, and claims he will withdraw these doctrines if they are repugnant 
to the final victor. He writes “the points of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God have so great an 
influence on the kingdom of man, as not to be determined but by them that under God have the sovereign 
power.” (38.5/305) In the same place, he directly refers to his doctrines as a “novelty”.  
207 The four issues are: the belief in ghosts, the denial of the independence of the soul from the body, 
earthly salvation, and the nature of hell.  
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Leviathan marks also a significant departure from Hobbes’ theological approaches in 
his earlier works, Elements of Law and De Cive. The latter touched on religion, but left 
eschatology more or less alone, they maintained a more orthodox tone. The strictly 
eschatological writings of Leviathan nearly outstrips the total theological discussion in the 
earlier works. But it isn’t just the content of Hobbes’ eschatology that changes. Hobbes’ tone 
also undergoes a transformation in Leviathan. Both De Cive and the Elements were 
conciliatory and framed in neutral language. Leviathan is sarcastic, mocking, in a word, 
“combative”.208 
Hobbes was perhaps emboldened by the near-total lack of censorship in England at 
the time, and the lack of any strong ecclesiastical authority capable of prosecuting him for 
heresy. This explains the opportunity for the change, but not its true motive. There are 
systematic reasons for Hobbes to embrace many of his eschatological views.209 Hobbes’ 
philosophical commitments require him to read the Christian eschatological tradition in the 
way he does in Leviathan. He held his tongue in his earlier political theory, perhaps partly in 
the interests of personal security, but primarily because his work had not yet evolved to the 
point where a radical reconstruction of the orthodox eschatology was seen to be necessary.  
Essential to this discussion is first a presentation of Hobbes’ eschatological vision of 
the soul, heaven and hell, and salvation. This will be followed by a section that analyzes this 
vision in terms of its historical precedents and philosophical motivations. Hobbes’ primary 
methodology throughout parts III and IV is to argue on the basis of Scripture alone, 
                                                
208 Johnston, “Hobbes’s mortalism”, pg. 660. 
209 See, for instance, David Johnston’s argument in “Hobbes’s mortalism” where he argues that Hobbes’ 
eschatological conclusions were the outgrowth of difficulties in his political theory arising from the 
religious conflicts of the English Civil Wars, difficulties that had not been apparent when he was writing 
EL or DC. 
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preferring only to analyze Scriptural content philosophically, rather than draw on wider 
sources for his arguments.  
I. Hobbes’ Eschatology 
1. The soul 
Traditionally, the soul is understood in Christianity as an incorporeal spirit. As a 
necessary preface to his discussion of the soul, Hobbes first insists that any use of the word 
“spirit” in Scripture is either simply metaphorical, or it refers to one of two things: “a subtle, 
fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination.” 
(L34.3/262). The former is a gaseous entity, but the latter is a cognitive error. The 
Schoolmen, in insisting on the incorporeality of spirit, are guilty of insignificant speech. To 
Hobbes, they are either incurably stupid, or are exploiting that absurdity for political ends.210 
The notion of “inspiration” is also related to these concepts. God is said to inspire 
(literally, blow into) life in Adam, and the Holy Spirit is said to inspire faith, etc. Inspiration 
must be a literal wind, or it must be interpreted metaphorically for Hobbes.  
It follows that if the soul is a spirit, it is a material thing. Hobbes’ account of the soul 
is thus free of any insubstantial elements. But Hobbes goes further, the soul is not just 
material it is dependent on the body, or else indistinguishable from it. He writes, “The soul, 
in Scripture, signifieth always either the life or the living creature; and the body and soul 
jointly, the body alive.” (L44.15/419). 
                                                
210 This will be covered in detail when we turn to Ecclesiology in the next section. Briefly, the doctrine of 
ghosts serves to perpetuate the power of the priesthood, by emphasizing their interventions on behalf of 
souls in purgatory and through their power to perform exorcisms.  
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If the soul cannot be separated from the body, Hobbes thinks that it cannot be 
naturally immortal. He argues, “That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a living 
creature independent on the body…is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture.” (L38.4/304) 
Hobbes approving cites Job 14:7 (“man dieth, and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the 
ghost, and where is he?”) and 14:12 (“Man lieth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no 
more.”) to provide evidence that men are by nature doomed to nonexistence after they die, 
until the Final Judgment.  
Despite clear and plain testimony of Scripture as to the absolute dependence of life 
on the power of God, “the doctrine is now, and hath been a longtime far otherwise: namely, 
that every man hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal…and 
consequently, not only the faithful and righteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall 
enjoy eternal life, without any death at all, much less a second, and everlasting death.” 
(L44.14/418–19) . Hobbes argues on the contrary: “the souls of the faithful are, not of their 
own nature, but by God’s special grace, to remain in their bodies from the resurrection to all 
eternity” (L44.15/419). If it were not for divine intervention into the order of things, the 
dead would remain lifeless for all eternity.  
At the final judgment, according to Hobbes, humans are raised from the dead to 
stand judgment. That the power to do this should come from God directly, as opposed to 
originating in the native power of the soul, should not surprise us: “For supposing that when 
a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carcass, cannot God, that raised 
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inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his word, easily raise a dead carcass to life, 
and continue him alive forever, or make him die again, by another word?” (L44/15/419).211  
If Scripture is not the source of the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, 
what is? Hobbes asserts it arises from “contagion of the demonology of the Greeks, of an 
opinion that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that 
when the body was dead, the soul of every man (whether godly or wicked) must subsist 
somewhere by virtue of its own nature (without acknowledging therein any supernatural gift 
of God)” (L44.16/420).  
By uncritically accepting that souls were independent of the body, Christian scholars 
struggled with the question of where the soul went after death, in effect being bound by a 
petitio principii. Among other things, this lead to the invention of Purgatory.   
This kind of doctrine, which rejects the natural immortality of the soul, has come to 
be known as “mortalism”. There are three basic variants of the idea: annihilationism, 
psychopannychism, and thnetopsychism.212 Annihilationists taught the total destruction of 
the person at death, with salvation being only in this life through a freedom from sin. 
Psychopannychists taught that the soul “slept” until the resurrection. In other words, it 
persisted as a substance, but had no conscious thought in the intermediate period. 
Thnetopsychists taught that the soul was indistinguishable from the body, or life, and that 
death was complete until the resurrection. (Hobbes falls squarely into the latter camp, and 
                                                
211 Elsewhere he repeats nearly the same argument: “For God that could give a life to a piece of clay, hath 
the same power to give life to a dead man, and renew his inanimate and rotten carcass, into a glorious, 
spiritual, and immortal body.” (L44.32/431–2). 
212 See Burns, Norman T. Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972, pgs. 13–18. Burns’ account is the gold standard, and all of the secondary literature 
on Hobbes’ mortalism consults it. My discussion is likewise indebted to this important book. Burns 
specifically discusses both Hobbes and Overton as mortalists.   
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can safely be referred to as a thnetopsychist). Mortalism of all stripes, as Norman Burns 
notes, was a thoroughly Scriptural movement, not merely a reasoning from facts of science or 
other natural evidence, but always with one eye on the Biblical texts.  This applies to Hobbes 
as well, he argues – “the fact remains that when Hobbes argued from Scripture  he argued 
like a Protestant, maintaining that Scripture itself and not reason was his supreme 
authority.”213 
While it was never an official doctrine of a major sect, or even especially popular, it 
did gain a number of adherents in Hobbes’ time, notably John Milton, and had a long history 
in Christian thought. Burns refers to it as “a thoroughly unorthodox but quite unoriginal 
idea” for Christians of the 17th Century.214 Many of the minor Churches of the so-called 
Radical Reformation had ideas of this sort.215 Even Martin Luther was a psychopannichist, 
and wrote in support of soul-sleeping, although he did not insist on it in his debates with 
other theologians, and Lutherans did not adopt the idea.216   
Mortalism was rejected as heresy by mainstream churches, and it was associated with 
the radical “Anabaptist” movement.217 It was condemned for Roman Catholics by the Fifth 
Lateran council: “we condemn and reject all those who insist that the intellectual soul is 
mortal…and those who suggest doubts on this topic. For the soul not only truly exists of 
                                                
213 Ibid., pg. 184. 
214 Ibid., pg. 1. 
215 See GH Williams, The Radical Reformation. (Page?) 
216 See Burns, Christian Mortalism, pgs. 27–33 . Luther saw the ideas as useful in defeating doctrines like 
the intercession of saints and purgatory.  
217 Luther’s personal position was all but forgotten, and the notion of mortalism was only associated with 
religious radicals. “Anabaptist” is a general terms of abuse for any non-standard Christian at the time. See 
Burns, ibid.  
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itself and essentially as the form of the human body…but it is also immortal”218 The 
Reformed Churches agreed with Rome on this point as well: Jean Calvin wrote Psychpannychia 
in 1542, specifically repudiating both the doctrines of soul-sleeping and thnetopsychism.219  
More germane to the English context, and probably under Calvin’s influence, Article 
40 of the 42 Articles of 1553 spoke against the doctrines: “They which say that the souls of 
such as depart hence do sleep…or affirm that the souls die with the body, and at the last day 
shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief declared unto us in 
Holy Scripture.”220 The Westminster Confession of Faith of 1647 concurred: “The bodies of 
men after death return to dust and see corruption, but their souls, which neither die nor 
sleep, having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them”.221 
Hobbes, therefore, must have known he was swimming upstream against well-established 
doctrine when he embraced the doctrine of the mortality of the soul. He surely would have 
been aware of the radical associations of this doctrine as well as its unpopularity. Yet he held 
to it, a measure of it’s apparent harmony with his system. 
2. Heaven and Hell 
As might be expected, Hobbes does not offer us a traditional account of heaven or 
hell either.  Hobbes views both as being on earth, with the elect and the reprobate inhabiting 
                                                
218 Text of session 8 of the Council, December 19, 1513. Available on the internet: 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum18.htm [.] 
219 In fact, Calvin is credited with inventing the term. Calvin refrained from attacking Luther in his 
arguments. See Burns, op cit.  
220 Documents of the English Reformation, 309–310. This article was omitted in the revisions of 1563 and 
1571, the editors of suggest it was because these issues were “felt to be no longer matters of controversy.” 
(284).   
221 Ibid, 511. Article 32 of the Confession. (Thanks to Overhoff and Johnston for drawing these passages to 
my attention). 
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human bodies. The bodies of the saints are refashioned into immortal vessels, while the 
damned retain their mortal flesh, and die a second death.  
Hobbes’ first step in making his case for an earthly afterlife for the saved is to argue 
that the term “Kingdom of God” is misunderstood. The Kingdom of God “is taken most 
commonly for eternal felicity after this life, in the highest heaven…and sometimes 
for…sanctification…but never for monarchy” (35.1/271–2). Hobbes counters, “To the 
contrary, I find the KINGDOM OF GOD to signify, in most places of Scripture, a kingdom 
properly so named…and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for dominion over sin 
(and only in the New Testament)” (35.2/272). 
All creatures are naturally subjects in the kingdom of God, due to God’s irresistible 
power, as we have seen in the discussion of natural theology in Chapter 1. But God from 
time to time has “also had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man 
speaketh to another.” (35.3/272). This was literally a kingdom for the Jews in the Old 
Testament, and it is metaphorical kingdom for contemporary Christians awaiting the Second 
Coming. It will consist of the union of the elect after the Final Judgment, again in a literal 
kingdom.  
I will only allude to Hobbes’ discussion of the Old Testament details here, as I have 
addressed this argument elsewhere in detail, but suffice it to say that Hobbes thinks that 
Moses and the high priests of Israel were vicegerents in the service of God (the Father).222 
The first kingdom of God ended when the people of Israel requested a king (Saul). On this 
                                                
222 This tripartite kingdom of God: (1) literal in Israel under the Father, (2) metaphorical under the prophets 
and apostles via the Holy Spirit, and (3) literal again under Christ,is Hobbes’ pattern of the Trinity. God is 
personated three times in three different figures/regimes, while remaining one God. I will discuss Hobbes’ 
account of the Trinity (or his rejection of it in all practical terms) later.  
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Scriptural-historical basis, Hobbes therefore claims: “In short, the kingdom of God is a civil 
kingdom…which kingdom having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold 
would be restored by Christ” (35.13/276). Until Christ returns, we are the subjects of his 
lieutenants, that is, our earthly sovereigns. This future restoration of God’s kingdom is, for 
Hobbes, the only way to make sense of the Christian commonplace, “Thy kingdom come.”  
Like many thinkers of the time, Hobbes is eager to validate his eschatological vision 
by reference to Old Testament precedents, which serve as parallels or analogies for the 
future. Johann Sommerville observes that “of vital political importance to Hobbes’ 
contemporaries was the history of the early Christian church, and the history of the Ancient 
Jews whose practices had influenced the early Christians.”223 It is no surprise that Hobbes 
uses the Old Testament to validate his arguments, at least on their face.  
After establishing that the kingdom of God is a future and literal kingdom, Hobbes 
proceeds to show that the kingdom is an earthly and a material kingdom. Again, Hobbes 
searches the Old Testament for inspiration for his argument. He starts with Adam, the first 
man. If Adam had not sinned, Hobbes avers, he would have lived forever, on earth. Christ’s 
sacrifice restored eternal life, but there are no reason to think that the location of that life 
changed. 
Hobbes says very little about the actual resurrection and judgment, perhaps in part 
because the classic account of it is in his least favorite book of the Bible, Revelation, with its 
notoriously metaphorical style. Resurrection is clearly an act of special grace, and hence it 
will be miraculous, again another reason for Hobbes to be silent about it. The act of 
                                                
223 Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the history of the Jews”, 160. 
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judgment itself proceeds according to God’s inscrutable volition, providing Hobbes with a 
third reason to be chary of examining the Final Judgment in any detail. Hobbes is not given 
to flights of mystical indulgence. Moreover, what happens at the Final Judgment matters 
little in comparison to the end result.  
After the resurrection the elect will be given, “glorious and spiritual bodies…they 
shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, nor eat and drink, as they did in their natural 
bodies, but live forever in their individual persons” (L44.27/426–7). By spiritual, Hobbes 
does not mean incorporeal, but “subtle, fluid, and invisible” (L34.3/262) or at least not 
“gross and corruptible” (L44.29/428). The saints will not procreate, in part because if they 
did, they would soon overcrowd the earth (L38.3/303)! 
In a word, the elect “shall be restored to that estate wherein Adam was before he has 
sinned” (L44.28/427). The reference to Adam is important, both for the stylistic reasons 
mentioned above, but also because Adam’s fall is the inverse of Christ’s sacrifice. Adam’s sin 
and fall from grace is reversed by Christ’s innocent sacrifice. Humanity will reassume the 
likeness of Adam before he was corrupted by sin, but this requires time. Just as Adam lost 
his immortality, but lived on for many years, so Christ redeemed humanity and restored the 
promise of eternal life, but humanity must wait till the Final Judgment to be rewarded with it 
(see L38.3/303).  There is a logical symmetry of Fall and Redemption. 
Hobbes notes: “That the place wherein men are to live eternally after the 
resurrection is the heavens, meaning by heaven those parts of the world which are most 
remote from earth (as where the starts are, or above the stars, in another higher heaven, 
called coelum empyreum, whereof there is no mention in Scripture  nor ground in reason) is not 
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easily to be drawn from any text that I can find.” (L38.4/303) Any reference to the Kingdom 
of Heaven is best understood to mean the Kingdom of the ruler of heaven, not a kingdom in 
heaven. Hobbes repeatedly insists that the kingdom of God will rise no higher than God’s 
own “footstool”.224  
Furthermore, Scripture indicates specifically (in the Book of Isaiah) that the seat of 
the Kingdom of God will be in Jerusalem, and Hobbes endorses this as literal truth. This is 
an interesting conclusion at the very least because Hobbes refuses to interpret Hell in such 
literal terms, as we shall see, but also because it is more specific than Hobbes tends to be 
about such details.  
Hobbes’ account of hell is in many ways similar to his discussion of heaven. While 
the elect arise from the dead to enjoy an earthly paradise, “so also God’s enemies and their 
torments after judgment appear by the Scripture  to have their place on earth.” (L38.6/305–
6) But the precise meaning of this earthly torment can be hard to discern from Scripture, 
Hobbes tells us. 
Scripture  refers to the place of punishment in a variety of ways, as being: 
underground in Tartarus, a bottomless pit; the home of giants; a lake of fire; utter darkness; 
and in Gehenna, a smoldering garbage dump outside of Jerusalem, noted for also being the 
place of idolatrous practices by the Israelites (L38.6–10/306–308). Many of these descriptors 
refer to actual historical places, and hence not all of them can be consistently maintained at 
the same time on a literal level. But since no one believes that eternal torment will actually 
                                                
224 See 38.4 and 38.23 
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occur in the former garbage dump of Jerusalem, “it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily 
that that which is thus said concerning hell fire is spoken metaphorically” (L38.11/308).   
First, Hobbes asserts that there is no literal tormentor. The names “Satan”, “Devil”, 
and “Abaddon” mean “Enemy”, “Accuser”, and “Destroyer” respectively, and “are 
therefore appellative, which ought not to have been left untranslated (as they are in the Latin 
and modern Bibles) because they seem to be the proper names of demons, and men are more 
easily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils,” which is of pagan and not Scriptural 
heritage (L38.12/308). The belief in devils originates in superstitious thinking, where humans 
invent easy, proximate solutions for problems with complex explanations. 
Literal devils could be seen as independent agents of evil who have carved out their 
own kingdom, outside of the jurisdiction of God. Furthermore, such personifications of evil 
can be seen as an excuse for sin, blaming it on a third party rather than placing the fault 
squarely in human depravity. The “Enemy of God” therefore must live on earth, and is any 
enemy of true religion, according to Hobbes. 
The reprobate do suffer “such bodily pains and calamities as are incident to those 
who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy the eternal king of 
the saints, God Almighty.” (L38.14/309). These punishments are coextensive with those 
“natural” punishments Hobbes discusses in Chapter 31 (¶40/243), that is the pains of vice 
and immoderation.225 The embodied life of the reprobate and that of the elect will thus be 
marked contrasts. While the elect are given a “glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.” 
                                                
225 See the discussion of “natural punishments” in Chapter 1. See also Richard Tuck, Natural Rights 
Theories, pgs. 125–127, and Johann Sommerville, Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 141, for a 
discussion of natural punishments in Hobbes. 
 136 
(L44.32/432), the reprobate retain their “gross and corruptible” forms, subject to the 
deleterious effects of sin. 
The most important aspect of Hobbes’ account of hell is that, its torments are not 
eternal for the individual sinner, but include a second death. This notion of a second death that 
is at the center of Hobbes’ redescription of Hell. He draws this idea from Revelation 21:8: 
“But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, 
and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with 
fire and brimstone: which is the second death.”226  Most interpreters have taken the second 
death to be metaphorical, as yet another way to express eternal torment, but for Hobbes, this 
second death is a literal expiration: the sinner entirely ceases to exist after the second death. 
How then are we to make sense of “eternal suffering”? Unlike the elect, the 
reprobate retain their bodies and continue to have children, sown in sin. Some of these may 
in fact display enough virtue to join the ranks of the elect, but the vast majority will live brief 
and unhappy lives mired in sin. Hobbes writes:  
For the wicked, being left in the estate they were in after Adam’s sin, may at the resurrection 
live as they did, marry, and give in marriage…and consequently may engender perpetually, 
after the resurrection, as they did before; for there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. 
(L44.29/428) 
This amounts to “an immortality of the kind, but not of the persons of men” 
(L44.29/428). So an individual sinner permanently dies a second death, but there will be a 
population of sinners for all eternity. The eternity of torment applies most properly to the 
class, not to the members as such. This argument is undoubtedly strange, and may in fact be 
                                                
226 Emphasis mine. King James Version, found online at: http://etext.virginia.edu/kjv.browse.html [.] 
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unique to Hobbes, but if Scripture paints him into a corner, he has his reasons for escaping 
in this way (see below). 
3. What Is Necessary for Salvation 
Salvation is equivalent to eternal life for Hobbes, both in terms of the Scriptures and 
natural reason. The argument is as follows: Being saved is to be protected from evils. 
Absolute salvation, salvation in an unqualified sense, must be absolute protection from evil.  
And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and 
consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature, and fell from that 
happiness by the sin of Adam, it followeth that to be saved from sin is to be saved from all 
the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us. (38.15/310) 
Hobbes goes further, noting that “since death and misery were the punishments of 
sin, the discharge of sin must also be a discharge of death and misery” (ibid.). The 
“discharge” of death, obviously, is eternal life.  (No controversy, at least here).  
But how do we obtain salvation, according to Hobbes? 
The tradition has it that by following the orthodox doctrine in faith, thought, and 
deeds, we can obtain salvation. Unorthodox opinions, or heresies, are to be shunned, as they 
lead to damnation.227 Tiny differences of doctrine are understood to have great significance, 
as they can lead to the greatest of rewards or the worst of punishments. We have already 
seen Hobbes’ legalistic argument against heresy, and his crypto-tolerationist stance. This 
previous discussion must be combined with an understanding of his argument for what 
salvation requires.  
                                                
227 See the Catholic Encyclopedia’s entry on heresy, accessed at: 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07256b.htm [.] 
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Hobbes follows Erasmus228 and mainstream Anglican contemporaries like William 
Chillingworth229 in adopting a theologically minimalist requirement for salvation, a 
deflationist strategy designed to minimize the importance of orthodoxy and keep the peace. 
He writes: “All that is NECESSARY to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ, and 
obedience to laws.” (L43.3/398). Salvation requires a virtue of thought (belief) and a practical 
virtue (obedience).  
Hobbes addresses his second point first in his exposition. He argues: “The laws of 
God…are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principal is that we should not violate 
our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns” (L44.5/399).  
Regarding the first principle, Hobbes writes: “The unum necessarium (only article of 
faith which the Scripture  maketh simply necessary to salvation) is this: that JESUS IS THE 
CHRIST.” (L44.11/402) Christ is understood as the redeemer prophesied in the Old 
Testament.  
Hobbes makes five Scriptural arguments to support this claim: (1) the intention of all 
of the Gospels is to establish Christ as Saviour; (2) the actions of the apostles were restricted 
to preaching Christ’s return and his role as redeemer; (3) in several places, Scripture  refers to 
salvation as easy; (4) Scripture asserts that faith in Christ is sufficient for salvation, “but more 
than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no other article is required” 
                                                
228 See the Radical Reformation… 
229 See the highly illuminating article by Paul J. Johnson, “Hobbes’s Anglican Doctrine of Salvation” in 
Thomas Hobbes in His Time, ed. Ross, Ralph, Herbert W. Schneider, and Theodore Waldman. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974: 102–125. 
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(L44.15/404)230; (5) Scripture attests to the article being “the foundation of faith” 
(L44.16/404).  
An important consequence of this is,  
that pastors that teach this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, though they draw from it false 
consequences (which all men are sometimes subject to), they may nevertheless be saved—
much more, that they may be saved who, being no pastors, but hearers, believe that which is 
by their lawful pastors taught them. (L44.16/405) 
The arguments holds, Hobbes says, even for supreme pastors – in other words, the 
sovereign! If a citizen judges privately that a legitimate public figure has erred in 
interpretation, she is nevertheless obliged to obey that authority. Thankfully, Hobbes argues, 
her soul is not at stake in such doctrinal disputes. As long as the fundamental article of faith 
is affirmed, quibbles in doctrine do not matter.  
Even in the case when the sovereign is not Christian, the bonds of servitude remain 
in effect. Hobbes counsels such a subject to follow the example of Naaman, who denied his 
faith in public, yet kept it in his heart. Martyrdom is not required, in fact, it is repudiated for 
the general populace. God specifically calls individuals to give their lives for the faith, and 
those individuals are unambiguously informed. The insistence on martyrdom by the Church, 
where it occurs, is an ideological tool to assure the Pope’s authority over sovereigns by 
holding out the prospect of sainthood for the martyr for religion.231 
The assertion that “Jesus is the Christ” is in fact a pregnant proposition. He writes:  
                                                
230 Hobbes, of course, is muddying the logic here. Just because something is a sufficient condition does not 
mean that it is a necessary condition. Having a monthly trolley pass is a condition sufficient to ride the 
trolley, but it is not a necessary condition – I could for instance, use a token. Paying a fare is a necessary 
and sufficient condition to ride the trolley (assuming we don’t have fare jumpers).  
231 See for instance, Hobbes’ discussion in 47.12/480. 
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But a man may here ask whether it be not as necessary to salvation to believe that God is 
omnipotent, Creator of the world, that Jesus Christ is risen, and that all men else shall rise 
again from the dead at the last day, as to believe that Jesus is the Christ. To which I answer: 
they are, and so are many more articles; but they are such as are contained in this one, and 
may be deduced from it, with more or less difficulty. (L44.18/406).  
Recall that Hobbes argues, however, that “it is inequitable to say that faith is denied 
by implication” (L.App2.52/533).  
So, on Hobbesian model, we must both do something (i.e., obey our rulers to the 
best of our ability) and believe something (i.e., that Jesus is the Christ) to be saved. Hence in 
an imprecise manner of speaking,  we are justified by faith and by works. We cannot be said 
to be justified by the justice of our works, because “there is none that hath not transgressed 
the law of God.” (L44.20/408). The best we can hope for is for our will, the source of our 
works, to be freely accepted as just (enough). But God only accepts the works of the faithful. 
In neither case can the believer assert a right to salvation, only a hope to be spared from just 
punishment. Of course, like a good Calvinist, Hobbes asserts both that “good” works are the 
expression of “good” faith and that, “faith is the gift of God, and he giveth it to whom he 
will.” (L44.9/401). 
II. Analysis 
1. Historical Precedents 
Jürgen Overhoff has drawn attention to the “striking” parallels between Hobbes’s 
eschatology and the wider culture of Christian radicalism in his book, Hobbes’ Theory of the 
Will. 232 I want to focus here specifically on the works of two Englishmen Overhoff and 
                                                
232 Overhoff, Hobbes’s Theory of the Will, 196. See the whole of Chapter 5 as well, especially pp. 192–201. 
Johnston also mentions Overton’s book in his article “Hobbes’ mortalism”.  
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others have referred to: The Personall Reigne of Christ Upon Earth by  John Archer (1642)233 and 
Mans Mortalitie by Richard Overton (1644).234  
John Archer was an English preacher who lived out the last days of his life as exile to 
the Netherlands. Archer’s short book is a remarkable statement of millennialist exegesis, 
predicting the end of the Roman Church in 1666 and the return of Christ around 1700. Its 
title recalls the so-called “Personal Rule” of Charles I from 1629 to 1640, where he ruled 
England without the aid of Parliament.  
Archer writes of three senses of “Christ’s kingdom”: providential, spiritual, and 
monarchical. Christ’s providential kingdom is how he “manages the affairs of all the world” 
(PR, 1), as master of nature. His spiritual kingdom is power he “exercises over the 
consciences of some people, and in special, the elect of God” (PR ,2). Hobbes more or less 
endorses both of these senses.235 
But Archer also writes of a future, literal, monarchical kingdom of Jesus Christ upon 
the earth, saying Christ “will govern as earthy Monarchs have done, that is, universally over 
the world…and in a worldly visible earthly glory” (PR, 2) Archer believes Christ was the 
ruler of the nation of Israel, and gave his orders directly to Moses and the high priests. 
Hence, “Christ’s government of that Nation…was a shadow or type of this state of 
Monarchical government, which in due time he will have immediately and visibly over all Nations 
                                                
233 Archer, John, The Personall Reigne of Christ upon Earth, London: Benjamin Allen, 1642. Available in electronic 
facsimile from Early English Books Online: http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home [.] Hereafter I will abbreviate 
this work parenthetically as PR. I have taken editorial liberty and modernized the spelling of Archer’s writing.  
234 Overton, Richard. Mans Mortalitie. Edited by Harold Fisch. Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 1968 [1644]. Hereafter, 
citations are given parenthetically as MM. I have also modernized Overton’s spelling and capitalization.  
235 I say “more or less” because Archer goes to great lengths to emphasize that it is Christ, specifically at 
work in the world here. Hobbes views the different stages of the kingdom of God as aspects of the Trinity, 
reducing the three separate persons of the Trinity thereby to a purely political concept. God the Father ruled 
ancient Israel for Hobbes.  
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on the earth” (PR, 4). Christ’s return is predicted by the Book of Daniel as a “fifth 
monarchy” following after the Assyrians, Persians, Greek, and Roman kingdoms.236  
Archer also draws the constant analogy between Adam’s original state and the 
human condition after Christ’s visible return: “Adam’s fall, and damning all mankind, was a 
Type or figure of Christ saving all the elect…So in the Sovereignty that Christ gave Adam 
over all that present World, was figured out the subjection of a World to come to Christ” 
(PR, 5). Archer incessantly interprets Old Testament events as a “shadow or type” of events 
at the end of days.  
Much the same as with Hobbes, Archer believes that the resurrected saints shall 
enjoy “exemption from all bodily troubles” and “there shall be no violent or untimely death, 
by any grief, sickness, and trouble” (PR, 30). They “shall so yoke original sin as that it shall 
get little or no ground of them; and that which crowns all this, is, that there shall be no more 
decay, nor backsliding in holiness” (PR, 28). This state will nevertheless be an embodied one. 
The wicked will coexist unhappily alongside the elect: “the sinner, though living long 
as well as the Saint, shall be cursed; therefore they shall be cursed tributaries” (21). Archer 
repeats the discussion of the “second death” several times, although he means it in the more 
traditional sense than Hobbes.  
Richard Overton’s Mans Mortalitie is also a remarkable pamphlet, both in itself and in 
its relationship to Hobbes’ ideas. Overton was a Leveller, a political radical who occasionally 
wrote on theological matters. Levelers advocated extension of the franchise and religious 
                                                
236 The Fifth Monarchy men were a group of English radicals during the Civil Wars, who clearly took some 
of their ideas from thinkers like Archer.  
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toleration, seeking to “level out” the differences between citizens.237 The book was an 
influential one. Burns notes, “Mans Mortalitie was the first English defense of soul sleeping 
to be published since the time of Tyndale, and in the religious ferment of the first civil war 
the tract received considerable attention.”238 
A first point of comparison is that Overton’s overall methodology is at many points 
similar to Hobbes’. He places great emphasis on the power of natural reason and on the 
findings of contemporary science. He refers to Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and the French 
surgical innovator Ambroise Paré by name. Overton points to a purely organic, some might 
say materialist, account of the mind239 and draws numerous parallels between animal cognition 
and human cognition. This unorthodox approach has earned Overton a reputation as an 
“unbeliever” in some of the secondary literature.240 However, Overton also presents an 
exhaustive catalog of Scripture  to back up his claims, many of which he interprets 
metaphorically to his end. Overton and Hobbes frequently deploy overlapping passages of 
Scripture.  
Overton, identically as Hobbes, thinks the soul or spirit is synonymous with “life or 
breath” (MM, 33). He says “by spirit is meant life” (MM, 54) and “by body and spirit, is meant 
whole man” (MM, 57). The soul is not a separate nor separable entity.  
                                                
237 A historical letter, believed to be the first use of the term in print, states “They have given themselves a 
new name, viz. Levellers, for they intend to sett all things straight, and rayse a parity and community in the 
kingdom”. Cited in the entry on “Levellers” in the Encyclopedia Britannica, eleventh edition (1911). The 
material is reproduced online at Wikipedia. 
238 Burns, Christian Mortalism, pg. 154. 
239 See for instance, the discussion on pp. 21–23. 
240 Fisch points out this reputation in his Introduction, before proceeding to demolish the idea. See pp. xvii–
xix. It is of course a reputation Overton and Hobbes share.  
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Perhaps most importantly, Overton denies that natural immortality of the fallen 
human being, and is thus also a mortalist. The body is dead until the resurrection. When we 
die, “it is plain that during this death man is void of actual being” (MM, 15) and “during this 
death there is no more present being to man, then to an hidden abortive embryo in this 
life…which is to say, he absolutely IS NOT.” (MM, 16). Adam was “gloriously immortal” 
before the Fall (MM, 1). Not only does Overton offer a sustained argument for the death of 
the mind/soul with the body, he provides an account that Hobbes could endorse 
enthusiastically on his own terms – a natural-philosophical justification conspicuously absent 
in Leviathan!241 
 Overton is aware that this idea is unusual. It might seem despondent, but “If it be 
scrupled, that this destroys the hope of our faith. I answer, it does but remove it from a false 
principle to a true, from a deceitful fancy to an infallible object, the Resurrection” (MM, 65).  
An Immortal soul would be “Ens extra Deum”, a think outside of God’s influence, which is 
both blasphemous and absurd (ibid.). Resurrection can only occur by an act of special 
grace.242  
Like Hobbes, Overton believes that the idea of an immortal soul is a relic of pagan 
beliefs, smuggled into Christianity. After reviewing a long list of candidates for the “soul” 
Overton notes:  
                                                
241 In fact, reading Overton’s scientific account alongside Hobbes’ mortalist passages goes a long way 
toward shoring up Hobbes’ transition from materialism to mortalism, addressing several of the questions 
that have bedeviled interpreters. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why Hobbes’ would omit a natural 
scientific account of a mortal soul. The first is the Scriptural tone of the second half of the book. Such a 
scientific account would be at odds with Hobbes’ focus on revealed theology. Second, the question of 
eternal life is not (obviously, if at all) a question of natural theology, and hence we should not expect an 
account of a mortal “soul” in the first half of the book either.  
242 See, for instance, the comparison between birth and rebirth (resurrection) on pg. 75.  
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Diverse other conceptions and fancies there be, to uphold this ridiculous invention of the 
soul traducted [passed down—JH] from the heathens, who by the Book of Nature understood 
an immortality after death; but through their ignorance how, or which way; this invention 
(reported to be Plato’s) was occasioned and begat a general belief: and so they, and after them 
the Christians have thus strained their wits to such miserable shifts, to define what it is, but 
neither conclude any certainty, or give satisfaction therein. (MM, 19)  
Elsewhere, Overton refers disparagingly to “this Heathenish Invention about the 
soul” (MM, 58). Overton was not alone or unprecedented in thinking this way. Fisch 
observes “the ‘mortalist heresy’ is at bottom one of those recurrent upsurges of original 
Hebraic doctrine which occur throughout the history of the Church and at no time more 
than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” (MM, xviii). Overton “was trying to restore 
an ancient doctrine of Moses which has been overlaid and distorted by Graeco-Roman 
categories.” (MM, xix). Burns puts Overton squarely into the Protestant tradition of God’s 
omnipotence: “Overton…thought thnetopsychism, could increase a man’s sense of 
dependence on God.”243 
Aside from these direct influences, there are several other incidental points of 
coincidence between Overton’s text and Leviathan. By themselves, these further points do 
not speak decisively, but taken together demonstrate a clear overlap of ideas and language 
between Hobbes and the other two.  
Overton sarcastically rejects the Cœlum Empyreum of Aquinas as the dwelling of 
Christ, which Hobbes likewise scoffs at in Ch. 37.4.   
Overhoff points to an example which is nearly identical in both Hobbes and in 
Overton. Both criticize the Scholastic attempt to locate the soul in the body, simultaneously 
                                                
243 Burns, Christian Mortalism, pg. 156. 
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in a part as well as entirely in the whole – Hobbes jokes about the soul abiding in the little 
finger, Overton in the big toe.244 
Both thinkers are skeptical about the nature of Hell, Overton observes “those and 
such like places which literally seem to import Hell, conclude the thing no more, then other 
literal expressions prove God to have corpulent eyes, eares, hands, &c. but are expressions 
after the manner of men” (MM, 39–40), and are metaphorical.  
It was not uncommon for 17th century writers to fail to footnote their works in a way 
that would satisfy a modern reader, both for considerations of style and out of a desire not 
to seem unoriginal.245 So it should not surprise us that Leviathan contains no references to 
either Archer or Overton.246 Given the similarities of their ideas and their historical 
proximity, it therefore seems difficult to deny that Hobbes was familiar with these texts, 
either directly or by word of mouth. In fact, if Hobbes had read Overton, he may have heard 
of Archer’s work that way.247 To be cautious, we should note that it is possible that Hobbes 
merely partook of these ideas as part of his general intellectual climate, without knowing 
these works by name or firsthand acquaintance.248  
                                                
244 See Overton, 220n229. The reference is to L 46.19 and to MM, 24. 
245 See for instance, Sommerville, Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 161–162. 
246 In fact Leviathan is particularly stingy, there is one positive reference to Selden, and several 
condemnations of other thinkers. Bellarmine gets the only extended, citational discussion that is not tied to 
the Bible. Even Aristotle is criticized without citations.  
247 Overton approvingly mentions Archer’s book no less than three times in its brief length: pp. 39, 41, 49. 
248 This is how Burns see the relationship between Milton and Overton, who in spite of many similarities 
argues that “Those parallels are not so striking in either exegetical content or expression as to demonstrate 
that Milton owed any debt to Overton directly. At most we may conclude that such a debt is possible. It is, I 
think, more likely that Milton and Overton both drew ideas from the lively discussion of mortalism that 
was conducted first among the sects and then, as the orthodox preachers tried to combat the idea from their 
pulpits, more generally among Christian Londoners as they tested against Scripture what was told them 
from tub and pulpit.” (Christian Mortalism, pg. 169) If one replaces Milton’s name with Hobbes’, one can 
also be tempted to agree with Burns here, and what applies to Overton can probably also be safely said to 
apply to John Archer. 
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Yet there are important differences between both authors and Hobbes. 
Archer, for one, is not a mortalist, although his view of the soul is eccentric.  
The personal reign of Christ on earth, is for Archer, a finite preamble to the last 
judgment, lasting “only” a thousand years. After the last judgment, the elect proceed to 
heaven. Obviously, Hobbes sees the earthly kingdom of God as the final stage of his 
eschatology. (Nevertheless they both agree that the world beneath Heaven is God’s 
“footstool” in some sense or other).249  True Heaven is for Archer, “so high above our 
capacity, that we cannot conceive it at all until we enjoyed this of Christ’s kingdom” (PR, 
31). While Hobbes agrees that God’s abode is inconceivable to mortal minds, he eschews 
entirely the mysticism so frequent in Archer. 
Hell for Archer is a restoration of primordial Chaos, the state of the world before 
Genesis, a vision which Overton, incidentally, also found to be compelling. The souls of the 
damned are condemned there for all eternity.  
Hobbes scrupulously avoids predicting when Christ will return, which is one of 
Archer’s explicit goals. Hobbes’ principles of scriptural interpretation will not let him press 
the “obscure” metaphorical texts of future prophesy.250 Furthermore, even if Hobbes 
believed that Christ would return in 1700 or thereabouts, he had good reasons of political 
order to keep him from mentioning it. Hobbes is wary of millennialism and the panic such 
doctrines can bring with them.  
                                                
249 PR, 33 and L38.4 and L38.23. 
250 See Farr, “Atomes of Scripture”.  
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Overton is circumspect on the shape of the resurrection and much of the afterlife (as 
is Hobbes), although he believes Heaven is beyond the Sun, which acts as a veil to screen us 
from the “glorious light” of God!251 
These differences suggest that Hobbes was not merely lifting the ideas whole cloth 
but carefully assimilating them to his thought. He sidesteps the more speculative, mystical, 
and/or fantastic elements of both Archer and Overton. Hobbes is certainly not a prophet, 
millenialist, or a political radical. Nevertheless, the main ideas of each thinker, an earthly 
Kingdom of God for Archer and a mortal soul for Overton both sit well with Hobbes’ 
system and have at least a prima facie Scriptural basis. Whatever he thought of the wider 
context of English religious radicalism, Hobbes certainly drew inspiration from Archer and 
Overton, adopting what he thought were good (or at least useful) ideas, regardless of their 
origin, and concurring on the Scriptural basis of these positions.  
What is stunning about the overlap is the extent to which Hobbes utilized radical 
religious inspiration in the name of what were deeply conservative goals.252 Clearly he was 
widely read in this literature and versed in this conversation, all the while remaining aloof 
from it in terms of his wider political commitments.  Burns comments,  
It is doubtful…that Hobbes would have conceived of the Kingdom of God as an earthly 
political kingdom ruled by Christ if the same view had not been expressed by innumerable 
radical Protestants since the early days of the reformation. Like Milton, Hobbes was no 
sectary, but he was not ashamed to incorporate into his own system whatever he thought 
sound in the revisionist theology of the sects.253 
                                                
251 See MM, 49–53. Fisch argues that this is one of Overton’s most unique, and poetic, theological 
speculations. Overton certainly argues eloquently on its behalf.  
252 This recalls the subtitle of Arnold Rogow’s biography of Hobbes: “Thomas Hobbes: Radical in the 
service of reaction”. New York: WW Norton, 1986.    
253 Burns, Christian Mortalism, pg. 187. 
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2. Philosophical Underpinnings 
Hobbes’ eschatology is a masterful example of his redescriptive methodology at 
work. Hobbes reconceptualizes the critical elements of the Christian apocalypse in the image 
of his philosophical system. He presents us with a vision that it amenable to his materialist 
concerns, but more importantly, addresses the urgent practical concerns engendered by 
controversy over the afterlife. Hobbes hopes, then, to construct an account of the end times 
that is first and foremost politically expedient.  
A literal kingdom of God on earth serves several functions. The first is ontological 
parsimony. One does not have to imagine or infer the existence of other worlds. An invisible 
parallel world is not needed. Second, and related to the first, an earthy kingdom of God is 
epistemologically accessible. It is a potential object for ordinary experience. Third, it 
consonant with materialism.  
Finally, and most importantly, an earthly kingdom of God is the outgrowth of a 
salutary political arrangement: the absolute dominion of church affairs by the sovereign. 
Hobbes repudiates the traditional view of an independent, “spiritual” Church, which claims 
to be the kingdom of God on earth, here and now. He writes, “The greatest and main abuse 
of Scripture (and to which all the rest are either consequent or subservient) is the wresting of 
it to prove that the kingdom of God…is the present Church (or multitude of Christian men 
now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last day)” (L44.4/412). While I do not 
wish to rehearse the argument for this position here, by placing the kingdom of God on 
earth and in the future, Hobbes is answering the question of what replaces the traditional 
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account of the kingdom of God.254 At the same time, he is arguing against any account of 
divided sovereignty. Hobbes gives us his final say: “If the Kingdom of God…were not a 
kingdom which God by his lieutenants of vicars…did exercise on earth, there would not 
have been so much contention and war about who it is by whom God speaketh to us; 
neither would many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king 
have denied it them.” (L35.13/277). 
Theological minimalism is an efficacious position for Hobbes for many reasons. 
First, it reduces the believer’s anxiety about his or her future by providing a clear and easily 
attainable path to salvation. It helps prevents doctrinal disputes from flaring up into religious 
strife, because the stakes involved are purely intellectual and not eternal life or torment. It 
minimizes the impact of a specialist theologian caste by rendering their insights subject 
entirely to the sovereign on the one hand, and diminishing their importance on the other. It 
reduces or eliminates the impulse to martyrdom, by emphasizing the obedience requirement, 
and pointing to the special vocation of true martyrs.  
Both a materialist salvation and doctrinal minimalism are exemplary features of 
Hobbes’ eschatology, but his mortalism (and the account of the second death) is the 
centerpiece of his theory. It is the glue that holds the whole together.  
One of the most interesting interpretive questions surrounding Hobbes’ mortalism is 
why he changed his position in Leviathan from the comparatively orthodox position of the 
Elements and De Cive.  Several theories suggest themselves. One is that the comparatively lax 
                                                
254 The argument against the kingdom of God belonging in some sense to the present world is a subject I 
will take up in a later chapter, where I explore Hobbes’ Erastian ecclesiology. The notion of heaven-on-
earth thus plays an important, but minor, role in the argument for church government, but it is properly an 
eschatological concept, and hence belongs in this chapter.  
 151 
censorship in England at the time allowed Hobbes to feel comfortable expressing his true 
feelings, and that he was a mortalist all along. Another theory is that Hobbes’ exposure to 
thinkers like Archer and Overton changed his mind. Both the Personall Reign and Man’s 
Mortalitie were published around the time Hobbes concluded writing De Cive in 1642 so that 
he could have been unaware of them until after he published that work. Yet another theory 
is that he altered his position to rectify a previously-undetected defect in his political theory, 
the fear, on the part of religious dissenters that they would be damned if they refused to act 
on their state-subversive beliefs, as David Johnston argues in “Hobbes’s mortalism”.255 Some 
combination of all these suggestions is likely.  
Personally, I am inclined to believe that Hobbes had not considered the mortalist 
doctrine seriously until he read some of the radical Christian literature of the time, and 
finding inspiration there, discovered it’s affinity with the elements of his wider system, and 
the doctrine’s utility for addressing some of the problems raised by the civil wars. The 
comparatively tolerant climate of 1651 only served to remove whatever prudential concerns 
Hobbes might have had with expressing such a radical doctrine so freely.  
Hobbes indeed has several strong reasons from within his philosophical system to 
reject the natural immortality of the soul and embrace mortalism. In brief: First, mortalism 
squares with his materialism, if not by necessary implication, then by philosophical affinity. 
Second, the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is an inheritance from Greek 
religion and philosophy, and has no Scriptural basis. It is fantastic, unscientific, and most 
importantly, Unchristian. Third, an immortal soul needs no help from God to persist, a 
                                                
255 See David Johnston, “Hobbes’s Mortalism”, pg. 662–663. 
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concept which Hobbes finds theologically suspect.  Finally, there are adverse political 
consequences to maintaining the soul’s immortality – among them purgatory and the fear of 
eternal torments.  
First, immortal souls are commonly conceptualized as incorporeal spirits, and there 
is no such thing as an incorporeal spirit for Hobbes. This assertion of incorporeality 
contradicts his materialism, as we have already seen. But, as David Johnston points out “The 
corporeal or incorporeal nature of the soul is a separate issue from its mortality or 
immortality.”256 It is not logically necessary for a body to be mortal. So it is logically 
consistent to maintain the soul is corporeal, but immortal, as Hobbes seems to have done in 
both the Elements and De Cive. In those works, he adopts the traditional picture of the soul as 
separable from the body and immortal, he just attaches the rider that the soul might just be 
merely physical. 
But because mortalism is not a logically entailed by materialism, which I grant, does 
not mean that it is impossible to maintain that souls do not exist independently of the body 
and that they are thus mortal. In fact, it seems sensible on some level if we believe that all 
the ordinary objects of experience admit of change, of generation and corruption. This gives 
us a philosophical reason to endorse mortalism on Hobbes’ premises.  
Adam before the Fall was an exception to this general rule. But Hobbes always 
characterizes the state of the elect after the final judgment as returning to an Adamic state 
via an act of special grace. The ordinary workings of the universe seem to reject the notion 
that created things are immortal, and the world after the Second Coming is an exceptional 
                                                
256 Johnston, “Hobbes’s  mortalism”, 654.  
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time, where the hand of God is more evident and active than previously seen in the 
postlapsarian age.  Recall that Adam himself was created individually and by a special act of 
God; Eve also.  
Second, the doctrine of an immortal soul is a relic of Greek “demonology”, which 
found a philosophical expression in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s Phaedo was a 
crucial philosophical expression of this idea of the soul’s immortality as is the doctrine of 
“separated essences” derived from Aristotle.  The importation of “separated essences” into 
their work by later Scholastic theologians gave support to this notion of an naturally 
independent and immortal soul, but as Hobbes argues, this is not Scripturally justified. 
Hobbes can make a convincing case that by arguing sola Scriptura, one can find independent 
confirmation of his scientific account. The fact that Hobbes was not the only one of his 
contemporaries to make this argument, lends credence to his claims. By casting doubt on the 
origins of the idea, Hobbes was also bringing suspicion onto the promulgators of the 
doctrine, namely officials of established Churches.  
Third, a naturally immortal soul does not seem to depend on God for it’s existence, 
which for Hobbes is theologically perplexing. A naturally immortal soul is independent from 
divine power. Seemingly, such a soul could not, for instance, be destroyed by God should he 
so desire. This would limit the omnipotence of God. Hobbes is here also affirming the 
Calvinist notion that everything depends entirely on God’s active choice for its existence, 
and that eternal life is a voluntary act of “special grace”, not something assumed. “For 
supposing eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body, and no 
immortality till the resurrection.” (L44.30/429) This third objection bleeds over into political 
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considerations, because the absolute, unchecked power of God’s will is the model for 
Hobbes’ sovereign, and a naturally immortal soul is like a dissenter clinging to “liberty”. 
Finally and most importantly, the doctrine entails other “dark doctrine[s]” 
(L44.16/420) which produce undesirable political effects. Hobbes lists three such effects: (a) 
the doctrine of purgatory, (b) the belief in ghosts, and (c) eternal torments. All three 
doctrines enhance the power of an independent clergy over and against the power of the 
sovereign.  
(a) As we have seen, Hobbes argues that the early Church fathers unquestioningly 
accepted the immortality of the soul on the basis of their encounters with Greek philosophy. 
This lead them to speculate on where souls might go after the death of the body. In time, a 
consensus was reached, and “the Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for 
them [the souls] this place of purgatory” (L44.16/420). That profit resides in a literal sense in 
the sale of indulgences, which rests upon the belief that the Roman Church alone can help 
the souls of those in purgatory to reach heaven – no mean political leverage! Purgatory helps 
drive a wedge into the loyalties of subjects, potentially forcing them to choose between their 
sovereign and their religious leaders. If purgatory is not hell, it is not heaven either. Nor is it 
akin to earthly life. It is discomfort, perhaps best seen as a “little hell”. It is potentially 
terminable, but without the “proper” intercessions, a soul could spend a long time in 
purgatory. The doctrine of purgatory preys on fears of being trapped in some intermediary 
state, and provides social power to the organization that can alleviate those worries. 
As an aside, the controversy over the “intermediate state” also raises questions about 
the nature of the final judgment and eternal life in general. On the traditional Protestant 
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view, which rejects purgatory, souls go immediately to heaven or hell after the death of the 
body. There they await the Final Judgment. Final Judgment solidifies the fate of the elect and 
the reprobate, they experience the full force of their sentence, which they had only 
experienced in a limited form prior. The mortalist tradition had problems with this 
interpretation because not only did it open the doors to detestable Catholic doctrines, but it 
diminished the role and grandeur of the Final Judgment. On the mortalist account, the Final 
Judgment restores life (or consciousness) to the dead, and marks the exact point of when 
eternal bliss or suffering begins. This account also dovetails with the common idea that 
resurrection was to include the body. The mortalist maintains that they sidestep errant 
theology and give dignity to what all Christians regarded as a watershed event in sacred 
history.257 Mortalists, Hobbes among them, could argue for the felicitous consequences of 
their beliefs as well as for their Scriptural basis. 
(b) The belief in ghosts also furthers the power of the Church against the sovereign, 
by supporting the practice of exorcism, itself another pagan relic dressed up in Christian 
grab. The belief in ghosts also builds up fear of being trapped between worlds, potentially 
forever.  
A further, unintended consequence of the belief in ghosts is to further perpetuate 
superstitious and unscientific thinking among the masses. This allows them to be 
manipulated for political gain by demagogues.  
(c) Eternal torment is the ultimate threat to the disobedient, and the biggest worry of 
any sincere believer. But there are serious objections be made to the idea. 
                                                
257 See Burns, Christian Mortalism, pgs. 33–34. 
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The Christian God is commonly understood to be merciful to sinners. In this light, 
Hobbes observes,  
it seemeth hard, to say that God, who is the father of mercies, that doth in heaven and earth 
all that he will, that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing, and without whose free gift a 
man hath neither the inclination to good nor repentance of evil, should punish men’s 
transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can 
imagine, and more. (L44.26/426) 
Since all things depend on God, in both Hobbes’ physical determinism and his 
theological predestinarianism, it does seem strange to punish eternally for crimes that God 
foresaw and permitted to happen, which but for the action of his grace would not occur.  A 
second death seems to be more compatible with the idea of God as the Father of Mercy. 
By mitigating the fear of eternal suffering with the idea of a second death, Hobbes 
relies upon the following line of reasoning, which I quote almost in its entirety from Anti-
White: 
…White slips into the question: ‘Is it better not to exist at all than to suffer eternal torment, 
when happiness is lost?’ In my opinion, not to exist is preferable to existence in such a state. 
The nature of goodness consists in its pleasing [us] or in its being eagerly desired, but of evil 
in its being repellant or despicable. We may say, then: ‘Nothing is worse or more shunned 
than the greatest evil, from which we can never extricate ourselves.’ But if ‘not to exist’ were 
worse than to suffer everlasting affliction, ‘not to be’ would be more hateful than torment, 
because clearly non-being endures no pain; therefore [non-being]is not evil. That we prefer a 
torment which lasts [only] for a fixed, finite, and short period to perishing or to death is due not to 
the loathsomeness associated with death or with our ceasing-to-be, but either to the hope of 
receiving, with life itself, the joys of life, or to the fear of [suffering] pain as we die.258 
The passage unambiguously endorses the belief that nonexistence is preferable to 
eternal suffering. Hobbes does not discuss the matter this frankly in Leviathan, but I feel it is 
safe to assume continuity on this issue between Leviathan and Anti-White—certainly it sheds 
light on the fate of the reprobate under sentence of a second death. 
                                                
258 Anti-White, 39.3/486. I thank Johnston’s and Overhoff’s writings for drawing my attention to this 
passage.  
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While the merits of the position can be debated, it certainly seems to be clear. White 
certainly disagreed, but the utilitarian tradition might concur with Hobbes. GE Moore, for 
instance, might argues that considered solely on its own, oblivion would be preferable to a 
state of affairs consisting of the consciousness of pain and nothing else.259 Advocates of 
euthanasia seem to embrace this position, although the individual’s view of the afterworld 
would influence this. Most importantly, this belief has a basis in Hobbes’ own ethical 
position, where pain is associated with evil, and violent (read: painful) death is regarded as 
the worst evil.  Violent death is evil, not because it causes death/annihilation, but because it 
entails pain and fear. 
The reinterpretation of hell as involving a second death speaks to a contemporary 
historical fear. Many people suspected they were unworthy to enter heaven, and worried that 
they were condemned to hell, even those who were faithful.260 Certainly, certain 
interpretations of the doctrine of predestination did not allay any fears in this respect. Even 
an outwardly virtuous and religiously observant person could lack saving faith. The concern 
was that people who felt they were condemned to eternal torment would have “nothing to 
lose” and would be disruptive and vicious. By recasting their fate as temporary, some of the 
subversive effects of a nihilistic outlook could potentially be blunted, even for those 
convinced of their damnation.  
All three of these doctrines (purgatory, ghosts, and eternal torments) empower a 
priestly caste over and against legitimate sovereigns, forcing subjects to choose, allegedly, 
                                                
259 See Moore, Principia Ethica, especially ¶112, 127. 
260 For a discussion of this worry, even among those that would consider themselves elect, see RT 
Kendall’s book on English Calvinism. 
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between God and King. All three problems ultimately reduce to the question of who has the 
ultimate sanction (access or not to eternal bliss/damnation) at their disposal. (I will address 
Hobbes’ specific ecclesiastical criticisms in the next section, but these political concerns are 
important enough to allude to here.) 
Mortalism is thus a watershed moment for Hobbes’ thought, it combines elements 
of each aspect of his philosophy, leveraging them into a new interpretation of Christian 
doctrine that favors clearheaded, scientific thinking on the one hand, and stable sovereignty 
on the other.  
Eternal life is a crucial political problem with high stakes, because “it is impossible 
that a commonwealth should stand where any other than the sovereign hath a power of 
giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death.” 
(L37.1/301) It is obvious that “eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal 
torment a greater punishment than the death of nature” (ibid.). We have seen Hobbes’ answers 
to these questions. No one other than the sovereign has the keys to heaven or hell. Eternal 
life is easy to achieve if you obey the legitimate authorities; you will not be damned for 
minor errors in doctrine. Eternal torment does not apply to the individual. If hell is a 
possibility, it is only a temporary punishment followed by sweet (by comparison) oblivion. 
Hell is not a worse evil, then, than the state of nature. 
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Chapter 5: Ecclesiology, Erastianism, and Anticlericalism   
“I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause, and that 
is, unpleasing priests, and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in the church that hath 
presumed most of reformation.” (L12.32/73–4).261 
Even though it is from the first half of Leviathan, this epigraph neatly summarizes 
Hobbes’ view of the priesthood and its ambitions against legitimate authority. In this 
chapter, I turn my attention to the issues of church government and organization in Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Hobbes devotes an enormous amount of time defending his vision of the 
relationship between church and state, although his basic position was by no means an 
unfamiliar or an unpopular one to his contemporaries. Nevertheless, Hobbes alienated many 
of his old friends with his scathing rhetoric and unflinching conclusions.   
Hobbes famously tells us: “Temporal and spiritual government are but two words 
brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign.” 
(L39.5/316). The problem of a separate church and state, and the relations between these 
two power centers, is a new one, Hobbes informs us.  
This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the world. There was no such 
dilemma amongst the Jews…Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of amongst 
the Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles…This difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, and 
troubleth those Christians only, to who it is allows to take for the sense of the Scripture that 
which they make thereof, either by their own private interpretation, or by the interpretation 
of such as are not called thereunto by public authority (EL25.2/141–2).  
Hobbes will systematically attack and undermine any such claims to private 
interpretation, either first-hand or from the mouth of another.  
                                                
261 Clarendon, in his “Survey” quotes this passage directly (though slightly inaccurately), and says that Hobbes 
with that last phrase “intends the Church of England, at that time under the most severe and barbarous 
persecution; and therefore it was the enviously and maliciously, as well as dishonestly alleged.” Survey, pg. 25 
(spelling modernized). I certainly do not see Clarendon overreaching with the implication.  
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In criticizing the division of power into temporal and spiritual, Hobbes is working 
here against the traditional interpretation of the roles of Church and State, as understood by 
the Roman Church and, as it turns out, mainstream Anglicans and Presbyterians as well. 
Hobbes sees the entirety of church government and church powers under control of the 
sovereign. This position has come to be known as Erastianism, after a thinker whose name 
became synonymous with these ideas, the Swiss physician Thomas Lüber (1524–1583), also 
known as Erastus. Erastus was famous for writing 75 Theses denying the right of clergymen 
to exercise the power of excommunication independent of the consent of the civil 
authorities.262  
Radical (“full-blown”) Erastianism was not uncommon among intellectuals of 
Hobbes’ time, like John Selden,263 and there was a strain of Erastian thinking in Anglican 
thought as well.264 The terms of the Act of Supremacy (1559) granted the English Monarch 
total control over the Church of England: 
such jurisdictions, privileges, superiorities and pre-eminences, spiritual and ecclesiastical, as 
by any spiritual or ecclesiastical power or authority have heretofore been, or may lawfully be 
exercised or used for the visitation of the ecclesiastical state and persons, and for 
reformation, order and correction of the same, and of all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, 
                                                
262 See  Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 128; see also Collins, The Allegiance of 
Thomas Hobbes, pp. 17–18; 171. “Erastianism” as understood in Hobbes’ time meant far more than Erastus 
himself advocated for in his Theses, and was understood to mean the total dependence of church power on the 
civil authority. 
263 After the publication of Leviathan, Hobbes sought out and became friends with Selden on the basis of his 
Erastian beliefs among other reasons. He gave Selden a personal copy. But Hobbes was well acquainted with 
Selden’s work beforehand. Selden is one of the few contemporary authors mentioned favorably in Leviathan. 
Hobbes praises his book on titles of honor at L10.52/56. See Sommerville, “Selden, Erastianism, and the 
History of the Jews”.  
264 See Sommerville and Collins above. Sommerville notes, “It is sometimes said that the Anglican clergy was 
Erastian in outlook. This is true in so far as clerics granted the monarch supremacy over ecclesiastical affairs, 
and held that churchmen can exercise their functions only with their sovereign’s permission. But on other 
points they parted company with Erastus.” (128)  
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abuses, offenses, contempts and enormities, shall for ever, by authority of this present 
Parliament, be united and annexed to the imperial crown of this realm.265 
There was plenty of healthy disagreement on the specifics of the Act, but the crown 
did have the right to choose its bishops and replace them if it desired.266 So it was not 
controversial for Anglican clergy to see their appointments governed by the sovereign. 
However, as we shall see, the power of excommunication and the idea of apostolic 
succession remained enormous points of contention across the broad intellectual landscape 
of Hobbes’ time.  
Sommerville offers a useful summary of the background conditions and Hobbes 
relationship to them,  
The main theoretical presumption of the Erastians was that two independent jurisdictions – 
civil and ecclesiastical – are impossible in one commonwealth. They supported this with a set 
of detailed claims about ancient Jewish and early Christian history. Hobbes endorsed their 
theoretical premise, and their conclusions, but took his own highly original and idiosyncratic 
line on history.267 
Hobbes’ argument for his version of the Erastian position occupies an enormous 
part of the second half of Leviathan, and includes the longest single chapter in the book. 
Hobbes presents his arguments in four of the Chapters of Part III and in (parts of at 
least) all four Chapters of Part IV. The Erastian argument, in one form or another occupies a 
significant portion of the second half of Leviathan, more than any other issue. The space 
devoted to it alone testifies to the political importance of the issue for Hobbes.  
In Part III, Hobbes first defines a Church in Chapter 29. After this, he switches to 
his historical-Scriptural argument for the unity of Church and State. He discusses the Old 
                                                
265 Section 8 of the Act of Supremacy, in Documents of the English Reformation, page 322.  
266 Ibid., Section 10 (323–324). 
267 Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the History of the Jews”, pg. 174. 
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Testament, with an emphasis on the figure of Moses (Chapter 40); he then turns his 
attention to Christ, (chapter 41); finally, he addresses the Church in the era after Christ’s 
death, through the conversion of monarchs from paganism to Christianity, up to (but not 
including) his Second Coming (Chapter 42). The latter is the single longest chapter in the 
whole book.  
This threefold discussion can be mapped onto three historical periods, the past 
(Moses to Christ), the present (the time of the Apostles up to Christ’s return), and the future 
(Christ’s Second Coming and after). Furthermore, each of these historical periods is 
identifiable with a figure of the Trinity and its chosen representative person. The past is the 
time of the Father, personated by Moses and the high priests of Israel up to the time of 
Christ; the present era is the time of the Holy Spirit, first with the Apostles, and then working 
through God’s “lieutenants”, civil sovereigns; the future is the time of Christ, the Son, as 
king.268 Patricia Springborg summarizes this nicely, when she writes that Hobbes’ “theory 
constitutes a periodization of sacred history as an elaborate structure of two spheres, three 
worlds, and three-phase time.”269 Hobbes doctrine of the Trinity did not pass without its 
share of criticism. I will consider the orthodox fallout from this position later on in the 
discussion. 
In part IV, “Of the Kingdom of Darkness”, Hobbes examines the self-authenticating 
errors that infiltrated the Christian mind, slowly over time, and which lead to its corruption. 
He devotes a large section of Chapter 44 (on the misinterpretation of Scripture) to a critique 
                                                
268 Christ’s (first, earthly) life is subsumed under the reign of the Father, as Hobbes later makes clear at the end 
of L41. 
269 Springborg, “Leviathan and the Problem of Ecclesiastical Authority”, pg 294. See also JGA Pocock, “Time, 
History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes”.  
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of Papal (and other sects’) arguments. Chapter 45 argues that many elements of Catholic 
ceremony and theology are demonological “relics of the religion of the Gentiles”. The 
critique of Scholasticism and Aristotle occupies Chapter 46. Lastly, Chapter 47 points out 
the benefits the “errors” (really, willful distortions) of the previous three chapters accrued to. 
Hobbes’ point in Part IV is to ridicule the metaphysics of Scholasticism and accuse clerics of 
usurping sovereign power under cover of an intellectual smoke screen. 
Hobbes’ argument throughout is bold and provocative. But it is also well-informed. 
Patricia Springborg praises the depth of Hobbes’ commentary on the subject, “Hobbes’ 
theology shows that he had done his homework. Not only could he apply humanist 
techniques of biblical criticism but his knowledge of ecclesiology was extensive.”270 
The Definition of a Church 
Hobbes defines a Church, “to be a company of men professing Christian religion, 
united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and 
without whose authority they ought not to assemble.” (L39.4/315–6)271 An immediate 
corollary of this definition is “that there is on earth no such universal Church as all 
Christians are bound to obey, because there is no power on earth to which all 
commonwealths are subject.” (L39.5/316) Hobbes rejects a division between temporal and 
spiritual sovereignty, arguing that “There is…no other government in this life, neither of 
state nor religion, but temporal” (L39.5/316). Hobbes adds, “Who that one chief pastor is, 
                                                
270 Springborg, “Hobbes and Bellarmine”, pg. 512.  
271 The original definition is in italics.  
 164 
according to the law of nature, hath already been shown, namely, that is the civil sovereign” (ibid., 
emphasis mine).  
The preponderance of Parts III and IV of Leviathan marshals the Scriptural evidence 
for the unity of temporal and spiritual power, or in terms more amenable to Hobbes himself, 
for the total control of religious institutions by the civil sovereign.  
Moses and the Old Testament  
Johann Sommerville observes that ancient “Jewish customs were seen as highly 
relevant to Christians”, so the Old Testament is a good place to start in any analysis of the 
relation between Church and State, and Hobbes was no exception.272    
Abraham was the first ruler of the Jewish people and exercised total control over the 
civil and religious life of the early Jews, “For God spake only to Abraham; and it was he only 
that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family” (L40.4/318). 
Isaac and then Jacob took up this mantle. But after the captivity in Egypt, the succession was 
ended.  
Moses was selected by God to be the ruler of the Israelites, but because he had no 
claim to the sovereignty of Abraham, his power was “grounded on the consent of the people 
and their promise to obey him.” (L40.6/319). The people believed that Moses spoke with 
                                                
272 Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the History of the Jews”, pg. 168. 
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God and “elected” him their ruler on this basis. Hence, Moses was in fact a sovereign by 
institution.273 
Hobbes argues that “it is plain that Moses, who was alone called up to God (and not 
Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people who were forbidden to 
come up), was alone he that represented to the Israelites the person of God, that is to say, 
was their sole sovereign under God.” (L40.7/319).274 If we take Moses as our model, and 
there is no reason on Hobbes’ terms not to, “we may conclude that whosoever in a Christian 
commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses is the sole messenger of God, and interpreter of 
his commandments.” (L40.7/321). Hence, 
no man ought in the interpretation of Scripture to proceed further than the bounds which 
are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures, since God now speaketh in them, are 
the Mount Sinai, the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent God’s person on 
earth. To look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to 
fear him, is allowed; but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God saith to him who he 
appointeth to govern under him, and makes themselves judges whether he govern as God 
commandeth him or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set, and to gaze upon God 
irreverently. (ibid.) 
Remember that to look upon the face of God is to die; to interpret the Scriptures is 
to risk a similar fate. 
Moses authorized who was a prophet. The seventy elders who prophesied existed by 
Moses’ appointment. “By which” Hobbes writes, “it is manifest that no subject ought to 
pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him who 
God hath set in the place of Moses.” (L40.8/321). 
                                                
273 See Ch. 18 of Leviathan. This is one of the rare instances where Hobbes actually provides an example of a 
commonwealth by institution. As we have seen, using Old Testament events and precedents is a validating 
trope both in Hobbes’ time and for Hobbes in particular.   
274 The parenthetical remark is a clever stab at the other modes of Church organization in Hobbes’ time: Aaron 
would be a bishop, signifying episcopacy; the elders are presbyters, and the people seem to be standing in for 
the Independents. All of these owe their powers to the sovereign.  
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The Levites, the tribe of Israel from whom the priests were called, were unable to 
own land in Israel, but were provided with a tithe to survive. But this was not an 
independent provision made outside of the regular channels, “it is manifest that the right of 
tithes and offerings was constituted by the civil power.” (L42.61/364) And, as Hobbes 
implies, what the sovereign gives, he can also take away (or modify) at his discretion.   
After the death of Moses, the high priest assumed the role of sovereign, and this was 
true until the election of Saul as king, “And whereas before all authority, both in religion and 
policy, was in the high-priest, so now it was all in the king.” (L40.11/323).  
The record seems clear, argues Hobbes, “from the practice of those times there can 
no argument be drawn that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings.” 
(L40.13/325). Hence, “so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude that 
whosoever had also the supreme authority of the commonwealth amongst the Jews, the 
same had also the supreme authority in matter of God’s external worship and representeth 
God’s person” (L40.14/326). Those powers include all the familiar powers of sovereignty, 
the right of interpretation of Scripture, the right to appoint church ministers, the right to 
control the support given to those ministers.  
Then, as in Hobbes’ time, people failed to recognize this unity of powers, “And from 
thence proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the 
nation.” (L40.12/324). A confusion of the rights of sovereignty, as history (and not just 
theory) clearly shows, leads to civil war, and violent death. “Hobbes found in history what 
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theory had already proved,” writes Sommerville, namely, “The Jews gave undivided 
sovereignty to their ruler because sovereignty was indivisible.”275 
Jesus and the World to Come  
Christ’s “office” has three parts, redeemer, teacher, and king. While Christ was on 
earth for the first time he only played two roles: redeemer and teacher. Both of these roles 
are conditions for the third. As redeemer, Christ’s death allowed humanity to be saved from 
eternal death. Also, Jesus worked “by teaching and by working of miracles, to persuade and 
prepare men to live so as to be worthy of the immortality believers were to enjoy, at such 
time as he should come in majesty to take control of his Father’s kingdom.” (L41.4/329) 
In his capacity as teacher, Jesus assumed no civil powers, nor did he challenge the 
civil powers in any way. Hobbes writes: 
The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world; he taught all men to obey, in the 
meantime, them that sat in Moses’ seat; he allowed them to give to Caesar his tribute, and 
refused to take upon himself to be a judge. How, then, could his words or actions be 
seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then civil government? (L41.5/330) 
Note that Jesus Christ, as Hobbes describes him, wholly conforms to Hobbes’ 
definition of a prophet—one who works miracles in the name of the true religion, who does 
not challenge the reigning power. 
The critical point is that the third and final aspect of His office, that of king, is 
reserved until after the Final Judgment. Christ assumed no civil authority and gave no such 
powers to His disciples—Christ did not create a Kingdom of God on earth when he came for the first 
time. In fact, although Hobbes claims that Christ as teacher was akin to Moses, and served 
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under God, considered as the Father, as his representative on earth (L41.9/333), Christ did 
not rule, but rather represented God in order to maintain continuity of that representation. 
If it sounds confusing, it is. Hobbes would return to these matters to try and make sense of 
them. If we take him at his word, these attempts were in vain. If we read between the lines, 
perhaps something else is afoot.  
We have already discussed the dynamics of this final era in our discussion of 
mortalism in the previous chapter. 
Power Ecclesiastical, Part I: The Church before Christian Sovereigns 
Chapter 42, “Power Ecclesiastical” is Hobbes’ lengthy discussion of the church in 
the current age, the most relevant for his argumentation. Both the chapter on the ancient 
Israelites and the kingdom to come are short, include for reasons mostly of intellectual 
completeness, and in the case of Moses, precedent. The chapter consists of three broad 
sections. First Hobbes considers the church government of the early Church, in the era 
before the sovereign power professed Christianity. Then, Hobbes considers the church after 
the conversion of sovereigns to Christianity, and concludes that the sole authority in religion 
lies with the sovereign. But in the final part, he pays special attention to the claims of the 
Pope, as articulated by Cardinal Bellarmine, that he alone is the head of the Christian 
Church. Unsurprisingly, Hobbes finds the papal argumentation unconvincing in the slightest.  
The 12 Apostles and 70 disciples picked up the role, and represent the person, of the 
Holy Spirit after Christ’s ascension. But the early church had no right (nor obligation) to 
resist the existing powers, nor did the commission of the leaders of the early church give 
them any power over their congregations. Hobbes notes that “the time between the 
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ascension and the general resurrection is called, not a reigning, but a regeneration, that is, a 
preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ” (L42.7/337). 
Recall first Hobbes’ distinction between a counsel and a command. A counsel, “is 
where a man saith do, or do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by 
it to him to whom he saith it.” (L25.3/166) A counsel is advice, and lacks coercive power. It 
attempts to persuade on the basis of the listener’s own good. A command, by contrast, “is 
where a man say do this, or do not this, without expecting other reason than the will of him 
that says it.” (L25.2/165) Laws are commands of the sovereign power.   
Hobbes systematically argues that at no point did the apostles ever possess or aspire 
to legal authority. He considers the duties of their office, the practice of conversion, the 
acceptance of the New Testament as a canon, the role of councils, and the organization of 
the early church. 
The proper teaching of the church is to submit to the governing powers, even if they 
are infidels. An ordinary Christian is under no obligation to martyr him- or herself for the 
faith to defy such a regime, in fact, quite the contrary. Hobbes cites the example of Naaman, 
who denied his faith in public but kept to it in his heart, to support his claim. God 
specifically calls those who He wants to be martyrs to His cause; all others need only follow 
in their hearts. 
For those who find this doctrine “repugnant”, Hobbes poses a thought experiment. 
Imagine a devout Muslim in a Christian country, whose sovereign demands he publicly 
profess Christianity (or suffer death). Should the Muslim profess Christian religion or not? 
What would an observer say? “If he say, he ought to suffer death, then he authorizeth all 
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private men to disobey their princes, in maintenance of their religion, true or false” 
(L42.11/339).  For Hobbes this is unthinkable, a clear violation of the natural law. If the 
observer picks profession of Christianity, then they concede Hobbes’ point.  
Hobbes reviews the Scriptural commission of the Apostles, and by extension, their 
“substitutes and successors” (L42.19/343) in the early church. The disciples of Christ were 
given a commission to perform five responsibilities. These were to: (a) preach, (b) teach, (c) 
baptize, (d) forgive sins, and (e) to excommunicate when necessary. Being a martyr was never 
a general responsibility for the ministers of the faith. 
Preaching is “that act by which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in 
proclaiming of a king.” (L42.16/341) It lacks entirely the power of command. Teaching is 
much the same as preaching. It is a counsel “that they shall do wisely to expect the coming 
of Christ hereafter, in patience, and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.” 
(L42.17/342) Baptism is the symbol of the regeneration of the sinner. It is a promise of 
loyalty in the kingdom to come and represents no disobedience to the powers that currently 
hold sway. Baptism paves the way for the forgiveness of sins.  
But the forgiveness of sins is not an absolute power, but is granted to the apostles on 
the basis of “the outward marks of repentance” (L42.19/343) which are determined not by 
an individual but by the assembled Church (ibid./344). Forgiveness was pronounced by an 
individual priest, as a prolocutor, that is, only on the basis of the agreement of the assembled 
Church. This last point is important for Hobbes’ argument, and he bolsters it with several 
passages from St. Paul. The remission of sins was a communal affair, based on its 
democratic acceptance of the sinner’s repentance. No one individual was singled out to make 
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the decision for the group. The prolocutor merely gave the groups’ decision: he was a 
mouthpiece, not an executive.  
Those whose sins are not forgiven are to be cast out, or excommunicated. Hobbes 
leaves his discussion of the power of excommunication for last because it is one of the most 
important for his purposes, and because it mattered very highly to his contemporaries. “In 
the late 1640s and early 1650s – at the time when Leviathan was being written and published 
– debate on church-state relations focused on the clergy’s power to excommunicate.”276 All 
of the clerical authorities of Hobbes’ time claimed for themselves alone the power of 
excommunication; a power which they claimed could deny eternal salvation to the 
excommunicate.  
On Hobbes’ reading, excommunication in the early Church “was no more than that 
they who were not excommunicate were to avoid the company of them that were.” 
(L42.21/345). A Church could physically refuse to admit someone from their assembly 
house, but on analogy with a private dwelling, not as a matter of assuming coercive power. 
“Excommunication, therefore, had its effect only upon those who believed that Jesus Christ 
was yet to come again in glory” (L42.24/346). Excommunication was “a delivery of the 
excommunicate person to Satan” (ibid.).  
Hobbes asserts that excommunication “was used only for a correction of manners, 
not of errors of opinion” (ibid., emphasis mine). The Scripture counsels believers to “Avoid 
foolish questions,” by which Hobbes infers that “all such places as command avoiding such 
disputes are written for a lesson to pastors…not to make new articles of faith by determining 
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every small controversy, which oblige men to a needless burden of conscience or provoke 
them to break the union of the Church.” (L42.25/347)277 Hobbes notes that Peter and Paul 
did not excommunicate one another, “though there controversy were great”, but lesser 
clergy were guilty of this, and “so early it was that vain glory and ambition had found 
entrance into the Church of Christ.” (ibid.) 
Excommunication can only happen where there is a “commonalty”—“For where 
there is no community, there can be no excommunication” (L42.26/347). Hence, there can 
be no excommunication of another Church. Since subjects must associate with their 
sovereign, there can likewise be no meaningful excommunication with one’s rightful ruler.  
The power does not work on a true believer: “he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ 
is free from all the dangers threatened to persons excommunicate.” (L42.29/348)  
Hence, the threat of excommunication, “when it wanteth the assistance of the civil 
power (as it doth, when a Christian state or prince is excommunicate by a foreign authority), 
is without effect, and consequently, ought to be without terror.” (L42.31/349)  
The “thunderbolt of excommunication” often invoked by the pope is mistaken. First 
because it assumes that kingdom of god is of this world, and second that the pope is king of 
the present spiritual kingdom. Incidentally, it relies on the metaphor of pope as Jupiter, 
hurling his thunderbolts and disobedient mortals, a theme which Hobbes will repeat 
throughout the second half of Leviathan.  
                                                
277 If such controversies were a distraction to the early Church, and carried no weight back then, they pose a 
similar danger to the present state of belief, and should likewise be avoided. That minimalist doctrine, the Jesus 
is the Christ, is sufficient. See my discussion in Chapter 4.  
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All of this amounts to saying that Church’s independent power of excommunication 
is far weaker than maintained, and does not constitute the true “keys to the kingdom”. 
So in summation, none of the points of the commission of the clergy gave them 
sovereign-like authority nor did it give them a special place apart from the community that 
acclaimed them.  
The early Christians faced two groups with the hopes of converting them to their 
religion: the Jews and the pagan Gentiles. For the Jewish people, the early Christians has to 
reason on the basis of the Old Testament to demonstrate that Christ was the Messiah.  
Paul came to the Jews without any legal authority and effected conversions, “by 
reasoning from the already received Scripture.” (L42.32/349) No one could be forced to 
agree with his opinions, but the Jews did accept the Old Testament as an authority. Hence, 
at that time “every one might believe or not believe, according as the allegations seemed to 
himself to be agreeable or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged.” (L42.33/350) 
This freedom of interpretation will disappear after the conversion of kings, but the early 
Church was far more democratic and tolerant in nearly every aspect as we have seen. 
The apostles again converted unbelieving Gentiles, not by force, but by first, using 
natural reasoning against pagan beliefs and second, testifying to the uprightness of Christ’s 
life and his mission, in other words, the truth of revelation.  
With regard to their opponents, Hobbes argues that the apostles could not “call for 
fire from heaven to destroy them, nor compel them to obedience by the sword. In all which 
there is nothing of power, but of persuasion.” (L42.44/355) 
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Hobbes summarizes,  
Seeing, them, our Savior and his apostles left not new laws to oblige us in this world, but 
new doctrine to prepare us for the next, the books of the New Testament, which contain 
that doctrine, until obedience to them was command by them that God had given power on 
earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is, laws, but only good and safe 
advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take and 
refuse at his own peril, without injustice. (L42.43/355) 
The early church formed councils to decide, locally, certain controversial issues. But, 
as Hobbes reminds us, “the acts of the councils of the apostles were then no laws, but 
counsels” (L42.47/357).  
How, then did the New Testament become canonical? “Canon” to Hobbes is 
ambiguous, because a canon implies that there is a rule in place. But there can be rules given 
by a teacher, that possess only persuasive influence, and there can be rules given by a 
sovereign which possess coercive power. As we have seen, the former are called counsels 
and only the latter are called laws. Before the conversion of kings, the books of the New 
Testament were only the former, and “it was not the apostles that made their own writings 
canonical, but every convert made them so to himself.” (L42.42/354) The Old Testament, 
by way of comparison, was canonical in the second sense only when the sovereign of the 
Jews, Moses and the high priests, made it the case, otherwise, they were canonical merely in 
the first sense, as advice (see L42.37–41/351–4). 
One of Hobbes’ crucial points is that the early church had a flexible, informal, 
organization, not a rigid hierarchy dictated by Sacred Scripture . Hobbes notes that in the 
early church there were both magisterial and ministerial positions. Magisterial officers were 
responsible for missionary work to unbelievers, administering the sacraments, and 
instruction of the converted.  
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The first order of magisterial officers were the 12 Apostles, who all saw Jesus in 
person. To this select group, Judas was subtracted, and three more members were added, 
Matthew (Matthias), Paul, and Barnabas. Matthew was chosen by his congregation to replace 
Judas. Barnabas had seen Christ before his ascension. Paul saw God in a vision on the road 
to Damascus. Paul and Barnabas were “chosen and authorized (not by the first apostles 
alone, but) by the Church of Antioch, as Matthias was chosen and authorized by the Church 
of Jerusalem.” (L42.53/359). So, aside from the original twelve, all the remaining apostles 
were “ratified” in some sense by the congregations.  
The word “bishop” means “an overseer or superintendent of any business, and 
particularly a pastor or shepherd” (L42.54/359) and “presbyter” means simply an elder of 
the Church. These are all ordinary words, not official titles. They all simply connote respect, 
and are synonymous with one another. Hobbes argues that “it is evident that bishop, pastor, 
elder, doctor, that is to say, teacher, were but so many divers names of the same office in the 
time of the apostles.” (ibid.) The names were given official status in a hierarchy by the later 
church, but for Hobbes, this represents a corruption of the informal honorifics of the early 
church. All of the titles mentioned in the New Testament are like this. “For there was then 
no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuading.” (ibid.) So in addition to 
attempting to grab coercive authority, the later church would use these titles to legitimize 
that trespass.  
Hobbes argues then, that as “the apostles Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas were not 
made by our Savior himself, but were elected by the Church…so were also the presbyters and 
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pastors in other cities elected by the Churches of those cities.” (L42.56/360)278 Hobbes 
repeats this point several times in his discussion, whether he is discussing the election of 
elders or of bishops. The church as a whole, not some special class apart, picked its officers. 
(When the church acquires a single spokes-person, in Hobbes’ technical sense of person,279 
only that authority will pick the officers). 
Ministerial officers, deacons, handled the day-to-day secular affairs of the church.  
The magisterial officers served Christ, while the deacons served the needs of the assembly. 
They too were elected by the members of their Church.  
As for the financial support provided for the church, Hobbes observes,  
in the time of the apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we 
shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was 
nothing but voluntary contributions of them that embraced their doctrine. There was yet no 
mention of tithes. (L42.64/365) 
Hobbes systematically and Scripturally undercuts any claims by the church as now 
constituted to direct divine sanction of its particular organization or independence. Tithes 
are not a Scriptural entitlement for a special clerical class. Sommerville notes that Hobbes 
here seems to be relying, at least partly, on John Selden’s History of Tithes (1618), a much 
more systematic work that reaches similar conclusions.280  
What is implied here is a scathing critique of three of the four contenders (Roman 
Catholicism, Anglican Episcopacy, and Presbyterianism) for Christian ecclesiology in 
Hobbes’ time; only Independency is spared from this argument.281 Whether bishops/pastors 
                                                
278 Remember that, for Hobbes, pastor is equivalent to bishop, and presbyter is equivalent to elder. Pastor and 
elder connote the same thing as well.  
279 See Chapter 16 of Leviathan. 
280 See Sommerville, Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 123. 
281 Independency gets its own share of abuse later on. As we shall see, Hobbes was not an Independent either.  
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or elders/presbyters, the titles are arbitrary and historical, they are not officially endorsed by 
Scripture. At the very worst, they represent a power grab by greedy clerics.   
As far as a historical narrative works, Hobbes’ account of the early Christian Church 
runs into difficulties under conditions where the Church is outlawed altogether. “Hobbes’s 
theory implies that when sovereigns did not simply ignore but actually prohibited 
Christianity, such assemblies were unlawful and seditious conventicles.” A church becomes 
“an alarmingly nebulous entity” under such conditions.282 The problem also applies to 
contemporary non-Christian societies. But Hobbes either ignores this seeming inconsistency 
or he leaves it as a skeptical implication for his more astute readers. It matters less for past 
institutions, because Christianity is a preponderant sociological fact in Hobbes’ world. But 
for Christian missionaries and Christian minorities, it presents a deeper theoretical challenge.  
Power Ecclesiastical, Part II: The Era of Christian Sovereigns 
Much changes when sovereigns become Christians. All that had previously been 
counsel could now become coercive law, with the force of a command behind it. All of the 
disorganized and diversified worship could become unified and authorized. The merely 
persuasive, democratic character of the early Church gets switched out for the coercive will 
of the sovereign. A mob becomes a person. The Church is subsumed into the state structure, 
like any other component corporate body.283  
                                                
282 Sommerville, op cit., pg. 126–7. 
283 It is worth analyzing, though I do not have the space for it here, the discussion of “Systems Subject, 
Private and Political” in Chapter 22 of Leviathan, to see what a Church would look like if construed as a 
“system” like any other.  
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The power of sovereignty includes absolute discretion over what doctrines are 
permissible within a commonwealth, and what doctrines will be taught there. Since a teacher 
can be said to be a pastor, it is not unfair to call heathen sovereigns pastors of their people. 
This is even more apparent for Christian kings. Hobbes observes, “This right of heathen 
kings cannot be thought taken away from them by their conversion to the faith of 
Christ…And, therefore, Christian kings are still supreme pastors of their people, and have 
power to ordain what pastors they please” (L42.68/367). This power is essential to the 
sovereign’s power, for “if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted 
into rebellion by fear of spirits.” (L18.15/115). 
Hobbes writes, “when an assembly of Christians choose their pastor in a Christian 
commonwealth, it is the sovereign that electeth him, because it is done by his authority” 
(L42.69/367). In other words, if the sovereign permits a pastor to be elected, it is the same 
as if the sovereign did it himself. But this can only happen with the sovereign’s permission: if 
he were to reject the procedure or the results, he is well within his power. The sovereign’s 
benign tolerance of quasi-independent elections is not a transfer of his right.  
From its powers as supreme pastor, it follows that all other pastors derive their 
authority from the sovereign, and rule in its stead and at its discretion, just as with any other 
kind of subordinate minister. There is nothing special or distinctive about the office of the clergy 
in this sense.  
Here is the crucial move,  
All pastors, except the supreme, execute their charges in the right (that is, by the authority) 
of the civil sovereign, that is, jure civili. But the king and every other sovereign executeth his 
office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God (that is to say, in God’s right, or 
jure divino). (L42.71/368) 
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Terminologically, the words “jure divino”, by divine law, were used by Catholics, 
Anglicans, and Presbyterians to refer to the sanction of their ecclesiology. Hobbes disputes 
their usage. 
Hobbes draws a startling conclusion from this. If the sovereign is supreme pastor,  
it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to preach (which perhaps no man will 
deny), but also to baptize and to administer the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, and to 
consecrate both temples and pastors to God’s service (which most men deny, partly because 
they use not to it, and partly because the administration of sacraments, and consecration of 
persons and places to holy uses, requireth the imposition of such men’s hands as by the like 
imposition successively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the like 
ministry). (L42.72/368–9)284 
This is a bold move, one that challenges some of the established practices of both 
the Catholic and Anglican Churches. In those Churches, ordained priests were the only ones 
capable of administering sacraments, and ordination occurred by “imposition of hands” by 
an already ordained priest. The line of succession of ordination could supposedly be traced 
back to St. Peter, whom Christ ordained himself. Similar reasoning applied to the 
Presbyterians. Sovereigns may have been able to regulate Church affairs, but traditionally, 
they had to defer to ordained priests when it came to the sacraments.  
Hobbes admits that it is rare for sovereigns to administer the sacraments and to 
consecrate, but this is not an argument against the sovereign having these powers, it is 
merely an explanation of why “it were not convenient for him to apply himself in person to 
that particular” (L42.73.369) but rather leave it up to his subordinates. The sovereign is 
simply too busy to take up these matters. Besides, Hobbes asks, when was the last time a 
pope or a bishop baptized anyone? Christ himself never baptized anyone. What is important 
for Hobbes is that the sovereign could wield these powers, should he decide. This was a 
                                                
284 As we shall see, Hobbes only acknowledges two sacraments, baptism and Holy Communion.  
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radical idea. “By adopting this position Hobbes diverged not only from the Catholics, 
Anglicans and Presbyterians, but also from the Independents.”285 
One of the important questions Hobbes faced from his conclusions was could a 
female monarch, like Elizabeth I, exercise full pastoral powers? Hobbes accepts the 
command of 1 Corinthians 14: 34-35, that women are forbidden to speak in Church.286 
Hobbes asserts that “authority does not take account of masculine and feminine” 
(L42.78/372), and claims that whoever a female sovereign appointed to exercise clerical 
power was acting through her sovereign authority. Elizabeth herself, Hobbes recounts, 
signed an oath not to exercise the pastoral functions. This was to secure the allegiance of a 
few holdouts in the clergy who were concerned that the Act of Supremacy, and its attendant 
oath of submission, were tantamount to granting Elizabeth these powers. Hobbes observes: 
“It was clear from this misgiving that those ministers were all of the opinion that the 
authority to perform pastoral functions is always conjoined with supremacy over the church, 
but that its exercise is only suitable for men.” (ibid.) In effect, Hobbes is not really answering 
the question. He points out the only historical example, and shows how it does not really 
apply to the future.  
This position on the pastoral powers of the sovereign created enough controversy 
for Hobbes that he revisited it in the Appendices of the Latin Leviathan. There, Hobbes 
repeats his assertion that kings can administer the pastoral functions, and that “Almost all 
those who were ministers of the church of England in the first year of Queen Elizabeth 
                                                
285 Sommerville, Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 121.  
286 The KJV states it thus, “Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to 
speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn any thing, let 
them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church.” 
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agreed with him.” (LA3.34/546)287 Hobbes also reiterates his claim about Elizabeth’s public 
declaration, but argues this did not prevent later English sovereigns from exercising those 
powers. Curley points out that this is a distortion – the documents attest to a total 
renunciation of pastoral power for the monarch (see n26, ibid./547). So Hobbes adds little if 
anything to the discussion, but the Appendices are a good way to tell what positions stuck 
out for Hobbes’ contemporary readers.  
As regards the imposition of hands, Hobbes challenges that it is a crucial step in 
appointing a minister of the faith. It is certainly an ancient ritual, dating to the Old 
Testament, and it has strong value as a tradition. Hobbes further argues that it is “natural” to 
“design [i.e., designate] by the hand, to assure the eyes” than to use words alone in a ceremony 
(L42.76/370), but the ritual imparts no special powers. If a person had the power to teach 
before they became Christian, they retain that power after their baptism and merely teach 
Christian doctrine. Since a sovereign had that power, after the sovereign was baptized, they 
could and would now teach Christian doctrine. Baptism is all that is necessary; laying on of 
hands is extraneous. It has merely conventional value.    
Hobbes’ argument bubbles with classic Erastian sentiment, “both State and Church 
are the same men.” (L42.79/372). But even though individual sovereigns are the head of the 
church of their respective nations, “If they please…they may (as many Christian kings now 
do) commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope.” 
(L42.79/373) But that case, the governance is by the permission of the sovereign, and is by 
civil law (jure civili), not divine law (jure divino). In effect, the Pope is granted a license to teach 
                                                
287 Hobbes refers to himself in the third person through the Appendices. 
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religion within the commonwealth, and that license can be restricted or revoked at any time 
for any reason.  
Hobbes elaborates and generalizes this position, saying that sovereigns may, “if they 
please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor (or to an assembly of pastors), and 
give them what power over the Church, or one another, they think most convenient, and 
what titles of honor (as, of bishops, archbishops, priests, or presbyters) they, and make such 
laws for their maintenance (either by tithes or otherwise) as they please” (ibid.) subject to the 
same civil discretion. He reaffirms, “a Church and a commonwealth are the same thing.” 
(ibid.) The sovereign makes Scripture into law and gives excommunication its bite.  
The upshot of all of this is Hobbes’ categorical rejection of any independent basis 
for Church structure, inhering in either reason or Scripture. The sovereign is free to do 
exactly as it pleases, because only it reigns by laws, by the laws of nature and jure divino. It can 
change its mind at any time. Its conscience is beholden only to God himself (L42.80/373). 
Hobbes faced very real opponents. “During the 1630’s Archbishop Laud and his 
associates claimed that bishops derived their spiritual powers from God alone.”288 The 
royalist Church in exile maintained these same opinions. Hobbes was to have his fair share 
of run-ins with these latter. The experience would embitter him. 
Power Ecclesiastical, Part III: The Power of the Pope: Bellarmine and Beyond 
The challenge of the papal power represents a special case for Hobbes. The papacy 
claims for itself several problematic powers, which Hobbes is determined to refute. First, the 
                                                
288 Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the History of the Jews”, pg. 164. 
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papacy claims exclusive and universal jurisdiction over a distinct spiritual realm; it asserts its 
infallibility on matters of religious doctrine; further, in the name of this authority is grants 
itself the right to excommunicate (and thereby depose) sovereigns. Hobbes chooses Cardinal 
Robert Bellarmine’s exemplary treatise, De Summo Pontifice, as his target in the final section of 
Chapter 42.289 Patricia Springborg calls Bellarmine’s work “the definitive defense of papal 
power” and there is plenty of support for this claim from contemporary observers.290 
Furthermore, there is evidence for the work’s importance simply in the way Hobbes 
addresses it. Bellarmine’s work is treated by Hobbes with a depth and care that is only 
rivaled by his analysis of the Bible!291 No other author in Leviathan receives anything like this 
level of detail in refutation. Hobbes confesses to have dealt with Bellarmine at such 
exhaustive length because he views him “as the champion of the Papacy against all other 
Christian Princes and States.” (L42.135/397).  Springborg is even more candid: “The Papacy 
was anti-Leviathan to Hobbes”.292 As well shall see, the papacy becomes a stand-in for any 
sect that denies the supremacy of the civil authority in all matters.  
                                                
289 The treatise, whose title means “On the supreme pontiff” is the third part of a much larger work, entitled 
Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus hujus temporis hereticos (“Disputations of the controversies of 
the Christian faith against the heresies of our time”), written from 1581–1592. The Catholic Encyclopedia, while 
not a neutral authority, refers to the work thusly: “This monumental work was the earliest attempt to 
systematize the various controversies of the time, and made an immense impression throughout Europe, the 
blow it dealt to Protestantism being so acutely felt in Germany and England that special chairs were founded in 
order to provide replies to it. Nor has it even yet been superseded as the classical book on its subject-matter” 
(accessed at: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02411d.htm [.]) Hobbes was not alone in his attempt at 
refutation. Theodor Beza also wrote a reply. Bellarmine was later sainted by the Roman Catholic Church, 
although there was some controversy between him and Pope Sixtus V regarding the extent of papal power. 
Bellarmine, in fact, was too restrained in his doctrine of indirect power for Sixtus, who placed the book on the 
Index of banned books for a period! Bellarmine, as Sommerville points out in Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in 
Historical Context, had first contributed to the debate on the Venetian interdict, with which Hobbes was closely 
familiar from his Italian contacts.  
290 Springborg, “Hobbes and Bellarmine”, pg. 506 n12 (I thank the Wikipedia article for drawing this to my 
attention).  
291 This does not mean, however, that Hobbes does not distort Bellarmine’s meaning nor simply lampoon his 
arguments at times. See “Hobbes and Bellarmine”, especially Sects. II and III. 
292 Ibid., pg. 518. 
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Hobbes seems to employ many of the common arguments against the papacy in 
general, and Bellarmine in particular, used by his countrymen in their battle of ideas with the 
Holy See. Sommerville observes, “A great deal of what Hobbes had to say against the 
theories of Bellarmine and other Catholics had already been said by Anglican writers.”293 
By way of summary, De Summo Pontifice consists of five books. The first Book argues 
that Peter was the monarch of the Church. The second argues that Peter was the bishop of 
Rome, and that the Popes are Peter’s legitimate successors. The third Book refutes the 
argument that the Pope is the Antichrist. The fourth aims to “prove the Pope to be the 
supreme judge in all questions of faith and manners” (L42.89/378). Lastly, the fifth Book 
gives Bellarmine’s wider conclusions, of which most important is that the Pope has supreme, 
indirect temporal power, “that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving them to 
one, and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of 
souls” (L42.121/390–1). 
Hobbes takes the central point of the first Book to be to “prove St. Peter to have 
been the monarch universal of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world” 
(L42.85/376).294 In support of this, Bellarmine cites Matthew 16:18–19, “Thou are Peter, and 
upon this rock I will build my Church….And I will give thee the keys of heaven…” As for 
the claim that Peter was the rock upon which Christ would build his Church, Hobbes widens 
the context to the earlier discussion, arguing that the “stone” referred to was “faith in 
Christ”—the foundational belief for the Christian Church. “Thou art Peter”, if correctly 
                                                
293 Sommerville, “Leviathan in its Anglican Context”, pg. 363 
294 Bellarmine also argues for a divided/mixed sovereignty as the ideal type of government, incorporating 
elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, a conclusion which Hobbes obviously rejects on the basis 
of his earlier arguments. See L18.16/115–6, L19.1/118, and L42.82/374.  
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translated, would be rendered “Thou art Stone (a surname)”, and it merely a play on words 
using the Saint’s surname. Hobbes interprets the gift of the “keys of heaven” to be given to 
“all supreme pastors” and not to Peter exclusively. Later on, Hobbes comments that the 
passage proves “no more than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession 
of Peter which gave the occasion to that speech: namely this, that ‘Jesus is Christ the Son of 
God.’” (L42/91/379).  
The second Book claims Peter was bishop of Rome (understood as “monarch of the 
Church or the supreme pastor of it”) and that the Popes are Peter’s successors (L42.86/376). 
Hobbes contends that Constantine, the first Christian emperor, properly held this title of 
head of the Church of Rome, noting: “I say of the Roman empire, not of all Christendom” 
(L42.86/376). While Rome was large and powerful, it is a mistake to equate it with the whole 
world, argues Hobbes. There were Christians at the time who were not Romans, and their 
sovereigns were their supreme pastors. Before sovereigns were converted, there was no 
monarch or supreme pastor.  
Hobbes (perhaps surprisingly) agrees with the third Book’s conclusion, that the Pope 
(that is, the office of the papacy) is not the Antichrist, despite the prevalence of this belief 
among Protestant religious authorities and among the masses of his time.295 Hobbes 
interprets Scripture to give two signs as to the identity of the Antichrist: (1) that he denies 
that Jesus is the Christ and instead (2) asserts himself as the Christ. From this second point it 
follows that he is an adversary of “Jesus the true Christ” (L42.87/377, italics removed). 
                                                
295 See Lake, Peter “Antipopery: The structure of a prejudice” for a detailed analysis of this phenomenon.  
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Furthermore, the Antichrist will give rise to a tribulation which will precede the Second 
Coming. The Pope fails to meet all three of these criteria.   
The last two Books of Bellarmine’s treatise elicit more involved arguments from 
Hobbes. The fourth Book argues for the supremacy of the Pope’s judgment in matters of 
faith and manners. Bellarmine bases this on three propositions: (1) the Pope is infallible, (2) 
that the Pope can make true (read universal) laws and punish their transgression, and finally, 
(3) that Jesus himself conferred mastery over “all jurisdiction ecclesiastical” to the Pope, and 
not to bishops or other clerical representatives (ibid.). Hobbes observes that this conclusion 
is tantamount to claiming that the Pope is “the absolute monarch of all Christians in the 
world” (L42.89/378, italics removed)—clearly an unacceptable conclusion for an English 
absolutist!   
Bellarmine advances four Scriptural passages designed to show the Pope’s infallibility 
(1) in matters of Faith: Luke 23:31–32, “Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that he may 
sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when though art 
converted, strengthen thy brethren”; Matthew 16:18 (cited above as well); John 21:16–17, 
“Feed my sheep”; and Exodus 28:30, “Thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgment, the 
Urim and the Thummim” (“evidence” and truth”). Hobbes rejects all four as overstating the 
case.  
As regards papal infallibility in manners296, Bellarmine quotes John 16:13, “When the 
Spirit of truth is come, he will lead you into all truth”. Bellarmine reads “all truth” to mean 
all the truths necessary to salvation. But if this is the case, Hobbes responds, “he attributeth 
                                                
296 Recall that for Hobbes, the most relevant use of the word “manners” is to mean “those qualities of mankind 
that concern their living together in peace and unity.” (See L11.1/57) 
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no more infallibility to the Pope than to any man that professeth Christianity” (L42.94/30)! 
Given Hobbes’ requirements for salvation, this requires inerrancy on a very minimal article 
of faith anyway.  
Bellarmine also argues that if the Church was commanded to follow the Pope, then 
he would have to be infallible in matters of salvific import, because otherwise, the Church 
would not have been sufficiently insulated from error. Hobbes mockingly rejects this, 
because Christ never commanded anyone to obey Peter as a sovereign, let alone his alleged 
successors! Subjects are to obey their civil sovereigns. Further, since “it hath not been 
declared by the [Roman] Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all 
the Christians in the world…all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in 
points of manners.” (L42.96/381). If the Pope demands the right to determine manners, he 
has overstepped his bounds, teaching “an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts 
of our Savior and his apostles delivered to us in the Scripture.” (ibid.)  And to hammer the 
point home, the requirements for salvation are easy to fulfill. 
Bellarmine cites no less than thirteen passages to support his claim that the Pope can 
make laws that are valid for all Christians (2).297 There is no need to rehearse the 
counterarguments in detail. All of them hinge on Bellarmine’s failure, in Hobbes opinion, to 
make certain critical distinctions between the commission of a teacher and that of a 
sovereign, or in other words between a counsel and a law. Hobbes displays his virtuosity 
with Scriptural exegesis. A representative passage is from Second Thessalonians 3:14, “If any 
                                                
297 The complete list is, in order of discussion: Deuteronomy 17:12, Matthew 16:19, John 21:16, John 20:21, 
Acts 15:28, Romans 13, First Corinthians 4:21, Timothy 3:2, Timothy 5:19, Luke 10:16, First Corinthians 11:2 
(along with First Thessalonians 4:2), Second Thessalonians 3:14 and Hebrews 13:17.  
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man obey not our word by this Epistle, note than man, and have no company with him, that 
he may be ashamed”. Hobbes argues that Paul “does not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, 
nor imprison, nor amerce [fine] him (which legislators may all do), but avoid his company, 
that he may be ashamed. Whereby it is evident it was not the empire of an apostle, but his 
reputation amongst the faithful, which Christians stood in awe of.” (L42.108/386). The 
word “obey” in the passage, argues Hobbes, is ambiguous in the original Greek, and can be 
take to mean either a true command, or as in the case in question, a piece of advice.  
Bellarmine’s attempts to argue for the superiority of the Pope in all matters of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction (3), have in fact the ironic result for Hobbes that ultimately, “all 
bishops receive jurisdiction, when they have it, from the civil sovereigns” (L42.112/388). 
Bellarmine’s first fault, in Hobbes’ eyes, is that he does not consider the question of the 
relationship between the Pope and other civil sovereigns, but only the relationship between 
the bishops and the Pope. He fails to tackle the real problem, that of papal supremacy.  
Bellarmine first argues that bishops rule de jure divino, “in the right of God”, but only 
mediately, through the Pope’s consent (L42.110/387). Hobbes’ incredulous response is, “if a 
man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino, and yet not immediately, what lawful 
jurisdiction (though but civil) is there in a Christian commonwealth that is not also de jure 
divino? For Christian kings have their power from God immediately”. Hence, “either he 
[Bellarmine] must grant every constable in the state to hold his office in the right of God, or 
he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himself.” (ibid.). De jure 
divino either applies to the sovereign alone or it applies in such a wide and attenuated way 
that it is meaningless.  
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This is a swipe at the Anglican tradition as well, which took the powers of bishops to 
be de jure divino, and used precisely this sort of language to argue for it, such that although 
bishops in the Anglican Church needed to be appointed by the sovereign, they maintained a 
sort of independence, a responsibility that was directly to God. Hobbes claimed that this was 
at its core a subterfuge, so that bishops could “deny to have received their authority from the 
civil state, and slyly slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary to the unity and 
defense of the commonwealth.” (L42.71/368, quoted by Sommerville below). In fact, the 
attack is even wider. Sommerville observes, “This criticism of the bishops of course worked 
equally against all other religious groups that claimed churches or ministers have spiritual or 
ecclesiastical functions distinct from the temporal or civil authority of the state – and so 
against Presbyterians, Independents and Catholics, amongst others.”298  With this one move, 
Hobbes rebuts the defenders of all the main competitors to ecclesiastical organization.  
Sommerville elsewhere adds the following about Hobbes’ method, that he “treats 
Presbyterian and Anglican views on the clergy’s power as modified versions of Bellarmine’s 
theory, arguing that they incorporated some but not all of its errors. So a refutation of 
Bellarmine would simultaneously demolish the mistaken opinions of Presbyterians and 
Anglicans.”299 
As a general observation, we can not that Hobbes seems to have buried his most 
trenchant insights and criticisms in places where the casual (or simply lazy) reader would not 
discover them.  
                                                
298 Sommerville, “Leviathan in Its Anglican Context”, pg. 367.  
299 Sommerville, Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 114. 
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In all, Bellarmine makes seven more arguments for the supreme jurisdiction of the 
Pope over bishops, arguments which Hobbes find illuminating because absent Bellarmine’s 
(ungrounded, for Hobbes) assertions about papal supremacy, these arguments are against 
episcopal power and serve Hobbes’ purposes. 
Of these seven, the fourth and sixth add the most to our understanding of Hobbes’ 
position. In the former, Bellarmine argues that if God had given bishops their jurisdictions 
directly, they would possess equality in the extent of their domains. Since this is clearly not 
the case, Bellarmine concludes that the jurisdiction of bishops is allocated by some mediate 
power. The argument only works for Bellarmine’s purposes, argues Hobbes, if the Pope has 
universal jurisdiction over all Christians. “But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is 
notoriously known, the large jurisdiction of the Pope was given to him by those that had it, 
that is, by the emperors of Rome…it followeth that all other bishops have their jurisdiction 
from the sovereigns of the place wherein they exercise the same. And as for that cause they 
have not their authority de jure divino, so neither hath the Pope his de jure divino, except only 
where he is also the civil sovereign.” (L42.117/389).     
Bellarmine makes the latter argument by demanding of bishops that they point to a 
place in Scripture that proves they rule de jure divino. Both Hobbes and Bellarmine agree there 
is none, the difference being that Hobbes thinks the same applies to the Pope as well. In 
general, Hobbes maintains that there simply is no Scriptural evidence for a uniquely specified 
church government, nor does he believe Scripture lends any support to an independence of 
clerical organization.   
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Hobbes’ responses to Book Five is in many a watershed for his political theory, 
leveraging many other key points of his theory to make his most devastating attack on papal 
authority. Hobbes states that the fifth Book reaches four conclusions: (1) The Pope is not 
the sovereign of all the world; nor (2) is he the sovereign of all the Christian world; (3) he 
does not have direct temporal jurisdiction; but, (4) he has supreme indirect temporal 
jurisdiction. Of the first three Hobbes accepts with a smirk that “These three conclusions are 
easily granted.” (L42.121/390).300  
Hobbes jokes that if by indirect power, Bellarmine implies the Pope got his power 
indirectly (that is, through subterfuge), he will grant that as well. But that is not what 
Bellarmine intends. Hobbes glosses the point as follows: “to the pastoral power (which he 
calls spiritual) the supreme power civil is necessarily annexed; and that thereby he hath a 
right to change kingdoms, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when he shall 
think it conduces to the salvation of souls.” (L42.121/390–1).  
Throughout Leviathan, Hobbes has argued “that the right of all sovereigns is derived 
originally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed” whether by 
institution or acquisition (L42.123/391). This rule by consent is the only way to make sense 
of direct temporal power. If the Pope does not assert direct power over commonwealths, he 
does not claim to rule by the consent of the governed, but rather “by a right given him by 
God (which he calleth indirectly) in his assumption of the papacy.” (ibid.) The power is 
essentially unlimited as stated, argues Hobbes, and the Pope claims to be able to depose 
kings whenever he feels the salvation of the people is endangered. He is answerable to no 
                                                
300 The situation is a little more complicated. See L42.121/390–1n82 for details. While Hobbes alters 
Bellarmine’s presentation, he does not change the substance of his claims in any serious way.  
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one else in this judgment, asserts Bellarmine. History certainly offers several instances of this 
power being used, notes Hobbes. But is does not imply ought. Hobbes argues pointedly, 
echoing L18.16, where he decried the split of power between parliament and the crown 
which lead to civil chaos: 
I think there be few princes that consider not this as unjust and inconvenient. But I wish 
they would all resolve to be kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two masters. They ought, 
therefore, to ease them, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own 
hands, or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope, that such men as are willing 
to be obedient many be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal and 
spiritual is but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by 
sharing with another indirect power, as with a direct one. (L42.123/392) 
Bellarmine gives us six arguments: (1) civil power is subject to spiritual power and 
supreme spiritual power entails ultimate power over civil authority; (2) since states have a 
right of self-defense in temporal matters, the same is more true in spiritual matters; (3) 
Christians should not obey heretical or pagan sovereigns, and the Pope is the proper judge 
or heresy; (4) when kings are baptized, they promise to defend the faith, and this means that 
they submit to papal authority; (5) Jesus commanded his apostles to “Feed my sheep”; and 
(6) historical examples abound of the exercise of this power by the Pope.  
The first three arguments are the most important. What does it mean to say that 
temporal power is subordinate to spiritual power (1)? Hobbes argues, “when we say one 
power is subject to another power, the meaning either is that [a] he that hath the one is 
subject to him that hath the other, or that [b] one power is to the other, as the means to an 
end.” (L42.124/392). Subjection is a property of persons, not abstract powers. Powers are 
subordinate to other powers, merely as means, in “as the art of a saddler to the art of a 
rider.” (ibid.). Hobbes infers from this, “If, then, it be granted that the civil government be 
ordained as a means to bring us to spiritual felicity, yet it does not follow that if a king have 
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the civil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is bound to obey the Pope, 
more than every saddler is bound to obey every rider.” (ibid.). If this is what Bellarmine is 
doing, he is not beginning from proper definitions, and stumbling into absurdity. Bellarmine 
makes a false analogy, on of the basis of his obscure thinking. Anyway: “Philosophical 
justification for analogical argument took the form of the doctrine of essences…But the 
refutation of the doctrine of essences was what Hobbes’ nominalist system was geared to 
accomplish.”301  
Bellarmine founds this argument on two claims. First, that all Christians are 
members of one commonwealth, and second, that a commonwealth is like an organic unity, 
where the parts depend on one another in a hierarchy. Since spiritual things do not depend 
on temporal things, the reverse must be true. Hence, all Christians are subordinate to the 
power of the Pope. It is not surprising that Hobbes disputes both claims. Regarding the first, 
it is clear to Hobbes that there is more than one commonwealth in the world, and thus there 
are several churches. “And their several sovereigns represent them, whereby they are capable 
of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man, which no general or 
universal Church is till it have a representant, which it hath not on earth.” (L42.124/393). 
Such a unity must wait until the second coming. We have seen how Hobbes has rejected the 
idea that the kingdom of God is here and now, and that this latter idea has been used to 
buttress clerical power of all varieties. As to the second claim, Hobbes argues that the 
members of a body do form a unity, “but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the 
soul of the commonwealth.” (ibid.). “Therefore, there is nothing in this similitude from 
when to infer a dependence of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal offices on the 
                                                
301 Springborg, “Hobbes and Bellarmine”, pg. 522. 
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spiritual, but of both on the civil sovereign (which ought indeed to direct his civil commands 
to the salvation of souls, but is not therefore subject to any but God himself.” (ibid.) This is 
in part because Leviathan “is a spoof on all organic theories of the state” as the Introduction 
will attest.302  
As for the argument from spiritual self-defense (2), Bellarmine notes that every state 
is entitled to depose another state’s government and substitute another of its own choosing 
if it “cannot otherwise defend itself against the injuries” the foreign government commits or 
seems likely to commit (L42.126/394, Hobbes quoting Bellarmine). This is even more 
justified when it comes to spiritual matters, argues Bellarmine. Hobbes has a two part 
response to this. Of course, Hobbes agrees, that nations have a right to defend themselves, 
“And if it were also true that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth, distinct 
from a civil commonwealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury done him or upon 
want of caution that injury be not done him in tome to come, repair and secure himself by 
war” (ibid.). But even if we grant this, the argument cuts both ways, and hence “it would be 
no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon like injuries done or feared, to make war upon the 
spiritual sovereign” (ibid.), a fact that surely Bellarmine would be reluctant to accept.   The 
second part undercuts the whole basis for Bellarmine’s plans, “But spiritual commonwealth 
there is none in this world.” (L42.127/394). This is reserved for the period after the Second 
Coming. Only then, will humanity have “spiritual” bodies, bodies of persistent, gas-like 
materials. Any other meaning of the phrase is incoherent on the conditions of Hobbes’ 
materialism. 
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Bellarmine argues (3) that Christians should not tolerate a non-Christian sovereign, 
nor a sovereign who professes to be Christian but who is a heretic. Since only the Pope can 
determine heresy, he is the one who can depose heretical rulers. Hobbes rejects both 
conclusions as false.  He has already illustrated that the natural law and Scripture attest to the 
servitude of a subject, regardless of the religion of his or her sovereign. Furthermore, the 
natural law indicates that the only judge of heresy is the sovereign itself.  
The only reason that Christians did not depose their earlier persecutors, like the 
pagan Roman emperors, was because they did not have the strength to do so, argues 
Bellarmine.    
The absolutist, of course, disputes this. While there are probabilistic grounds for 
rejecting revolution, like for instance, that it leads to chaos, the state of nature, etc., Hobbes 
eschews them here. Bellarmine has already signaled a distaste for the violence of an 
unpopular revolution. Hobbes must stand on his principles.303 The issue is not one of 
practicality, ultimately, but of justice (which in Hobbes’ definition is honoring one’s 
covenants): “It is not, therefore, for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that 
Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any one whose 
doctrine is the public doctrine, an heretic) that authorize the teaching of an error.” 
(L42.131/395). Moreover, “the danger that may arise to religion by the subjects tolerating of 
an heathen, or an erring prince, it is a point of which a subject is no competent judge” 
(ibid./396).    
                                                
303 Although this does argument again raise the specter of whether Hobbes is a utilitarian or a deontologist. The 
argument here is deontological.   
 196 
The last three arguments Hobbes dispenses with perfunctorily. As for royal baptism 
(4), Hobbes concedes Bellarmine’s contention that sovereigns serve as Christ’s lieutenants, 
“But they may, for all that, be the Pope’s fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own 
subjects, and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome itself.” (L42.132/396).  
“Feed my sheep” from John 21:16, to Bellarmine entails the power to chase away 
“wolves” (heretics), to enclose “furious rams” (Christian kings that do not submit to the 
pastor), and the ability to feed the flock. Hobbes accepts the three roles, but finds nothing of 
the extent of power that Bellarmine does. Feeding the flock is teaching, which as we have 
seen, is non-coercive. As regards the wolves, Hobbes maintains that the correct 
interpretation is to retreat from them. Hobbes reiterates his point about the rams – that 
Christ never assumed this power for himself, nor did he grant it to Peter, nor did Peter 
confer it on the line of Popes. 
From the use of historical examples (6), Hobbes concludes, “first that the examples 
prove nothing; secondly that the examples he allegeth make not so much as a probability of 
right.” (L42.135/397). The extended critique of Bellarmine is finally at an end.  
As Patricia Springborg highlights, Hobbes has more than political reasons for 
rejecting papal authority. There are also deep metaphysical issues for him as well, tied to the 
Catholic Church’s reliance on Scholasticism and Aristotle. We will consider these objections 
later on.  
Part of Hobbes’ vitriol stems from his absolutism, but the anti-clerical nature of his 
attacks is rooted both in his persona experiences and his critique of human nature. 
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Comparison with the Earlier Works 
A great deal of recent scholarship has attacked supposed discontinuities in Hobbes’ 
works on the issues of Church-State relations and ecclesiology. (Hobbes’ contemporaries 
also noted these changes, but I will not address those issues here). 
Elements of Law argues that “the government of bishops hath a divine pattern in the 
twelve rules, and seventy elders of Israel, in the twelve apostles and seventy disciples of our 
Savior.” (EL26.8/159, emphasis mine).  This is a seeming divine endorsement (de jure divino) 
of episcopacy. Such a move takes away the discretion of the sovereign in these matters. 
Hobbes also notes that, “though kings take not upon them the ministerial priesthood (as 
they might if it pleased them) yet are they not merely laic, as not to have sacerdotal 
jurisdiction.” (EL26.11/162), which implies that kings are not (at least automatically) pastors, 
and must undertake holy orders to administer the sacraments.304  
De Cive argues that two things matter in the selection of church officials: (1) the 
process of selection and (2) the act of ordination. Hobbes argues that the selection is made 
by the church itself, as he also argues in Leviathan. At first this was democratic, and later it is 
the decision of the sovereign. The act of ordination, however, is specific to those already 
designated as church officials. He writes: “It is therefore incontestable that by the custom of 
the Church under the Apostles, while the ordination, or consecration, of all Ecclesiastics which is 
done by prayer and the laying-on of hands, was the business of the Apostles and Teachers, the 
selection of ordinands was the business of a Church.” (DC17.24/224). So, here, Hobbes 
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note 43. The argument does not exclude the sovereign from exercising pastoral functions, provided they are 
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argues that ordination is something special and it is the province of the priesthood to 
administer it, even though they take their direction from the sovereign. The passage also 
seems to condone a priestly hierarchy of Apostles, Bishops, Elders/Presbyters/ordinary 
priest, absent only the Pope in the traditional scheme, which by implication is an espousal of 
the correctness of episcopacy.  
Later on, Hobbes argues that while matters of natural reason are the sole 
responsibility of the sovereign to adjudicate, there are other matters that are beyond the 
scope of sovereign power:  
But to decide questions of faith, i.e. questions about God, which are beyond human 
understanding, one need’s God’s blessing (so that we may not err, at least on essential 
questions) and this comes from CHRIST himself by laying on of hands. For our eternal 
salvation, we are obliged to accept a supernatural doctrine, which because it is supernatural, 
is impossible to understand. It would go against equity if we were left alone to err by 
ourselves on essential matters. Our Savior promised this Infallibility (in matters essential to 
salvation) to the Apostles until the day of judgment, i.e. to the Apostles and to the Pastors who 
were to be consecrated by the Apostles in succession by the laying on of hands. As a Christian, 
therefore, the holder of sovereign power in the commonwealth is obliged to interpret holy 
scripture, when it is a question about the mysteries of faith, by means of duly ordained 
Ecclesiastics. (DC17.28, 233).  
Here Hobbes explicitly endorses the distinctive character of laying on of hands, 
invokes the idea of a strict and significant idea of apostolic succession, asserts clerical 
infallibility on matters essential to faith (for the reasons of equity), and argues that sovereign 
must accept the interpretation of these distinctively-ordained clerics on the matters of the 
mysteries of faith – all ideas Hobbes explicitly rejects in Leviathan. By implication, the 
sovereign is not the supreme pastor, and cannot perform the sacraments.   
Hence, on certain important matters, Hobbes seems to have changed his mind, from 
a relatively mainstream conception of the national church as best represented by the 
distinctive features of Anglican episcopacy in the Elements and De Cive, to a much more 
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radical position in Leviathan. We need not disagree that Hobbes liked English episcopacy 
best, and thought it “the most commodious that a Christian King can use for governing 
Christ’s flock”, even later in life to see the transformation of ideas here.305 Richard Tuck 
observes, “the Elements of Law and De Cive do indeed set out a fundamentally orthodox 
Anglican theology, while Leviathan breaks dramatically with that tradition.”306 
On the basis of this shift, Tuck argues that “effectively, what happened in Leviathan 
was that the sphere of natural religion…had expanded to include all religion: Christianity was 
no longer a special case, but a civil religion like the religions of antiquity.”307 On this basis, as 
Tuck argues in his typically polemical fashion, Hobbes had no choice but to turn to a deistic 
belief about god, and to a purely civil worship entirely under the control of the sovereign. 
Hobbes was now willing to jettison the appearance of orthodoxy for unspecified reasons, 
perhaps related to his own, heightened anti-clerical feelings. 
Others do not draw such radical conclusions. Sommerville for one argues that “the 
basic theory on church-state relations expressed in Leviathan is the same as that put forward 
in De Cive. Arguably, Hobbes’ teaching on bishops and ordination is inconsistent with that 
theory, and was tacked on in order to conform to the sovereign’s wishes or to avert royalist 
criticism.”308 Sommerville points out, for instance, that the invocation of clerical Infallibility 
in De Cive is inconsistent, and ultimately seems to be a verbal concession that the sovereign’s 
actual powers eliminate.309 Ultimately, although De Cive exhibits a certain orthodoxy, “its 
Anglicanism was skin-deep, and on most of the fundamental questions relating to church 
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308 Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, pg. 124.  
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government it teachings were close to those of Leviathan.”310 Elsewhere, Sommerville also 
argues that the same argument applies to the differences mentioned in the Elements.311 
Sommerville is not the only scholar who argues that Hobbes, despite appearances to the 
contrary, is actually in (or around) the mainstream of Anglican thinking of his time.312  
So what are we to make of these two alternatives? Was there are real transformation 
of Hobbes’ views? I tend to side with what might be called the conservative interpretation of 
Sommerville and others. Hobbes’ more conventional-seeming views in the earlier works do 
contain the seeds of the position in Leviathan. Certainly the latter work looks like a 
maturation of a view, written under conditions of greater freedom than his previous works. 
The intellectual climate of the post-civil war era was certainly less restrained.  
At this point, I want to turn to an examination of Hobbes’ critique of religious rituals 
and Scholastic philosophy. These ideas necessitate a further critique of clerical motives as 
Hobbes understood them. 
The Sacraments 
Incorrect interpretations of the role and meaning of the sacraments are a significant 
issue for Hobbes, because they tend to be used as a smokescreen to set the priesthood apart 
from civil authority, and make them an indispensible institution because of their special, 
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even magical, powers. Hobbes summarizes the complaint as “the turning of consecration 
into conjuration or enchantment.” (L44.11/416). This is tantamount to idolatry for Hobbes.  
Since the Council of Trent (1545–63) the Roman Catholic Church has officially had 
seven sacraments: baptism, confession, the Eucharist (also known as Holy Communion or 
the Lord’s Supper), confirmation, marriage, holy orders, extreme unction (also known as the 
last rites). Sacraments are vehicles that bestow God’s grace on humankind according to 
Catholic Doctrine. While they have commemorative and symbolic value, they are chiefly 
rituals that impart the grace of God. Sacraments are necessary for one’s salvation on this 
model.313 They can only be administered by an ordained priest. Baptism, for Catholics, 
involves a removal of the curse imposed by original sin, and is administered to infants as well 
as adult converts. Those who go unbaptized are denied salvation because they are not 
officially members of the church. The sacrament of the Eucharist involves 
transubstantiation, where the ordinary bread and wine is transformed entirely into the flesh 
and blood of Christ, respectively. Only the bread was shared with the congregation. The 
Catholic mass was conducted in exclusively in Latin.   
The Protestant tradition takes serious issue with the Catholic interpretation. Luther 
and Calvin both restricted the number of true sacraments to two: namely baptism and the 
Lord’s Supper. The sacraments were more than mere signs, but they were not the 
transparent mechanisms of grace that the Catholics contended they were. The “real 
presence” of Christ was evident at the Lord’s Supper, for instance, but locating it in the 
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bread and wine or the specific trappings of the ritual was incorrect.314 Transubstantiation was 
seriously misguided.  
The Anglican tradition draws on the insights of Luther and Calvin here as well. The 
39 Articles of 1571 acknowledge only two true sacraments. Regarding their nature, the 39 
Articles says: 
Sacraments ordained of Christ, be not only badges or tokens of Christian men’s profession; 
but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace towards us, by the 
which he doth work invisibly in us, and not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm 
our faith in him.315 
Thus, the sacraments have a role in the reception of grace, but it is not as 
mechanical, as it was understood to be in the Catholic model. Both traditions agree on the 
symbolic, communitarian, and commemorative value of the sacraments, but this is a 
secondary function, not their main purpose.  
The remaining five, endorsed by the Catholic Church, the Articles call, “states of life 
allowed in the Scriptures; but yet have not like nature of sacraments with baptism and the 
Lord’s supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained by God.”316 
The Anglicans saw baptism as a sign of membership in the Church, but also as 
a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby as by an instrument, they that receive baptism 
are grafted into the Church; the promises of the forgiveness of sin, and of our adoption to 
be the sons of God, by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed; faith is confirmed; and 
grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God.317 
 They agreed with the Catholics, however, in preferring infant baptism.  
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The Anglicans saw the Lord’s Supper as “not only a sign of the love Christians ought 
to have among themselves to one another; but rather it is a sacrament of our redemption by 
Christ’s death.”318 The English Church vigorously rejected transubstantiation, saying that it 
“cannot be proved by Holy Writ, but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, 
overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.”319 
The English also opposed the display of the sacred host on similar grounds.  They believed 
in sharing the wine with the lay people as well as the bread, but they did require an ordained 
priest to administer the sacraments.  
The Westminster Confession of 1647 largely agree with these views on the 
sacraments.320  
But Hobbes breaks even further with the tradition, eviscerating the sacraments even 
further. For him: 
A SACRAMENT is a separation of some visible thing from common use, and a consecration 
of it to God’s service, for a sign either of our admission into the kingdom of God (to be of 
the number of his peculiar people) or for a commemoration of the same. (L35.19/278). 
Consecration is separating out an everyday, profane thing and giving it a special 
dedication to God’s use, it is “thereby to change, not the thing consecrated, but only the use 
of it from being profane and common to be holy and peculiar to God’s service.” 
(L44.11/416, emphasis mine). Hobbes cleanly and clearly breaks with the mainstream of 
Anglican thought here because he assigns only symbolic value to the sacraments, nothing 
more, nothing to do with grace or the divine presence. “For Hobbes, they are mere signs, 
whose value is purely symbolic or commemorative. Neither do they carry any effective 
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presence nor do they convey any grace.”321 This has the effect of depriving the priesthood of 
a distinctive ability, one which contributed greatly to their reputation.  
Both the Old Testament and the New Testament have distinctive sacraments. For 
the sacrament of admission the Old Testament has circumcision, the New Testament 
baptism. For the sacrament of commemoration, the Old Testament has the Passover meal, 
while the New Testament has the Lord’s Supper.  
Hobbes rejects transubstantiation as an abuse of Scriptural language. Christ “never 
said that, of what bread soever, any priest whatsoever should say This is my body, or this is 
Christ’s body, the same should presently be transubstantiated.” (L44.11/417). Hobbes argues 
even the Catholic Church did not adopt the doctrine until a mere five centuries ago, “when 
the power of popes was the highest, and the darkness of the time grown so great as men 
discerned not the bread that was given them to eat” (ibid.).  
Hobbes likens the Catholic priest to the Egyptian conjurers of the Old Testament 
(who turned their staves into serpents in a parody of Moses’ miracle), because “by turning 
the holy words into the manner of a charm, which produceth nothing new to the sense; but 
they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man—nay more, into a God, and 
require men to worship it (as if it were our Savior himself present God and man), thereby to 
commit the most gross idolatry.” (ibid., 416). Both the Egyptians and the priests are liars, 
and pretend to power over other men.  
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As a result of his views on the sacraments, “Hobbes stood apart from a solid 
theological group which included Puritans and Arminian Anglicans alike, not to mention 
other Protestant groups.”322  
Hobbes seems to have had two principal goals in his account of the sacraments. The 
first is a metaphysical one. The sacraments as traditionally understood rely on the existence 
of metaphysical entities which Hobbes will not accept; they must be reconstructed to 
eliminate these issues. Chief among these is what Hobbes calls the doctrine of “separated 
essences”, drawn from Aristotle and refined by the Schoolmen. Transubstantiation, 
consubstantiation, even a “real presence” are difficult notions for Hobbes to integrate into 
his philosophy.  
Secondly, there is the sociopolitical goal of disenfranchising the clergy by exposing 
the traditional view of the sacraments as a fraud designed to increase clerical prestige and 
power. On all of the mainstream models of the sacraments, a specially-invested priest is a 
necessary component. If the grace received through the sacraments is necessary for 
salvation, then the priestly officiants are necessary. The position is prestigious. If the power 
to perform the sacraments depends on an exclusive ritual of laying on hands or whatever, 
then there is a bottleneck. Priest are the only ones who can wield the keys to heaven. People 
anxious over their salvation will turn to priests for help, perhaps even ignoring their civil 
sovereigns in order to preserve their souls. This is Hobbes’ worry, and it is no surprise that 
his account of the value of the sacraments is hollow for this very reason.  
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Springborg concurs, “The church of Rome committed the double enormity of 
denying this sovereign prerogative [of Church government], creating a caste of clergy to 
exercise ecclesiastical functions, and of propagating idolatrous doctrines concerning the 
nature and attributes of God as a means of bolstering an independent power structure.”323 
Relics of Gentile Religion  
Exorcism is another priestly ritual that Hobbes attacks as fraud. Exorcism has its 
roots in the belief in the existence of demons, which Hobbes maintains is alien to the 
Christian tradition, and is rather a “relic of the religion of the Gentiles,” specifically the 
Greeks.  
Exorcism has a remote and a proximate cause. The remote cause is pre-scientific 
human cognition, where it is “hard for men to conceive of those things in the fancy and in 
the sense otherwise than of things really without us” (L45.2/436). When anomalies occur, 
and people see strange things in dreams, hallucinations, etc., humans naturally suppose they 
saw something real, but incorporeal, or something corporeal but “made of air (or other more 
subtle and ethereal matter)” (Ibid.). Because these people did not understand the mechanism 
of sense, they supposed that these “objects” (to Hobbes mere phantasms) were what came 
to be known as demons, and these demons were things to be feared for supernatural power. 
Demons could be good or evil. 
The proximate cause of exorcism is merely the specifically Greek account of 
demonology that influenced the ancient world, even the Jews. The latter saw demons as 
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existing only in evil types. “Good demons” were to the Jews, ultimately the spirit of God 
working through the prophets.  
On this account people could become possessed by demons, becoming 
“demoniacs”. Hobbes is convinced that all accounts of possession are really instances of 
mental illness. He defines madness as having “stronger and more vehement passions for 
anything than is ordinarily seen in others” (L8.16/41). Hobbes even believes in collective 
psychosis, where a multitude under the influence of an “inspired” leader exhibits madness.  
Unfortunately, the Bible seems to be guilty of endorsing a belief in both demons and 
in demonic possession. Does not Christ cast out demons, calling them by name? “I answer 
that the addressing of our Savior’s command to the madness or lunacy he cureth is no more 
improper than his rebuking of the fever or of the wind and the sea” (L45.5/438). Christ was 
speaking metaphorically, which we should give him poetic license. (This is a reason, of 
course, why Hobbes is wary of the meeting of metaphors and small minds). And no one 
believes Christ endorsed a belief in fever-spirits or sea-spirits. Furthermore, Christ never 
spoke of incorporeal spirits. Hobbes handles all other such references in a similar way, with a 
judicious recourse to metaphor.  
To the question of why Christ did not enjoin his followers to disbelieve the accounts 
of malevolent spirits, Hobbes, in good fideist terms, replies “such questions as these are 
more curious than necessary for a Christian man’s salvation.” (L45.8/440). Christ did not 
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reveal the truths of natural science either. These were left to men to discover. The lingering 
of the belief in spirits is no major obstacle to Christ’s mission, which was to save mankind.324 
“That there were many demoniacs in the primitive Church, and few madmen and 
other such singular diseases (whereas in these times we hear and see many madmen, and few 
demoniacs) proceeds not from the change of nature, but of names.” (L45.9/441). A more 
enlightened world has no more need for demonology.  
The same metaphysical and political concerns we saw in Hobbes’ treatment of the 
sacraments is behind the account of exorcism.  
Another way to look at these anticlerical issues is to see them through the lens of 
magic. By “magic” we can mean both (seemingly) supernatural powers and what we would 
call ordinary stage magic. David Johnston observes, “In Hobbes’s eyes, magicians and 
prophets were the moral enemies of sovereign power and civil peace. The root of their 
claims to supernatural power was a desire to exercise real power over other men and 
women.”325 In his analysis, Johnston tends to keep prophecy and miracles on one hand, and 
magic on the other. It is my sense that Hobbes doesn’t always consistently maintain a 
juxtaposition between these two groups. Rather, Hobbes cites as a main abuse of priests “the 
turning of consecration into conjuration or enchantment.” (L44.11/416). If magic is fraud, 
and priestly consecration is magic, then priestly rituals are frauds to impress onlookers. If 
priest bear resemblances to prophets (by working “miracles”, like transubstantiation) then 
we can start to see an implication that prophets might be frauds, too. There is a continuity, at 
least an occult one, between magic and “miracles”. Hobbes has already implied that what is a 
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miracle to one generation might not be to one more informed. Hobbes, by highlighting the 
“tricks” seeks to imply, not assert explicitly, that miracles are sleight of hand or chicanery.  
Another relic of pagan religion that is preserved by some Christian sects for Hobbes 
is idolatry, the worship of images. Idolatry is prohibited by the second commandment. To 
worship something is to publicly honor it, with “all words and actions that betoken fear to 
offend or desire to please” (L45.12/443), whether these signs be sincere or not. A king or 
other ruler can be safely accorded a level of respect Hobbes calls civil worship, as long as the 
sovereign in question is not thought or treated as if he were more than a human being.  
Images are “in the largest sense…either the resemblance or the representation of 
some thing visible; or both together” (L45.17/445). Since God is not visible, there can be no 
image of him. Further, since “there can be no image of a thing infinite…there can be no 
image of God” (L45.15/444). Nothing resembles God and nothing can fully represent him. 
To worship an image is therefore to worship something other than God; it is to accord 
honor to something finite and visible. 
Interestingly, to both the modern observer and to his contemporaries, Hobbes notes 
that “if a king compel a man to it [idolatry] by terror of death or other great corporal 
punishment, it is not idolatry” (L45.22/445).326 Since the king is the author if his subject’s 
acts, in this case, the king is the properly sinner on Hobbes’ account.  
Closely related to idolatry is scandalous worship, “where men whose actions are 
looked at by others, as lights to guide them by” (L45.26/448) seem to commit idolatry, and 
lead others astray. A pastor that consents, under threat, to “counterfeit” idolatry, makes sure 
                                                
326 Both Bramhall and Hyde positively howl at this.  
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the common people “cannot but stumble and fall in the way of religion” (Ibid.). The pastor 
sins, although it is only idolatry proper if in his heart he is worshipping the image. A 
common person commits no sin under compulsion, because his example lacks authority. 
The pastor is the minister of the sovereign, and possesses some authority merely by his 
example. 
“To worship God in some peculiar place, or turning a man’s face toward an image or 
determinate place, is not to worship or honor the place or image, but to acknowledge it 
holy” (L45.23/446). This is in response to some radical puritans who refused to worship in a 
church, or who argued about priestly raiment or the position of the altar, etc.  
Hobbes also adds that “to worship God…in case the place or image be dedicated or 
set up by private authority (and not by the authority of them that are our sovereign pasts) is 
idolatry.” (Ibid.) Moses was not wrong to set up the brazen serpent (because he was 
following God’s orders, and he was both king and high priest), but the Israelites who set up 
the Golden Calf were. 
Hobbes briefly considers two possible counterexamples. The first comes the time of 
Moses: from the cherubim adorning the Ark of the Covenant and the brazen serpent. First, 
these images were not worshipped in the strict sense, and secondly, these images were not 
created by human devising, but were commanded by God. Furthermore, the image of the 
serpent was destroyed. Hobbes’ second example concerns the painting of angels.  
Hobbes has two, wider points he draws from this critique of Christian idolatry. First, 
“the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things at this day practiced in the 
Church of Rome, I say are not allowed by the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of 
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Rome from the doctrine there taught, but partly left in it at the first conversion of the 
Gentiles, and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of 
Rome.” (L45.29/448–9). Furthermore, “Christian sovereigns ought to break down the 
images which their subjects have been accustomed to worship, that there be no more 
occasion of such idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant people, where images are worshipped, 
do really believe there is a divine power in the images” (L45.30.449).  
To those who think that no one could be so stupid as to really worship an idol, 
Hobbes retorts “we see daily, by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study 
nothing but their food and ease are content to believe any absurdity rather than to trouble 
themselves to examine it, holding their faith, as it were, by entail unalienable (except by an 
express and new law).” (L45.30/450). 
The present idolatry of Christian Churches cannot be derived from Scripture, argues 
Hobbes. It must have happened when the new faith began converting the pagans, who 
retained some of their old traditions and beliefs. Specifically, Hobbes argues that idolatry 
crept into the Roman Church when expensive pagan idols were converted to Christian use 
by new converts who were reluctant to discard their pretty and ostentatious decorations. 
Moreover, “the immoderate esteem and prices set upon the workmanship” (L45.33/451) of 
these idols made them valuable tools for priest. Hobbes argues that “as worldly ambition, 
creeping by degree into the pastors, drew them to an endeavor of pleasing the new made 
Christians…so the worshipping of the images of Christ and his apostles grew more and 
more idolatrous” (Ibid.). 
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There are numerous other relics of paganism at work in the Roman Church. 
Canonizing saints is an ancient, pagan practice that has no basis in Scripture. It is apotheosis 
by another name. Furthermore, Hobbes’ eschatology has the saints being dead until the 
resurrection. They could not intercede even if we wanted them to.  
Carrying relics and images in procession is a practice from Greek and Roman 
religion, as are the burning of candles before images, and the use of holy water. Many 
festivals celebrated by Christians are the palimpsest of pagan revelries.  
All of these considerations lead Hobbes to conclude that “the Papacy is no other 
than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.” 
(L47.21/483). 
But Hobbes expresses faith that the contradiction between Scripture and pagan relics 
will be resolved in the favor of a truly Scriptural Christianity. Commenting on the 
persistence of these pagan relics, Hobbes writes in words recalling Mark 2:22:327  
And if a man would well observe that which is delivered in the histories concerning the 
religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I doubt not but he might find many more of these 
old bottles of Gentilism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, either by negligence or 
ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of Christianity, that will not fail in time to 
break them. (L45.38/453).   
Vain Philosophy  
In the penultimate chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes considers “darkness from vain 
philosophy and fabulous traditions”.328 Hobbes defines philosophy as the science of the 
                                                
327 In the KJV, the passage runs as follows: “And no man putteth new wine into old bottles: else the new 
wine doth burst the bottles, and the wine is spilled, and the bottles will be marred: but new wine must be 
put into new bottles.” 
328 Curley suggests that Hobbes’ title here in all likelihood is a pastiche of two passages from St. Paul. The 
first is Romans 1: 21–22, “Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were 
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generation and properties of any thing accessible to the human mind. Because it is a science, 
it excludes experience or mere prudence. It also excludes falsehood. It excludes the 
argument from authority as well, as this is merely uncritical faith in that author, not science. 
Finally, philosophy cannot deal with knowledge acquired from revelation, “because it is not 
acquired by reasoning.” (L46.4/454).  
Hobbes has a low opinion of Ancient philosophy: He asserts, “The natural 
philosophy of those schools was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and 
insignificant language” (L46.11/456).329 Adding, “Their logic, which should be the method of 
reasoning, is nothing else but captions [quibbles] of words, and inventions how to puzzle 
such as should go about to pose them.” (L46.11/457). Finally, “Their moral philosophy is 
but a description of their own passions.” (L46.11/456). And “in so great diversity of taste, 
there is nothing generally agreed on, but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever 
seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of commonwealth.” (Ibid. /457).  
In sum,  
there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) 
have not some of them maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly 
said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle’s Metaphysics; nor more 
repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly 
than a great part of his Ethics.” (L46.11/457). 
Hobbes does not seriously engage with the texts of Ancient philosophy. He 
dismisses them with great rhetorical flourish. But the philosophers of antiquity are not really 
                                                                                                                                            
thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing 
themselves to be wise, they became fools” and Colossians 2:8, “Beware lest any man spoil you through 
philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after 
Christ.” Both renditions are from the KJV. See also n12 on 463 of Curley’s edition.  
329 Recall how Hobbes traces the belief in incorporeal substances back to mistaken dreams, among other 
things.  
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his targets here, it is the contemporary use of these ideas he finds troubling. And to this end, 
all the ridicule he can heap on the Ancients is worth it. 
Hobbes notes that, in the early Church’s converts, “Among them were also 
philosophers; but the latter embraced the faith as half-baked Christians; unwilling to desert 
the teachings of their masters, they retained as many of those teachings as they could in any 
way reconcile with Christian doctrine.” (L46.9/470[OL]). So it was not just religious ideas 
like demonology that persisted in this atavism, but philosophical notions as well. The 
blending of Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine seemed invisible at the time. It would 
be centuries before philosophy had enough perspective to see the two distinct ideas which 
were ultimately incompatible (in Hobbes’ eyes) with each other.  
Hobbes is no kinder to Jewish thought, “by their lectures and disputations in their 
synagogues they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy 
concerning the incomprehensible nature of God and spirits, which they compounded of the 
vain philosophy of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer 
places of the Scripture (and which might most easily be wrested to their purpose) and from 
the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.” (L46.12/457).  
Hobbes seeks to overturn the educational orthodoxy of his time, where “tenets of 
vain philosophy, derived to the Universities and then to the Church” (L46.13/458). 
Regarding University education, Hobbes writes “since the authority of Aristotle is only 
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current there, that study is not properly philosophy (the nature whereof dependeth not on 
authors) but Aristotelity.” (L46.13/458).330  
Hobbes lambastes the metaphysics and the physics of the School Men, in ways that 
should be familiar to us. Hobbes critique aims to make it be “that men may no longer suffer 
themselves to be abused by them that by this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain 
philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country with 
empty names, as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked 
stick.” (L46.18/460). The doctrine confuses people, with “insignificant trains of strange and 
barbarous words…yet it hath a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also to make men 
think they have it, and desist from further search.” (L46.40/467). It makes subject believe in 
magic powers wielded by priests (and not by civil sovereigns).  
Hobbes is no gentler to the ethics and political theory derived from ancient 
republicans. But he devotes special attention to the question of priestly marriage. “It is also 
vain and false philosophy to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity or continence, 
as they do that pretend chastity and continence for the ground of denying marriage to the 
clergy.” (L46.33/464). If sex is too unclean for priests, “much more should other natural, 
necessary, and daily works, which all men do, render men unworthy to be priests, because 
they are more unclean.” (Ibid.). But the real reason is not purity at all. Hobbes suggests that 
St. Paul’s emphasis on the unmarried life made early preachers better able to escape 
persecution than “to be clogged with the care of wife and children” (L46.34/465)! But the 
                                                
330Remarkably, Hobbes says of Aristotle “it may be he knew [it] to be false philosophy, but writ it as a 
thing consonant to, and corroborative of, their [Athenian] religion—and fearing the fate of Socrates” 
(L.46.18/460).   
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“secret foundation” (L46.34/465) is papal ambition. Celibacy “serveth to assure this power 
of the Pope over kings” (L47.10/479), because if a king is priest he cannot control his 
succession and he is beholden to the orders of the Pope.331   
Hobbes’ crescendo is an indictment of flawed accounts of supernatural events:  
for all the errors brought in from false or uncertain history, what is all the legend of fictitious 
miracles in the lives of the saints, and all the histories of apparitions and ghosts alleged by the 
doctors of the Roman Church (to make good their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the 
power of exorcism, and other doctrines which have no warrant, neither in reason, nor 
Scripture), as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten word of God, but old 
wives’ fables? (L46.41/467, emphasis mine).  
The early fathers were either gullible or fraudulent to put so much stock in these 
stories. Hobbes can be read on many levels in this critique. First, we can see a strictly anti-
Catholic screed. Then, perhaps a criticism of human frailty when it comes to these tales. 
Finally, we can see Hobbes casting radical doubt on the reliability of any accounts of the 
supernatural, a familiar theme in his work, but one he takes some measure to conceal.  
The Schoolmen are guilty of many gross intellectual errors in Hobbes’ mind. They 
are committed to arguments from (suspicious) authority. They mix their corrupted 
philosophy with religion. They extended their ideas beyond experience to the dream world, 
and built up the whole edifice from a shaky foundation of vague definitions.   
But they were the predominant line of thought in Hobbes’ era. Scholasticism was 
clearly the intellectual arm of the Roman Catholic Church. But it was also a major 
component of the education of Oxford and Cambridge. Thus, it had important influences 
on the Anglican intellectual tradition as well. Reading the dispute between Hobbes and 
                                                
331 Hobbes also notes that Scripture since says that in the kingdom of God the blessed will not marry, so 
that if the present Church is the kingdom of God, as the Roman Church maintains, its “blessed” (i.e., 
priests) cannot marry.  
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Bramhall is enough to see both Bramhall’s deep intellectual debt to Scholasticism on the one 
hand and Hobbes’ deep, early Modern contempt for it. What better than to replace the 
honorable position of Aristotle than a Leviathan? 
Cui bono? 
Thus, the central point of Hobbes’ account of the Kingdom of Darkness is to show 
that all of the “darkness” (non-Christian elements) in contemporary Christianity wasn’t just 
forgivable error, it was ideological. Every departure from true Christianity served some 
interest. Hobbes introduces his conclusion with a rare approving mention Cicero, who 
recounts a story of a judge who asked plaintiffs “cui bono?”, that is, “who benefits?” from 
having committed an alleged crime. “For amongst presumptions there is no that so evidently 
declareth the author as doth the benefit of an action.” (L47.1/477).  
Hobbes recapitulates the several doctrines of darkness that he has identified in Part 
IV. The cornerstone of these is the doctrine that the Kingdom of God is the present 
Church, but Hobbes ticks off several more. He cites the doctrine of papal infallibility, the 
subordination of bishops to the pope, the exemption of clergy from civil laws. He highlights 
the special place accorded to the Lord’s Supper, and to the priests who administer it. Hobbes 
notes that by making of matrimony a sacrament, the priesthood can designate some 
marriages as legitimate and others not. Priestly celibacy prevents a sovereign from being 
both king and priest. Confession serves to provide “intelligence of the design of princes” 
(L47.11/479)! By canonizing saints, priests encourage the belief that they can determine who 
is saved. Their alleged sacramental powers do the same. Purgatory, with its attendant notion 
of indulgences, “enriches” the clergy. The belief in demons, possession, and exorcism makes 
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“the people more in awe of their power.” (L47.15/480). Finally, the doctrines of Aristotle, as 
used in the Schools with their “frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure 
language…serve them to keep these errors from being detected. And to make men mistake 
the ignis fatuus [will o’ wisp] of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel.” (L47.16/480).  
After this exhaustive list, Hobbes is forced to conclude that if we examine these 
doctrines together, we can see  
the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly to the setting up of an unlawful power over the 
lawful sovereigns of the Christian people, or for the sustaining of the same when it is set up, 
or to the worldly riches, honor, and authority of those that sustain it. And therefore, by the 
aforesaid rule of cui bono we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spiritual darkness 
the Pope, and Roman clergy, and all those besides that endeavor to settle in the minds of men 
this erroneous doctrine: that the Church now on earth is that kingdom of God mentioned in 
the Old and New Testament. (L47.17/480, emphasis mine) 
Elsewhere Hobbes says “The authors, therefore, of this darkness in religion are the 
Roman and the presbyterian clergy.” (L47.4/478, emphasis mine). This association makes 
sense if we recall that Hobbes thought Beza’s assertion that the kingdom of God is of this 
present world was “The most difficult place to answer” (L44.17/421).332  
Hobbes thus seems to share the sentiments of John Milton who famously wrote that, 
“New presbyter is but old priest writ large”.333 It’s fair to say Hobbes opposed both Roman 
Catholics and Presbyterians. But I think it goes deeper than that. Any ecclesiology that 
asserts (a) a special role or powers for the priesthood and (b) asserts the independence of the 
spiritual from the temporal, is guilty of essentially the same offense. And this means that we 
                                                
332 Beza was Calvin’s successor in Geneva. The Genevan church followed the presbyterian model of 
organization. If the Scottish and Parliamentarian rebels followed Beza’s example, then the Presbyterian 
model writ large claimed the same thing about the kingdom of God. Hobbes had plenty of grounds to 
dislike the Presbyterians to begin with, this just added another.  
333 This is the concluding line from “On the new forcers of conscience under the long parliament” (1647). 
Sommerville brings this up in “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the history of the Jews”, pg. 162.  
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can also see a hidden critique of traditional Anglican mores, Canterbury sandwiched in 
between Geneva and Rome. [bring in the sec lit that mentions this!] 
Hobbes accuses priests, of all stripes, of abusing their position for seditious and 
ambitious fraud, of willfully distorting Biblical doctrines to further their ends, of setting 
themselves apart from both ordinary men and ordinary subjection.  
Later in Leviathan, Hobbes takes a less serious approach to the rejection of papal 
power, comparing it to the kingdom of the fairies! Consider the comparisons: 
1. The Roman Church is the ghost of the Roman Empire. 
2. The secret language of the fairies is unknown, but the Church uses Latin. 
3. The universal king of the fairies is Oberon; for Catholics it is the Pope. 
4. “The ecclesiastics are spiritual men and ghostly fathers. The fairies are spirits and 
ghosts.” (L47.24/483). 
5. Fairies live in “enchanted castles”, Catholics “have their cathedral churches” 
(L47.25/483). 
6. Fairies vanish into thin air to evade authorities; ecclesiastical courts accomplish the same. 
7. Fairies kidnap human children, so, too, “The ecclesiastics take from young men the use 
of their reason by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and 
traditions, and abused Scripture” (L47.27/483). 
8. Universities are the fairy laboratories of the church, where they create their 
enchantments. 
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9. Fairies send elves to pinch those they are displeased with; the Pope sends his agents to 
annoy princes. 
10. “The fairies marry not, but there be amongst them incubi that have copulation with flesh 
and blood. The priests also marry not.” (L47.29/483).334 
11. Priests support themselves by tithes; fairies “enter into dairies and feast upon the cream 
they skim from the milk.” (L47.31/484). 
12. Priests repay donations with fairytale currency – “canonizations, indulgencies, and 
masses” (L47.32.484). 
13. Fairies have “no existence but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the 
traditions of old wives or old poets”, so papal power “consisteth only in the fear that 
seduced people stand in of their excommunications, upon hearing of false miracles, false 
traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture.” (L47.33/484).  
14. Both fairies and the Roman church are pesky, and hard to get rid of.  
This is, of course, outrageous. But it is carefully calculated theater. First, note that 
Hobbes does not refer to the papacy consistently throughout his lampoon. In fact, most of 
these comments are sect-neutral. Even when the Papacy is the explicit focus, we should 
always be aware that “it is not the Roman clergy only that pretends the kingdom of God to 
be of this world, and thereby to have a power therein distinct from that of the civil state.” 
                                                
334 Quentin Skinner notes that this passage epitomizes the rhetorical device of aposiopesis, where a clear 
implication is set up, but not made explicit. If these sentences were completely parallel, Hobbes is saying 
priest violate their vow of celibacy, perhaps in a predatory and/or corrupting way. Or he could be implying 
that priests “seduce” minds as well. See Reason and Rhetoric, pg. 419.   
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(L47.34/484).335 The overall effect is to make priests harder to be taken seriously. Its 
position as Hobbes’ parting salvo should not be underestimated.  
The Trinity 
The doctrine of the Trinity is central for main stream Christian thought. Throughout 
the history of Christianity, however, there have been those who have denied the validity of 
the concept. In Hobbes’ own time, those who denied the Trinity were often referred to as 
“Socinians”, after Fausto Sozzini (Latin : Socinius), an Italian aristocrat who moved to 
Poland in 1580 and lead a sect of radical Christians, who among other things, were known 
for their Anti-Trinitarian leanings.336   
Hobbes was accused of Socinianism in his work. Tuck observes that Hobbes “cast 
doubt on the Trinity, both by denying the possibility of a Holy Ghost or Spirit, and by 
asserting that Christ was the same person as God only in the sense in which Moses was 
also”.337 His account of the Trinity as successive impersonation had the effect of explaining a 
“mystery” and thereby disenchanting it.  
In Leviathan, Hobbes argues “it is plain that Moses…was alone he that represented to 
the Israelites the person of God” (L.40.7/319). Later he claims, that “Our Savior, therefore, 
both in teaching an reigning, representeth (as Moses did) the person of God” (L.41.9/333, 
emphasis mine). On the one hand, these claims seem to create an equivalency between Christ 
and Moses, potentially making the former just a man. On the other hand, they seem to cast 
                                                
335 The OL (47.27/487) renders this passage “For it is not only the Romans who aspire to government by 
the church, on a claim of divine right [jure divino].” While Hobbes tones down some of the humor in the 
OL, as Skinner points out repeatedly in Reason and Rhetoric, he retains all 14 comparisons.   
336 See Chadwick, Owen, The Reformation, pgs. 200–3. 
337 Tuck, Richard “Hobbes and Locke on Toleration”, pg. 165. 
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doubt on the fundamentally tripartite substance of God. Moses and Christ are both 
portrayed as representative of one God, “The Father”. This kind of talk went straight to the 
core of belief for many believers in Hobbes’ time. 
The charges stuck with Hobbes long enough for him to mention these issues in the 
Latin Leviathan’s appendices. In Appendix 1, regarding the Nicene Creed, he first reconsiders 
the issues surrounding the Trinity. While ostensibly acting as a good faith interpreter, 
Hobbes seems to undermine the validity of the concepts involved.  
For instance, “A.” makes an interesting aside, arguing: 
It seems to me that they [early Christian doctors] were not right to want to explain that 
mystery. For what do you do when you explain a mystery except destroy it, or make of a 
mystery what is not a mystery? For faith, converted to knowledge, perishes, leaving only 
hope and charity. (L.App1.15/502). 
The fact that this is precisely what Hobbes himself has done with the Trinity, should 
not be lost on us. 
Later on, Hobbes also argues that  
…almost all those theologians who published explanations of the Nicene creed use 
definitions taken from the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle, when they ought to have 
proven the holy Trinity from Sacred Scripture alone. I am amazed also that the Nicene 
Fathers, so many of whom were philosophers, did not bring into the creed itself those terms 
of art which they used in their explanations. (L.App1.90/518).  
Curley points out that this is a patently false statement by Hobbes, made by “A.” and 
uncontested by “B.”. There are philosophical terms (homoousios and ousia) in the creed, and 
there is no Scriptural basis for them. By making such a statement, Hobbes is undermining 
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our confidence in the Scriptural basis of the creed, and casting doubt on the Trinity itself.338 
The implication is that the doctrine of the Trinity is another relic of Gentile philosophy. 
In Appendix 3, as well, he discusses the Trinity. Here he comes closest to a 
retraction of his earlier approach. Hobbes “admits’ that “For since Moses also bore the 
person of God in some manner (as all Christian kings do), he seems to make Moses one 
person of the Trinity.” (L.App3.12/543). He further confesses to being “careless” in this 
regard, but in spite the fact that :he repeats the same thing in many places…it can easily be 
corrected” (L.App3.12–14/543). When properly reformulated, Moses is merely a 
lieutenant.339 Lessay notes that this concession doesn’t accomplish much: “Although the 
former persons of the Trinity now became ministers of God, the triune nature of the divinity 
was still understood in terms of historical representation, and from that viewpoint, Jesus 
played a role undistinguishable from Moses and the apostles”.340 
I am left with the sense that Hobbes rejected any mystical interpretation of he 
Trinity, and that he thought at best that it was a useful device to illustrate his theory of 
personhood. Contaminated as it was by Greek philosophical notions, Hobbes found little to 
save in it but its name. 
                                                
338 See Curley, Edwin, “Reply to Professor Martinich”, pg. 286–7. Again, the arguments holds whether you 
want to follow Curley into advocating Hobbes’ atheism, or if you more moderately wish to see him as 
“merely” a Socinian.  
339 Hobbes certainly felt the need to retreat from his bold challenge to the Trinity. Whether he genuinely 
felt like he had committed an easily-corrected error, or if he was just being disingenuous, there is plenty of 
room for debate in the literature. Myself, I lean toward Hobbes being skeptical of the Trinity.  
340 Lessay, “Hobbes’s Protestantism”, 285. Lessay cites a passage from Bramhall which draws out the 
implication that the Trinity, being thrust into history, lacks eternity. There was a time when it did not exist, 
and perhaps where it could not exist (or be changed), Ibid., n.79. 
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Independency? 
A number of recent scholars have tried to argue that Hobbes was actually an 
Independent in matters of religion.  While a provocative thesis, I do not think this line of 
reasoning is correct.  
In his introduction to Hobbes’ life and ideas,341 Richard Tuck argues that Hobbes 
was sympathetic to the Independents.342 One of the bases of this interpretation is a curious 
passage towards the end of Leviathan. After praising England for untying the successive 
“knots” of papal control, episcopacy, and finally the Presbyterians, Hobbes claims that “we 
are reduced to the independency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or 
Apollos, every man as he liketh best. Which, if it be without contention…is perhaps the 
best.” (L47.20/482)343 
Tuck makes his case by arguing that Hobbes had principled reasons to endorse 
Independency, and further that his personal actions put him on the side of the Independents 
as well. Jeffrey Collins has made similar arguments.344 Hobbes shared many of the arguments 
used by the Independents against both episcopacy and Presbyterianism. On a more personal 
                                                
341 Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction. The argument occurs on pages 34–48, in a section entitled “The life 
of a heretic”. 
342 By the Independents, we mean any of the various radical Christian sects that argued for totally dismantling 
the state’s monopoly on religion. The Independents, whom history came to call “puritans” wanted to leave the 
disposition of each congregation solely to the members of the congregation alone. Sommerville summarizes 
this as follows: “Independents argued that churches should be voluntary associations, or  congregations, of 
godly people. The local congregation of the faithful, they held, should be autonomous in church affairs. On 
civil and political questions, indeed, congregations would be subject to the state authorities, but they would not 
be subordinate in ecclesiastical affairs to any national or regional hierarchy of churchmen, nor to any synods, 
assemblies or councils. In church affairs each congregation would be independent – hence Independency.” 
(Johann Sommerville, “Hobbes and Independency”,  Revista di storia della filosofia, n. 1, 2004, 156–173. Page 
157.) It is worth noting that Cromwell and much of the New Model Army were Independents, so the 
association of Independency with the Protectorate was clear to most of Hobbes’ contemporaries.  
343 Curley observes that Clarendon found this statement to be an endorsement of the Independents.  
344 CITE! The allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, among others.  
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level, Hobbes is said to have given “aid and advice” to Independents making arguments 
against traditional Church organization.345 Hobbes befriended the Independent-minded John 
Selden. Tuck claims that Hobbes wrote Leviathan as a sort of application for readmission to 
England, and that the passages in the Review and Conclusion, which speak to submitting to 
a conqueror are intended to endorse the Cromwell regime. Tuck claims that in his later 
writings, “Cromwell is treated with considerable respect”.346  
Johann Sommerville has vigorously disputed Tuck’s claims in his article “Hobbes 
and Independency”. As we have seen, Hobbes had little love for the Anglican clergy in exile, 
resenting them for their apparent role in alienating him from the young king, among other 
things.347  
Hobbes did agree with the Independents on some key points of principle, but not 
many. He agreed that there was no biblically mandated Church organization, and the Church 
had no power apart from the state. But he rejected the nonconformity of the Independents 
to a single standard of uniform religious observance. He rejected their willingness to refuse 
to acquiesce to state authority when guided by their conscience, up to and including outright 
rebellion. He also lacks their confidence in the transparency of the Scriptural message, and 
the right of the individual to embrace his or her own interpretation of it. Clearly, Hobbes is 
against all such forms of enthusiasm and inspiration. Hobbes argues, in a word, that the 
Independents were “lawless, greedy, rebellious madmen.”348 
                                                
345 Tuck, Hobbes, 41. 
346 Tuck, Hobbes, 44.  
347 See Chapter 2.  
348 Sommerville, “Hobbes and Independency”, 170. 
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Sommerville also argues that Tuck overstates or outright distorts Hobbes’ personal 
relationships with individual Independent thinkers. Hobbes certainly did not speak glowingly 
of Cromwell, as Tuck contends. Tuck’s argument for the personal connection depends 
heavily on his reading of a series of letters to Hobbes from one Henry Stubbe, an Oxford 
academic, whom Tuck alleges to be an Independent. Sommerville argues that Stubbe was 
more opportunist than Independent, wanting to use Hobbes to gain access to his patron.   
We can find more evidence of this difference between Hobbes and Independent 
thought. In his 1679 [?] defense of his reputation against the attacks of John Wallis, the 
Oxford mathematician, Hobbes writes that “it is his private opinion, that such an episcopacy 
as is now in England, is the most commodious that a Christian King can use for the 
governing of Christ’s flock”.349 We can certainly dispute the sincerity of this claim. He also 
claims that he “wrote and published his Leviathan, far from the intention either of 
disadvantage to his Majesty, or to flatter Oliver, who was not made Protector till three or 
four years after, on purpose to make way for his return.”350 This claim about Cromwell does 
indeed fit with the facts of Leviathan’s publication, although it is by no means clear that the 
arguments of that work have the royalist intent Hobbes claims for them here. 
We can also recall Hobbes’ assertion from his discussion of natural religion that 
“seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought to exhibit to God but one 
worship…where many sorts of worship ne allowed, proceeding from the different religions 
                                                
349 Hobbes, “Considerations on the reputation of T. Hobbes”, in EW, IV, 432. 
350 Ibid., 415.  
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of private men, it cannot be said that there is any public worship, nor that the 
commonwealth is of any religion at all.” (L31.37/242)351 
So what are we to make of the passage in Chapter 47 of Leviathan, which seemingly 
endorses Independency? One argument is recourse to irony, which is the interpretation of 
Martinich, according to Sommerville.  
The problem is that these matters of religion cannot be “without contention” under 
the terms dominant in Hobbes’ time, an argument Lloyd thinks reasonable [more]. Hobbes’ 
idyllic, democratic picture of the early Church resonates with our modern experience to a 
degree that we would mistake it for an endorsement. But much as with Plato, Hobbes was 
deeply suspicious of democracy.  Hobbes could not (or would not) imagine a world without 
monolithic, national churches.  
How do the two pieces fit together? 
Hobbes repeats many of the same arguments between Parts III and IV of Leviathan, 
sometimes offering two separate arguments in each Part, sometimes deepening or 
completing the argument begun in Part III in Part IV. This complicated relationship 
prompts the reader to wonder, “why are there two Parts here, and what is the relation 
between them?”  
SA Lloyd offers the following helpful opinion on the relative roles of Parts III and 
IV, “Part 3 redescribes competing or problematic characterizations of the disruptive interest, 
using acceptable methods for interpreting the nonnatural source of knowledge taken to be 
                                                
351 The marginal note reads, “Public Worship consisteth in Uniformity”. 
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authoritative in such questions. Part 4 then completes the argument by providing a 
sociological and historical account of how the errors that underwrote the disruptive 
characterization of interest in Part 3 arose, attempting thereby, to delegitimize, once and for 
all, the problematic conception of interest.”352 Obviously, we need to unpack Lloyd’s rather 
clinical and technical language here to grasp her meaning.  
Lloyd is saying that Hobbes presents an alternative view of the entire Christian 
drama. He retains all of the important elements (Trinity, heaven and hell, miracles, etc.) but 
he redescribes them using a new form of biblical analysis and bringing new scientific tools to 
the conversation. He does not jettison too much, in order to keep his reader’s attention (and 
to save his own hide, we might add). He sticks to the text of the Bible, or at least claims he 
does. In Part III, Hobbes merely rationally reconstructs Christianity, presenting a new 
picture of what that religion could and should look like. He sees it as both intellectually 
airtight and politically expedient. Lloyd thinks that most of this attempt was sincere on 
Hobbes’ part, that he was in pursuit of a genuine reconciliation between Christianity and the 
new scientific disciplines (both physics and civil science). Martinich ascribes to Hobbes the 
same project. I have my doubts, but the external form of Hobbes’ project, I believe, follows 
the pattern Lloyd lays out.  
Part IV, according to Lloyd, is where Hobbes shows us how 17th century orthodox 
views of Christianity arose, and seeks to expose the ideological foundations of that view for 
what they are – a land grab by priests. Hobbes himself says “in the fourth part, lest the 
people be seduced by false doctors, I have exposed the ambitious and cunning plans of the 
                                                
352 Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Leviathan, pp. 311–312. 
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adversaries of the Anglican Church.” (L47.29/488 [OL]). If my interpretation is correct, this 
last line contains a slight bit of irony, because Hobbes is referring to the reconstructed 
Anglican Church he envisions, and not the actually-existing Anglican Church. Hobbes’ 
analysis seems to attack the later as much as some of his more explicit opponents.  
Lloyd’s analysis is important because it tells us something Hobbes never did: how to 
read his masterpiece chapter-by-chapter, so that the sometimes disjointed-seeming pieces fit 
together. 
Putting it all together 
So this is Hobbes’ vision of Christianity: a field of national churches, headed by each 
nation’s sovereign. These churches are organized as the sovereign sees fit, with the proviso 
that the sovereign exercises total control over them, and may even choose to perform 
pastoral function if he desires. All church ministers owe their appointment to the sovereign, 
and administer to religious functions in his name. The sovereign alone reigns jure divino. All 
appointments may be modified or revoked at any time. The sovereign may delegate some 
authority to church ministers, even the Pope in Rome, but these have no independent 
authority at all. The sovereign may receive advice, but not commands from church leaders. 
Control over church organization is an inalienable right of sovereignty. There is no 
meaningful distinction between temporal and spiritual power. A sovereign must be wary of 
the tendencies in human nature to exploit the role of the priest to subvert legitimate state 
power.  
The sovereign also has an inalienable right to set religious doctrine. This includes 
determining the meaning of Holy Scripture, even including what books of the Bible are to 
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count as canonical. The sovereign also determines what counts as a miracle and who is to be 
considered a prophet.  
There are only two sacraments, Baptism, an act of initiation into the church, and the 
Lord’s Supper, a commemoration of Christ’s sacrifice. Both have symbolic value only: no 
special presence or transference of grace occurs during the sacrament. Only permission from 
the sovereign is required to perform the sacraments.  
Despite the latitude accorded to the sovereign in doctrinal matters, it is important for 
the subjects to recognize that only a handful of doctrines are essential for salvation. 
Reservations can and must be kept to oneself. God can see into our hearts, and he alone can 
judge our inner thoughts and beliefs. Even seemingly idolatrous practices must be 
acquiesced to, because martyrdom is not the duty of every Christian it is the exclusive 
province of those called directly by God. Christ commanded his followers to believe in him 
and to obey those in power. One cannot be saved without fulfilling both of these criteria. It 
is certainly not a sin to go against one’s conscience in religious matters, if it means obeying 
the sovereign. 
A scientifically-minded Christian can expect an afterlife much different than 
traditional views, and one consistent with materialism. It will be on earth, in a kingdom 
personally ruled over by Christ. Saints will live forever with new, more perfect bodies. 
Sinners will mercifully die a second death. Hell and everlasting torment will be seen for what 
they are: metaphors.  
An enlightened Christian will also see that the philosophy of Aristotle and his 
successors, the School Divines, will offer no help in religious issues. In fact, quite the 
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contrary. Natural reason has little to say about Christianity, and it is vanity to search among 
the Greek philosophers for answers to properly Christian mysteries.  
Christianity has been purged of all alien (that is, non-Scriptural) elements by Hobbes’ 
redescription and analysis. It is no longer tainted by Roman models of empire; Greek 
notions of the soul, spirit, and demons; or Aristotelian-inspired Scholastic obfuscation.  
Hobbes’ account has two components, first an assertion of sovereign supremacy in 
matters of religion, and second, advice on doctrines from a would-be counselor and expert. 
The latter is explicitly made conditional on sovereign approval, but it acknowledges that it 
was written in the absence of a proper authority. These two pieces need not be taken 
together, although it is easier to imagine the first without the second, rather than vice versa.  
So we can pose Cassii’s question to Hobbes himself: cui bono? The answer is 
unabashedly, “the sovereign!” But on Hobbes’ model, the sovereign is a rational device for 
the survival of the subject. So the answer, for Hobbes, is more fully, the commonwealth as a 
whole benefits. But if we take a step back and address the war of ideologies here, Hobbes is 
clearly endorsing a unified sovereign power over the divisive power of a so-called spiritual 
kingdom. I do not think that this is an accident or an oversight. Hobbes practically invites 
the careful reader to turn the device onto his own analysis. What emerges with relative clarity 
is an instance of “politick religion” in the Machiavellian vein. We now turn to these matters. 
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Chapter 6: Leviathan ’s Insincerity 
Hobbes was not an orthodox Christian. He was not a sincere Christian either. His 
purpose is writing Leviathan was to rationalize and domesticate Christianity for the purposes 
of stable rule. Hobbes instrumentalizes religion in a cynical way similar to Machiavelli, 
although he is not as straightforward about it. Underneath it all, Hobbes personally seems to 
have been closer to a deist than anything else, although he appears to have had some 
misgivings about his beliefs. We may never be able to determine exactly what Hobbes 
himself thought, but the message of Leviathan is not perfectly literal and contains deep 
skeptical questions about Christianity. It also contains a somewhat cynical use of religion as a 
tool for social engineering. In writing this way, Hobbes was involving himself in a long 
tradition of skepticism and “politick religion”, and his contemporary critics saw him as doing 
such. 
“Atheism”: Past and Present 
Typically, those who assert Hobbes’ atheism do so partly by indicating that so many 
of his contemporaries saw him as an atheist, and thus he must be an atheist.  One of the 
stumbling blocks here is that to call someone an “atheist” in 17th-Century England meant 
that you were using an ambiguous term. “Atheism” was often used simply as a term of 
abuse, with no real implications as to its theological ramifications. It often expressed simple 
dislike or political disagreement. It was not uncommon, for instance, for the Jesuits to be 
called atheists in Stuart England (and vice versa)! But there were more specific uses as well.  
 233 
For the early moderns, writes David Wootton, “The quintessence of atheism was 
believed to be a combination of Epicureanism and Machiavellism: the pursuit of pleasure 
and power without fear of divine retribution.”353  Atheists were commonly believed to deny 
the existence of heaven and hell, to deny the intervention of God in the natural world, and 
to deny the immortality of the soul. There was a strong connotation of immorality associated 
with “practical atheism”.354 
Unbelief was something to be kept hidden, “it is easy to find examples of individuals 
who rejected completely the truth of the Christian religion, but who yet maintained that it 
was essential that religion should be inculcated in the common people, on the grounds that 
only a small minority of philosophers were capable of acting well out of virtue rather than 
the fear of God.”355 But this did not stop the opinion from being prevalent among that small 
minority. “At times – in the France of Mazarin or the England of the later Stuarts – unbelief 
appears to have been fashionable and widely disseminated amongst the educated ruling 
class.”356 
These unbelievers thought that “only religion could provide an adequate foundation 
for social order.” and understood “the social utility of the fear of God”357 Hence, “atheists in 
                                                
353 Wootton, David, “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe”, History Workshop 20 (1985: Autumn), 82–100, 
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354 Ibid., pg. 86 
355 Ibid., pg. 87. 
356 Ibid., pg. 92.  
357 Ibid., pg. 87.  
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general were convinced of the social necessity of faith, and consequently of their own moral 
obligation to conceal their unbelief under a cloak of hypocrisy and deceit.”358  
The term “atheist” seems to have gained currency after the start of the Reformation, 
and reflected the worry that lack of religious cohesion could lead to social disorder.359 “It was 
a commonplace of anti-atheist writings that unbelief was encouraged by religious schism.”360 
There was tremendous worry at the time about the spread of atheism; it was an epidemic 
similar to the Red Scare. This, “Anxiety focused on two areas…One was a kind of secular 
attitude to politics habitually associated with Machiavelli…In addition, naturalism and 
systems of scientific explanation [were] seen as implicitly atheist caused misgivings”361 
Wootton’s discussion provides at least circumstantial evidence to consider when 
analyzing the work of Thomas Hobbes for signs of atheism. If we connect many of these 
dots, we will find an image Hobbes looking back at us.  
Michael Hunter observes that there were five criteria for atheism that recurred in 
English polemics against irreligion at the time. The first was “questioning of the authority of 
the scriptures and drawing attention to inconsistencies within them”; second the denial of 
providence and a “preference for natural as against supernatural explanations”; third, denial 
of the soul’s immortality, because “this was thought to lead to a dismissal of the Last 
Judgment as ‘ridiculous and fabulous’” while glorifying worldly ambition; fourth, a “cynical”, 
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Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 35 (1985), 135-157, pg. 154.  
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Machiavellian vision of religion as a human invention and social tool; finally, atheists were 
thought, consequent to their beliefs, to be “scoffers”.362  
Hunter admits this is more a paranoiac vision of the atheist than any document of an 
actual atheist culture of the time. There was, however, at least some truth to these ideas. But 
even if this was only the popular impression, than it is hard not to see how Hobbes’ 
contemporaries could view him as a thoroughgoing atheist. It is a veritable portrait of the 
“Beast of Malmsbury”! In fact, if we consider the rhetorical argument below, Hobbes may 
have intentionally styled himself after the caricature to achieve an effect.  
The modern reader, however, has a fairly clear, unified, and different idea of what it 
means to be an atheist. An atheist usually denies the truth of the monotheistic “belief in a 
personal God who takes an interest in the world and who has given a special revelation to 
humans.”363 Many modern atheists deny the existence of any sort of god or gods, personal or 
not, or any supernatural existence or events whatsoever.364  
Not many 17th-Century thinkers could truly be called an atheist in this latter modern 
sense, although many could fall into the former camp. Hobbes certainly admits, probably 
sincerely, that the idea of God as first cause is acceptable to him, although this is far from a 
robust picture of the personal God of Christianity. He says, “it is impossible to make any 
profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one 
God eternal, though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his 
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nature.” (L11.25/62). He certainly does his best to disenchant the world and leave it with 
only natural laws.  
It is undeniable that Hobbes was called an atheist countless times by his critics, and 
that the full range of meanings was intended, including the modern ones. Given the various 
definitions and nuances mentioned, this amounts to a large number, of often incompatible, 
accusations.   
The controversy of interpretations 
If you ask a scholar whether Hobbes believed in God, the most common answer is a 
resounding “no!” followed often by an “of course not!”.365 The same is also true, by and 
large, of his contemporary critics and for much of the 18th and 19th Century. But recently, 
there are a large number of historically-minded scholars who have argued the contrary, 
saying that it is “obvious” or nearly so if he is properly contextualized that Hobbes was not 
an atheist. We can speak generally and say that for every statement, pro or con, about 
Hobbes’ sincerity on matters of religion, there is a vociferous adherent to both sides of the 
argument, typically invoking the obviousness of their claim. This  dissensus is, of course, a 
lousy place to start.  
                                                
365 In fact, Willis Glover calls this ‘the orthodox undergraduate view of Hobbes’. See Glover, Willis B. 
“God and Thomas Hobbes” in Hobbes Studies, Harvard 1965, pg. 142. Glover thinks Hobbes was a theist. 
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We should be plain with the issues here. Short of a discovery in some archive or 
private library, there is no smoking gun.366 Hobbes never said in print or to someone who 
recorded it that he did or did not believe in the Christian god; nor did he say explicitly that 
he wrote in a misleading or ironic way.367 Thus, we will not be able to ascertain beyond all 
doubt what Hobbes believed in his heart, assuming this was even constant throughout his 
life. We are left with conjecture and the interpretation of the texts and contexts. I do believe 
that an interpretation that highlights the use of irony in Hobbes’ text is well-supported and 
insightful. 
Strauss and Curley 
If Hobbes was an atheist in his contemporaries’ eyes, they must have seen evidence 
of irony or insincerity in his writings. Modern readers discover traces of Hobbes’ irreligion 
by detecting irony as well. The first author one should consider when discussing a hidden 
meaning in a philosophy text is Leo Strauss.  
In “Persecution and the Art of Writing” Strauss considers the question of “writing 
between the lines”.368 He begins from the idea of persecution, where ideas exist that would 
put their author at personal risk if they appeared in print in a literal and straightforward way. 
Persecution necessitates that a thinker in such a situation leans to “write between the lines” 
and put his or her true meaning behind a mask.  
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Strauss argues that “The real opinion of an author is not necessarily identical with 
that which he expresses in the largest number of passages.”369 He elaborates: 
One is not entitled to delete a passage, nor to emend its text, before one has fully considered 
all reasonable possibilities of understanding the passage as it stands—one of these 
possibilities being that the passage may be ironic. If a master of the art of writing commits 
such blunders as would shame an intelligent high school boy, it is reasonable to assume that 
they are intentional, especially if the author discusses, however incidentally, the possibility of 
intentional blunders in writing.370   
A little later, he adds to the methodology: 
if an able writer who has a clear mind and a perfect knowledge of the orthodox view and all 
its ramifications, contradicts surreptitiously and as it were in passing one of its necessary 
presuppositions or consequences which he explicitly recognizes and maintains everywhere 
else, we can reasonably suspect that he was opposed to the orthodox system as such—we 
must study his whole book all over again, with much greater care and much less naïveté than 
ever before.371 
Since many thinkers in the 17th Century wanted to abolish persecution, they 
concealed their ideas with only perfunctory guile. “It is therefore comparatively easy to read 
between the lines of their work.” Strauss notes that “I am thinking of Hobbes in particular” 
here.372 (In the Ancient World, the approach was far different.) 
Strauss’ article is critical of a current scholarly mindset, which resists the appreciation 
of the role of irony in historical texts. A culture unused to persecution quickly and quietly 
forgets that it was a fact of life in other times and places, and adopts modes of criticism 
which display that amnesia. Everything becomes literal, and the ironic understandings of 
earlier generations become illegible or confused. What parades itself as innovation is in fact a 
great step backward.  
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The difficulty of a Straussian interpretation arises from the fact that it is nearly 
impossible to prove, using the resources of a text itself, whether or not there is irony present. 
In fact, Strauss acknowledges that “It must…be considered possible that reading between 
the lines will not lead to complete agreement among all scholars.”373 
While I am interested here in Strauss primarily for his methodology, he had no 
shortage of opinions on Hobbes’ sincerity.  In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss 
devotes a chapter to exploring the movement in Hobbes’ political treatises away from 
Anglican conventions, arguing that “he was a little a believing Christian then as later”, and 
that in his works sought to “replace natural theology by a pretended revealed theology.”374 
Elsewhere, Strauss tells us that “Hobbes teaches… ‘direct atheism’” in natural theology and 
that he “attempts to refute revealed religion…by attempting to prove that the content of the 
Biblical revelation is against reason.”375 In fact, Strauss maintains that Hobbes is an atheist 
through almost all of his writings on the thinker.376  
I will rely on Edwin Curley’s masterful article “‘ I Durst Not Write So Boldly’ or 
How to Read Hobbes’ Theological-Political Treatise” for the best example of reading 
between the lines of Leviathan. Curley considers in exhaustive detail the “Straussian reading 
of Hobbes.”377 He begins from an anecdote in Aubrey’s Brief Lives:  
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When Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus first came out (1670), Mr. Edmund Waller sent it 
to my lord of Devonshire and desired him to send him word of what Mr. Hobbes said of it. 
Mr. H. told his lordship: -- Ne judicate ne judicemini [“Judge not that ye not be judged”] – 
Matthew 7:1) He told me he had outthrowne him a bar’s length for he durst not write so 
boldly.378 
(The reference is to a game of strength where a bar was thrown for distance.) In 
other words, Spinoza wrote more directly about certain issues that Hobbes dared to. What 
Curley proceeds to do is to compare several issues in Hobbes’s Leviathan and Spinoza’s 
Treatise, all dealing with religion, to see if Spinoza was in fact “bolder”. He concludes that 
there is “quite a lot in Spinoza’s work which Hobbes might have found to be bolder”, but 
more importantly, “that where Spinoza’s position is more radical, Hobbes’ less radical 
position is often stated in a way suggesting irony”. This irony is a defense against persecution 
and a way to allude to scandalous positions. And it allows Hobbes to retain his place among 
the secular theorists of early modernity, against his recent critics who would return him to 
the fold.379  
Curley relies throughout on the discovery of a ironic rhetorical device at work in 
Hobbes, which he calls “suggestion by disavowal”.  A clear example of this in Hobbes is in 
Chapter 33 of Leviathan, where Hobbes discusses the fact that the Scriptures were for a long 
time solely in the hands of ambitious and deceitful priests who could have altered them to 
their ends, he concludes “I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New 
Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things which were done and 
said by the prophets and apostles.” (L33.20/257). After having lead us by the nose to the 
obvious conclusion that “priests altered the Scriptures to their advantage” Hobbes retreats 
from the brink, leaving readers to decide for themselves. He never explicitly says what would 
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be controversial, in fact he denies it. Thus “this rhetorical strategy has the advantage that the 
author is not required to defend the conclusion she disavows”; the author has “plausible 
deniability”!380 This is clearly one of the reasons why Hobbes adopted the dialogue format, 
however inelegantly, in his later writings.  
Curley considers the following areas in comparison with Spinoza: (1) the general 
account of religion, (2) his discussion of prophecy, (3) miracles, and (4) Scriptural authority. 
In all four areas, Spinoza makes explicit what Hobbes leaves to the reader. Or analyses of 
these areas, informed by Curley’s readings among others, should illustrate the skepticism that 
Hobbes injects into those areas. 
Consider briefly the discussion of Scriptural authority. Since the end of the time of 
miracles, Hobbes argues, we are left with only the Scriptures as our guide to morals and to 
salvation. Hobbes undermines the authority of the Scriptures in four ways: (1) he disputes 
that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, (2) he disputes the authorship of the book of 
Job, (3) he questions the nature of the canonical Scripture, and (4) he challenges the reliability 
of the narrative of miracles. 
(1) By turning to textual analysis of the Bible and noting inconsistencies in the text, 
Hobbes concludes that Moses was not the (sole) author of the Pentateuch, which was 
“nearly universally held by his contemporaries.”381 Hobbes, “does, to some extent, pull his 
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punches.”382 Spinoza is “much bolder”, he argues that the Books “could only have been 
written by someone who lived many generations later.”383 
(2) Hobbes reads Job as “a philosophical treatise on the problem of the prosperity of 
the wicked and the suffering of the good” not as a historical document.384 Hobbes notes this 
is reflected in the literary style of the Book, which alternates between prose and verse.  
Again, “Spinoza is less cautious,” he agrees more forcefully with Hobbes’ points and goes so 
far as to say that “the style of the poetry is gentile in character.”385 
(3) We have already seen how Hobbes stops short of saying that the books of the 
canon were altered to the benefit of priests, although he alludes to it. Spinoza questions the 
logic of inclusion and exclusion of the books of Scripture  into the canon itself, and wonders 
of possible corruption of both message and text.   
(4) Hobbes claims we can only believe, and not know with certainty, that the events in 
the Bible transpired as written. We have everything on hearsay, and as Hobbes has been at 
great pains to show us elsewhere, there are plenty of ways to mistake a natural event for a 
miraculous one. But we must trust that the sovereign will approve the correct texts. Spinoza 
claims the text is “full of faults, mutilated, corrupted, and inconsistent, that we only have 
fragments of it”.386 
Much the same is true for Hobbes’ other arguments. Where Hobbes insinuates, 
Spinoza declares. The two seem to agree on most points, except transparency. While even 
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Spinoza is not perfectly frank, he is far bolder, and Hobbes certainly could have admired his 
audacity on these and other points. Leibniz, Curley notes, perceived a genetic relationship 
between these two texts, and it is clear that Spinoza knew his Hobbes.387  
Curley is sure to note, “The fact that Hobbes openly expressed ‘minority opinions 
sure to involve him in some controversy’ is sometimes made an argument for his sincerity, 
apparently on the theory that if Hobbes was prepared to accept the consequences of openly 
stating some unpopular views, he could not have intended to indirectly suggest others even 
more unpopular. But this seems to me a complete non sequiter.”388 As a strict point of logic, 
Curley is correct. And certainly it makes sense that Hobbes could be willing to be seen to 
challenge what for a lack of a better term we might call superstructural elements of 
Christianity, like the immortality of the soul, but would be hesitant to attack the base: the 
idea of Christ himself or the totality of the authority of the Scriptures. Leviathan’s text was 
emboldened by a lack of censorship and consensus among a fundamentally Christian 
population, not a lack of Christianity among a fundamentally skeptical population! 
Curley is willing to bite the bullet and claim that “I think Hobbes was probably an 
atheist, but that at a minimum he was deeply skeptical about Christianity, and about theism 
in general, and that seeing that is essential to understanding Leviathan.”389 Quentin Skinner 
will use almost the exact same language in his discussion of Hobbes’ style to follow.  
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Martinich  
The best place to start for contemporary discussions of a sincere, theist, Christian 
Hobbes are the writings of AP Martinich, especially his book, The Two Gods of Leviathan.390 
Martinich argues that Hobbes was a sincere, orthodox, but nonstandard Christian. “He may 
not have had a strong emotional commitment to religion. He may not have had a strong 
attachment to the rituals of any denomination…But he certainly had a strong intellectual 
commitment to religion.”391 
By “orthodox”, Martinich means that Hobbes clung to the minimal standard of 
orthodoxy outlined in laws passed in the time of Queen Elizabeth that required adherence to 
the canonical Scriptures and the first four church councils as the standard for orthodoxy.392 
But his views are nonstandard. “The standard views are the received, or mainstream, 
religious opinions of a particular time and place.”393 Hobbes was clearly not in the 
mainstream of his era’s belief system, a fact even he would probably not dispute; hence on 
Martinich’s interpretation Hobbes was nonstandard, but orthodox. Martinich thinks that the 
failure to appreciate the different scope of these two terms is the cause of so much 
confusion and frustration in Hobbes studies.   
Martinich summarizes what he takes Hobbes’ project to be as follows: 
Hobbes was trying to answer the challenge that the new science of Copernicus and Galileo 
posed for religion and to prevent the abuse of religion for political purposes. Hobbes’s goal 
with respect to these two issues was (1) to show that the distinctively religious content of the 
                                                
390 Martinich, AP. The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992.  Other prominent figures in the 20th Century include AE Taylor, FC 
Hood, and Howard Warrender. 
391 Ibid., pg. 1.  
392 See for instance, the Act of Supremacy, article 20 in Documents of the English Reformation, pg. 327.  
393 Op cit., pg. 2.  
 245 
Bible could be reconciled with the new science and (2) to prove that religion could not 
legitimately be used to destabilize a government.394  
Martinich offers a painstaking, historical analysis intended to show how Hobbes’ 
thought fits into the range of nonstandard Christianity. He concludes that “Hobbes was a 
Calvinist”.395 Furthermore, “Hobbes subscribed to a divine command theory of morality.”396 
Hobbes’ “orthodoxy and Calvinist theology make him a religious conservative”.397 
Martinich concludes that Hobbes’ project was a failure, that he could not hold the 
new science and Christianity together under tension, and that “on the whole his views fit 
into a long tradition that tended to undermine it, often contrary to the intentions of 
authors.”398 Hobbes was like those other thinkers, who “Despite their best efforts to save the 
intellectual respectability of Christian doctrine, they contributed to its downfall.”399 This, of 
course, does not change the fact for Martinich that he believed he could reconcile the two.  
Martinich has conceded a lot to those who argue that Hobbes was a nonbeliever. He 
is not sure is Hobbes was especially passionate or devout. He agrees that Hobbes kept 
himself within a much narrower, legalisitic definition of orthodoxy than many of his 
contemporaries. He accepts that Hobbes held unusual beliefs for the Christians of his time. 
He sees Hobbes’ aim as trying to square religion with science, and to eliminate the 
intellectual foundations of disobedience to the sovereign. He accepts that in the final analysis 
this reconciliation could not be done because the subject matter was too disparate, and that 
in fact Hobbes’ efforts backfired, and undermined Christianity. Martinich’s major 
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disagreement with the atheist interpretation of Hobbes stems from the fact that he believes 
that Hobbes acted in good faith, and did not employ irony with regard to his fundamental 
beliefs.  
Martinich devoted an Appendix in his book to address Curley’s article. The 
Appendix accuses Curley of, among other things, reading tendentiously in support of his 
ironic reading. Comparing Curley with the Grand Inquisitor of The Brothers Karamazov, 
Martinich argues that he “is illegitimately interpreting the speaker to mean the opposite of 
what he says, merely in order to get the words uttered to fit their interpretation.”400 
Martinich believes that the inaugural conceit of Curley’s article, the anecdote from 
Aubrey is “so cryptic and vague that we have no idea what specifically he [Hobbes] was 
talking about.” Curley’s project is “fruitless”.401 
Martinich reviews several of the claims Curley had made about Hobbes, and offers a 
pious reading of each of them. But his most powerful objection is that he believes Curley 
“operates with a defective idea of how to recognize irony.”402 Martinich pleads for a stronger 
consideration of the context of the passages on which Curley’s case for irony is built, where 
it will be seen, he says, that “The vast amount of what Hobbes wrote about religion is on the 
face of it favorable to religion or presupposes it. Given this general appearance of approval, 
a few allegedly dubious passages cannot be used to drive an interpretation.”403 
Martinich and Curley exchanged further intellectual blows in the Journal of the History 
of Philosophy in 1996, where Curley was given the chance to respond to Martinich’s Appendix 
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addressing his work. Curley aggressively and with gusto defends his view against the 
viewpoint espoused in the Two Gods of Leviathan in an article entitled “Calvin and Hobbes, or, 
Hobbes as an Orthodox Christian”.404  
Curley problematizes Martinich’s definition of orthodoxy by illustrating various areas 
where the creeds of the first four church councils are unhelpful or where Hobbes, in spite of 
adhering to the letter of the creeds, seems well out of step with his peers. He “concedes” 
that “if we adopt his plausible definition of ‘orthodoxy’, and we take Hobbes at his word, 
Hobbes must have been an orthodox Christian.”405 Yet this avoids the question of “whether 
we should take Hobbes at his word.”406 Curley certainly thinks the creeds are too weak a 
foundation to determine “orthodoxy”. I agree, the creeds are too narrow and the definition 
Hobbes clings to seems more like a legal loophole (it is gave him that much protection) than 
anything else. Hobbes seems to have gerrymandered a little to retain the appearance of 
orthodoxy.  
Curley notes “The kind of irony I claimed to find in Leviathan places the 
responsibility for drawing the right conclusion on the reader.”407 Given this onus, we can 
expect different readers to interpret the text in different ways. As Strauss said, even the 
experts will disagree. Martinich and Curley’s disagreement here is an example of divergent 
readers creating divergent interpretation. 
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Martinich professes to read ironically only if the literal interpretation makes no sense. 
But Curley argues that an ironic “strategy can only work if the literal interpretation makes 
some sense.”408  
He reiterates that Hobbes writings “seem to demonstrate a tendency to vacillate on 
important religious themes, and some would say this should make us suspicious.”409 Curley’s 
argument consists of introducing further examples of irony in Hobbes, focusing this time on 
the Nicene Creed and the Trinity. He “catches” Hobbes in a flat out falsehood in his 
discussion of the creed and assumes he could not possibly have been so careless. When 
Hobbes claims there is no Greek philosophy in the Creed, he cannot have ignored homoousia. 
Hobbes’ account of the Trinity, claims Curley, is so scandalous he could not have expected 
readers to take it seriously.  
Martinich’s reply elaborates on his appreciation of the role of irony in a text like 
Leviathan. He does concede that Curley is right that a literal meaning must have some 
plausibility if irony is to work. But he thinks that Curley is cherry picking his 
“contradictions” to prove his theory. After all, “Hobbes contradicted himself on 
nonreligious issues, about which it is clear he was not being ironic. To focus only on the 
apparent religious contradictions would be to commit the fallacy of special pleading.”410 
Furthermore, Hobbes was all too human at times: 
Hobbes wrote, “Who is so stupid as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, 
when another detects his error to him?” …Hobbes was. Even when several mathematicians 
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pointed out his errors to him, he could not come to see that he was wrong. So he did not 
merely assert a contradiction, he tenaciously asserted one.411 
Thus, “For all of his brilliance, Hobbes was sometimes confused and sometimes 
stubbornly obtuse.”412 Curley would grant this, but it does not undermine his larger point 
that there can be genuine inconsistencies and intentional ones. When inconsistencies recur, 
this is a problem. 
Martinich adds that there is a further interpretive problem,  
Hobbes expected some readers to recognize that he was being ironic (atheists, agnostics, 
and/or deists) and other readers not to recognize this (Christians). Oddly, the evidence 
strongly suggests that those who thought they recognized that Hobbes was being ironic were 
by and large Christians.413 
I think Martinich is mischaracterizing the situation here. Hobbes expected intelligent 
(and educated) readers to be able to see his purposes, but to be able to disavow that he 
actually upheld those purposes if the authorities became involved. He wanted “plausible 
denial” as has been said. Moreover, we do know that many Christians saw the implications 
of his views, but we are unable to determine how many unbelievers actually saw them, 
because irreligion was not something public. “This is the fundamental reason why there are 
so few atheists to be found: not because there were no atheists, but because the atheists 
themselves believed they were obliged to pretend to be Christians.”414 
Even if people took him to be ironic, Martinich argues, that no more proves that he 
was “than the converse fact that some people took Swift as serious when he was being 
                                                
411 Ibid., pg. 275–276. 
412 Ibid., pg. 276. 
413 Ibid., pg. 277. 
414 Wootton, “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe”. Pg. 88.  
 250 
ironic” in a Modest Proposal.415 Except that we can consider the intellectual talent of some of 
Hobbes’ readers, many of whom had similar educational backgrounds and many of whom 
were widely regarded as insightful people.  
Martinich defends his interpretation of Hobbes’ account of the trinity as sincere,  
claiming “Hobbes wanted to show the power of his novel theory of personhood by using it 
to explain the doctrine of the Trinity”.416 He dismisses Curley’s argument about the Nicene 
Creed on a grammatical technicality. 
For Curley, this response only digs Martinich deeper in the hole. He retrenches and 
reiterates his opinions on the Nicene Creed and the Trinity in his “Reply to Professor 
Martinich”, adding two comments. First that homoousia is not the only philosophical term in 
the Nicene Creed and two, that “it does seem a tad bit dangerous to say that [“so much for 
the Trinity”] at a time when an open denial of the doctrine of the Trinity might land him in 
jail on charges of Blasphemy.”417  
The two remain at loggerheads, and it illustrates the difficulty of a Straussian reading, 
difficulties of which Straussians are aware. If it were possible to prove that a text is ironic 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, irony loses its value and is effectively literal. It is entirely 
possible that Curley, and many others, are wrong about particular points being ironic. 
Nonetheless, it strikes me as implausible that they are wrong about all of them. Furthermore, 
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it seems likely, given the widespread existence of ironic writing styles at the time, that 
Hobbes would have known about them and employed them if he had dangerous ideas (we 
consider this below). It strikes me as plausible that the unforced, “natural” judgment of so 
many intelligent and careful readers concurring on skeptical themes in Hobbes is favorable 
to the interpretations of scholars with literal-reading methodologies.  
George Wright makes an interesting intervention in this debate in his article “Curley 
and Martinich in Dubious Battle”.418 He argues that “the Curley/Martinich dispute displays a 
concern over Hobbes’s inner beliefs disproportionate to the profit to be gained in settling 
the question, granting that were possible.”419 And, “as the Curley/Martinich exchange shows, 
any evidence as to Hobbes’s sincerity in the text can be read in (at least) two ways….” Thus, 
“we should not be surprised at the somewhat exasperated tone of the exchange; not easy to 
signal, sincerity is not easy to determine.”420 Elsewhere, about Hobbes’ sincerity he admits “I 
do not think we can know.”421 But Hobbes’ personal sincerity is besides the point for him. 
Wright argues that if we pay attention to the structure of Hobbes’ arguments, his 
personal opinions ultimately do not matter. “Even if he sought to signal them (which I 
doubt), Hobbes’s subjective states of mind are of little importance in comparison with the 
structure and elaboration of the arguments found in his writings.”422 Keep in mind, he says 
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“As complicated as the deceptive ambiguity strategy is when only the messages sent are 
simultaneous avowal and disavowal, it attains Byzantine complexity when the signs signal 
both those messages and advance the larger argument.”423 In other words, it is difficult to 
make a sustained argument, if you sabotage the premises at every turn.  
Obviously, Wright makes a point. Leviathan has a determinant argumentative 
structure, that takes Christian theology seriously enough to redescribe it point-by-point. We 
must be clear about what hidden messages we see in Hobbes and how these line up with the 
actual arguments in the book. But the Straussians insist that the signals occur at the margins, 
or in passing. They need not disrupt a larger argumentative structure. Hobbes’ tendentious 
reading of Christian texts and theology to conform to his materialism and political theory 
seems apparent if we examine what he includes and excludes, what he distorts in the 
traditional view, and how convenient some of his new interpretations are for these wider 
goals. Hobbes’ challenges Christianity on two levels: first by making it work on its own terns 
with his physics and politics, and second, by challenging its ultimate validity in sarcastic 
asides and petty inconsistencies.  
The deepest hidden message I see in Leviathan is that politics depends on and must 
direct religion. This Hobbes gets from Machiavelli, as we will see below. But first, a detour 
through eloquence.  
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Rhetoric  
Our argument for an ironic reading of Leviathan gains further credibility when we 
consider the scholarship on Hobbes’ rhetoric. Work by David Johnston and Quentin 
Skinner looms large in this area.  
Johnston, in The Rhetoric of Leviathan, argues that “Leviathan was designed less as a 
scientific treatise than as a work of rhetoric…In writing this work Hobbes was, above all 
else, performing a political act, not a scientific one.”424  
 Johnston argues that Hobbes possessed “a keen interest in and sensitivity for the 
transmission of ideas…in ‘instruction’ (broadly conceived) as opposed to inquiry.”425 
Hobbes understood that propositional arguments are inherently “weak media for the 
transmission of ideas.”426 Rhetorical skill is necessary for logically sound, scientifically-
justified arguments to be truly convincing. Both are essential for a political theory. 
For Johnston Leviathan is the high water mark of Hobbes’ rhetorical, educational 
flourish, the method by which he hoped to attain the “cultural transformation” that supplies 
the subtitle to his book. Leviathan “is an intensely polemical work with literary qualities 
comparable to those of the most esteemed works in the whole of English literature.”427 
There Hobbes, “attempts to synthesize the new science’s methods of reason as applied to 
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politics with the older lessons of the rhetorical tradition.”428 In the Elements and De Cive, 
Hobbes had not yet committed fully to the rhetorical, political mode of exposition. 
Hobbes came to see that political philosophy’s “ultimate aim must be to shape public 
opinion at large, if only by educating the educators.”429 Leviathan reflects Hobbes’ growing 
concern with public opinion. Much more space is devoted to the discussion of sedition and 
the sovereign’s responsibility to contain it, starting at the Universities. The concept of 
authorization for the sovereign was a major innovation in Hobbes’ theory, one with a 
distinctive legitimizing role. 
From the get-go Leviathan was intended for the reading public at large, not some 
small fragment of it. “It was perhaps the first work in the history of political philosophy to 
be designed entirely with this aim in mind.”430  
These concerns animate Hobbes’ account of religion, says Johnston. Hobbes was 
concerned with the power of Christianity to mold public opinion against the sovereign. 
Consider his interpretation of Scripture. “The fact is that Hobbes considered the Bible, or at 
least certain interpretations of it, to be the chief agent and carrier of superstitious beliefs in 
his time.”431 Hobbes sought to fit Christianity into his political program. “The radicalism of 
his reinterpretation of the Scriptures was simply one element in a larger design: to transform 
his readers into more rational and predictable beings, and by doing so to make them better 
suited for membership in a new kind of political society.”432   
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Johnston points out similar goals and argumentation with regard to Hobbes’ new 
account of the soul and “magic” (which includes prophecy and miracles). Hobbes often 
proceeds indirectly, arguing in such a way as to sow doubt in the reader about, say, the 
existence of miracles, without directly proving they cannot exist. Johnston argues that by 
working in this indirect way, with canonical ideas being accepted by subject to skepticism, 
Hobbes could retain his audience’s attention and have them do the work for him. “As a 
rhetorical strategy, it was far more effective to accept that authority ostensibly and by raising 
doubts in the minds of his readers, to turn it toward his own purpose.”433 But there is no 
doubt that Hobbes’ aim “was to subvert many of the most central tents of Christian 
theology, Protestant as well as Catholic, and to replace them with Hobbes’s own rationalized 
version of Christian doctrine.”434 
Hobbes’ skillfully outflanked his opponents in a time where a frontal assault would 
have been “literally suicidal for him to do so.”435  
Johnston argues that Hobbes goes beyond founding a mere civil religion based on 
modified Christian principles, that he seeks to radically refashion religion so that it would 
transform human nature itself into something more rational and peaceful.  
Quentin Skinner’s larger thesis in his magnificent Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of 
Hobbes is to demonstrate that Hobbes made a complete reversal in his estimation of the 
value of rhetoric to political theory. In the Elements and De Cive, Hobbes holds rhetoric in 
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disdain and elevates reason above all. By the time he writes Leviathan, he comes to believe 
that “reason is of small power in the absence of eloquence.”436  
But for our purposes, it suffices to indicate the profound and systematic use of 
classical rhetorical devices used in that work. Skinner demonstrates, quite ably and 
exhaustively, that Hobbes employs all of the tropes and techniques of neo-Ciceronian 
rhetoric to a high level of proficiency and effect. Every stylistic device is employed in 
Leviathan and Skinner catalogues every one.437  
Skinner argues that “The Leviathan constitutes a belated but magnificent contribution 
to the Renaissance art of eloquence”.438 Speaking of the work later on he adds, that “the 
English version of 1651 must rank among other things as a masterpiece of satire and invective, 
embodying as it does a systematic application of the techniques evolved by the theorists of 
rhetoric for speaking with ridicule and contempt.”439 
Hobbes’ later political philosophy, for Skinner, depends on the union of scientific 
principles with rhetorical power. Hobbes, after “having initially abandoned rhetoric in favor 
of science, he eventually sought to found his civil science on combining them.”440 
This has direct bearing on the understanding of his religious beliefs. Skinner notes 
that “lack of attention to Hobbes’s rhetorical strategies has arguably given rise to a number 
of over-simplified interpretations of his religious beliefs, especially his beliefs about the 
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veracity of the Bible and the mysteries of the Christian faith.”441 But because “Hobbes makes 
systematic use of various devices specifically recommended by the theorists of eloquence for 
contriving a tone of irony and ridicule.”442 And it “is in dealing with his religious antagonists 
that Hobbes makes the fullest play with the inversions typical of ironic speech.”443  
Hence,  
to think of Hobbes’s prose as a clear window through which we can gaze uninterruptedly at 
his thought is a serious mistake. Hobbes’s thought in Leviathan is mediated by a prose in 
which the techniques of ornatus are used to produce a large number of deliberately 
ambiguous effects. To fail to recognize this fact is to fail to recognize what kind of a work 
we have in our hands.444 
This confirms what we already knew, that Hobbes was a master stylist. And that style 
can conceal a thinker’s ideas. Johnston and especially Skinner merely “show their work”. 
While the two have their disagreements, I think they make their point.445  
Bramhall and Clarendon 
It is an anachronism to called men who were contemporaries of Hobbes 
“Straussians”, but they were used to reading as such, if only in the pursuit of the impious. As 
David Wootton argues “All contemporaries agreed, for example, that Leviathan was an attack 
on Christianity. We know that unbelievers read such books with an eye to what they took to 
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be their hidden, true significance.”446 Hobbes’ readers often display an uncanny ability to 
isolate ideas and themes in Hobbes that have the kind of implications Straussians drool over. 
We now turn to two of them for help.  
I have chosen to focus here on John Bramhall’s The Catching of the Leviathan,  or The 
Great Whale (1658) and Clarendon’s Brief Survey and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors 
to Church and State, in Mr. Hobbes’s Book, Entitled Leviathan (1676) for several reasons.447 Both 
men knew Hobbes personally, Bramhall (as we have seen) from the debates on liberty and 
necessity, Clarendon from their earlier association at Great Tew, whilst in exile, and later as 
adversaries.448 Both men were the highly educated elite that could follow Hobbes line-by-
line, whether through Scripture or History, Theology or Natural Philosophy, in English or in 
Latin. Both men read widely in Hobbes’ work, and are attentive to detail and continuity of 
the texts. Retrieving their insights on Hobbes from history will be a benefit to the modern 
reader. Finally, both men, it must be confessed, are entertaining writers.  
The Catching of the Leviathan consists of three chapters. The first argues that Hobbes’ 
principles are destructive of religion, the second argues that Hobbes’ principles undermine 
government, and the third accuses Hobbes of contradicting himself. Bramhall styles these 
chapters as “harping irons” (harpoons) directed at the heart, his “chine” (backbone)449, and 
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his head, respectively. As one can see, even from his titular metaphor, Bramhall “possessed a 
style which was both hard-hitting and picturesque.”450 
Bramhall claims that Hobbes’ “principles are brim full of prodigious impiety”451 and 
as a chief example he offers the following passage in De Cive, where Hobbes writes: 
“Without special assistance from God, it proved almost impossible to avoid the twin rocks 
of Atheism and superstition; for the latter proceeds from fear without right reason, the 
former from an opinion of reason without fear.” (DC.16.1/187). Bramhall seized upon this 
as evidence of Hobbes’ tolerance for, if not inward expression of, atheism.452 (Incidentally, 
Strauss notes the same passage approvingly in his book on Hobbes.453)  
Bramhall fires away at Hobbes, that, “his God is not the God of Christians, nor of 
any rational man.”454 Bramhall argues that Hobbes denies the ubiquity of God, his 
immutability, his simplicity, even his existence. Hobbes denies his eternity as well.455 The 
ground of this assertion is “That there is no incorporeal spirit, is the main root of Atheisme, 
from which so many branches are sprouting up.”456 In other words, Hobbes’ materialism 
entails that God himself is material (this is before Hobbes admits it in the Appendix to the 
Latin Leviathan in 1668), which renders all of those orthodox attributes of God false. A 
material God cannot be everywhere at once, he would be subject to transformation, he 
                                                
450 Bowle, John. Hobbes and His Critics: A Study in Seventeeth Century Constitutionalism, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1952. pg. 28. 
451 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 117.  
452 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 117–118.  
453 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pg. 77. 
454 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 119. 
455 This occurs in Chapter 3, where Bramhall draws the conclusion that if God exists in time, as Hobbes 
asserts, he cannot be infinite, “Infinite is that to which nothing can be added, but to that which subsisteth by 
successive duration, something is added every minute.” (Bramhall, Catching, pg. 169). 
456 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 121. 
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would be divisible, and for Bramhall this is tantamount to denying that he is perfect and 
omnipotent, hence that God as God exists. Samuel Mintz has explored the contemporary 
understanding of the implications of materials for God is his study, whose title is styled after 
Bramhall’s, The Hunting of Leviathan. For Hobbes’ peers, materialism always entailed 
atheism.457 
The Bishop is unrelenting, “They who deny all incorporeal substances, can 
understand nothing by God, but either nature…(as TH seems to intimate) or a fiction of the 
brain without real being, cherished for advantage and politick ends, as a profitable error”.458 
There is nothing stopping Hobbes (or Spinoza, for that matter) from asserting versions of 
both, as I think he is doing.  
With regard to the Trinity, Bramhall observes with characteristic style,  
The emblime of a boy attempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a Coccleshel, doth 
fit TH as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who thinketh to measure the profound 
and inscrutable mysteries of religion by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become 
of the great adorable mysterie of the blessed undivided Trinity? it is shrunk into nothing. 
Hobbes’ theory of personation for Bramhall takes away both the glory and the 
mystery of the Trinity (a criticism Clarendon will also concur in, and which Curley makes 
much of).  
“Neither is he more orthodox concerning the Holy Scriptures”.459 Bramhall draws 
the implications that if the Scripture  depends on sovereign authority for its canonization 
and authority, then first, the early Christians were criminals under Hobbes’ theory, and 
furthermore, “if Christian Sovereigns, of different communions, do clash with one another, 
                                                
457 See Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, Ch. 4, 5. 
458 Bramhall, Catching, Op cit.  
459 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 126.  
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in their interpretations, or misinterpretation of Scripture (as they do daily) then the word of 
God is contradictory to itself”, which is the same as saying it has no authority at all.460  
Bramhall enumerates six “principles” of Hobbesian religion, and invites the reader to 
draw a conclusion, ex ungue leonem:461 
1. No one need risk his life for faith.462 (See L42.11/338–9 and L43.23/410) 
2. Subjects may deny Christ, if commanded by their sovereign. (Ibid.) 
3. A Christian may commit idolatry to avoid harm or death. (“It seemeth TH thinketh there 
is no divine worship, but internal. And that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or 
his limbs more than his God.”463 [ L45.22/445–6])  
4. It is not true that “it is better to obey God rather than man”464 in the state of nature. 
(L31.39/242) 
5. “[T]he sharpest and most successful sword, in any war whatsoever, doth give soveraign 
power and authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject all sorts of Theologicall 
                                                
460 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 127.  
461 “From the claw, we may judge the lion”. In other words, Bramhall “leaves it to the freed judgement of 
the understanding Reader” to judge Hobbes an atheist on the basis of the principles and fragments of 
irreligion Bramhall presents.  
462 When Bramhall provides a passage from Hobbes, which is uncited, that affirms that Christians should at 
times be martyrs, Bramhall observes “But I fear all this was said in jest.” (Catching, 135). The passage 
seems to be a conglomeration of Elements 25.14 and Leviathan 43.23. 
463 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 133. 
464 This is a reference to Acts 5:29, as Curley indicates. Clarendon saw fit to comment briefly on this 
passage as well in his Survey (pg. 188), if only to express disapproval with how weakly Hobbes addressed 
it. The repetition of areas of critique may be due to Clarendon’s reading of Bramhall, but it probably 
reflects the inherent controversial nature of these passages to readers in Bramhall and Clarendon’s 
historical and cultural position. 
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doctrines, concerning the Kingdome of God, not according to their truth and falsehood, 
but according to the influence they have upon political affairs.”465 (L38.5/305) 
6. Civil laws are the only measure of Good and Evil. (This is as if “one should go about to 
controle the Sun by the authority of the clock.” 466 Further, “Nothing could be written 
more false in this his sense, more dishonourable to God, more inglorious to the humane 
nature.”467 [L6.7/28–29, L17.2/106, L18.10/114]) 
All of these principles are indeed (more or less) found in Hobbes. Bramhall discusses 
them polemically, but he is being fair to Hobbes in citation. All of these “principles” are 
offensive to Bramhall’s religious sensibilities. They imply relativism, dishonesty, and impiety.  
Bramhall summarizes his opinion of Hobbes’ religion “His whole works are a heap 
of misshapen errours, and absurd paradoxes, vented with the confidence of a Jugler, the 
brags of a Mountebanck, and the authority of some Pythagoras, or third Cato, lately dropped 
down from heaven.”468 The insinuation is of fraud and of distracting spectacle to cover it up. 
Later he claims, “The true ground of this and many other of his mistakes, is this, 
That he fancieth no reality of natural justice nor honesty, nor any relation to the Law of God 
or nature, but only to the Laws of the Commonwealth.”469 Bramhall clearly view Hobbes as a 
positivist and a secularist, although he could not have used such language.  
                                                
465 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 133.  
466 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 136. 
467 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 135.  
468 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 138. A “third Cato” is a reference to Juvenal’s Satires, where apparently the 
historical Cato the Censor is ridiculed for his stubbornness. 
469 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 154. 
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I omit discussion of the second chapter in detail, but move briskly through the third. 
Bramhall has read between the lines previously, albeit inconsistently, in the third chapter he 
seems to be strictly accusing Hobbes of intellectual weakness. Ironically, he provides plenty 
of fodder for a Straussian reader.  
One of Bramhall’s telling “contradictions” he finds in Hobbes is his account of the 
early Church, or more precisely, since “there was no Christian Soveraign in those parts of 
the World then…and by consequence, according to his definition, no Church.”470  
Bramhall notes the inconsistencies we have mentioned before between De Cive’s 
account of the clergy and Leviathan’s version, and how the power of princes increases, why 
the role of ordination becomes insignificant. 
In summary, Hobbes has it all backwards, “making policy to be the building, and 
religion the hangings, which must be fashioned just according to the proportion of the 
policy; and (not as Mr. Cartwright would have it) making religion to the building, and policy 
the hangings, which must be conformed to religion.”471 This final chord strikes another note 
about Hobbes’ secular, cynical intentions about religion, at least as Bramhall saw them. 
Bramhall sees a hidden message of atheism (or at least irreligion and skepticism) and 
“politick religion” animate in Hobbes’ political works. He definitely has a sense of Hobbes 
as a showman and a man sympathetic to atheists and atheism. Bramhall seems to appreciate 
two levels of irreligion in Hobbes, the first being the unorthodox implications for 
Christianity of Hobbes’ doctrines, the second being a sense that through it all, Hobbes is 
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471 Bramhall, Catching, pg. 179. The reference is to Thomas Cartwright (1535–1603) a Puritan churchman.  
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deceitful about his views on religion as a whole, that he is not merely unorthodox, but an 
unbeliever using religion for politics.  
Hobbes’ wrote a response to Bramhall, after the latter had died of a stroke. In An 
Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall, Late Bishop of Derry, Called the “Catching of the 
Leviathan”,472 Hobbes argues that since “the words atheism, impiety, and the like, are words of 
the greatest defamation possible” he must write a defense of his ideas against Bramhall’s 
accusations.473 Hobbes argues that Bramhall picks phrases and conclusions out of context in 
order to conclude Hobbes is an atheist. He defends himself at length, point-by-point, 
making clear statements to the effect that he is an orthodox believer. Stylistically, his 
metaphors rival and sometimes outshine Bramhall’s own.   
The work is remarkable for two reasons. The first is that Hobbes is very candid 
about his views. He admits, for instance, that God is “corporeal and infinite” on his view.474  He 
admits the reasons for his candor in Leviathan: “For when I wrote it, I may safely say there 
was no lawful Church in England, that could have maintained me in, or prohibited me from 
writing anything.”475 
The second reason is more germane to our undertaking here. Hobbes insists that the 
reader examine “the places of my Leviathan which he cites, and see not only how he 
[Bramhall] answers my arguments, but also what the arguments are which he produces 
against them; or else that he [the reader] would forbear to condemn, so much as in his 
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thought: for otherwise he is unjust.”476 (He says the after expecting most reader to only read 
the beginning and the end of a book). He asks, “Who that knows me, will say that I have the 
confidence of a juggler, or that I use to brag of anything, much less that I play the 
mountebank?”477 Hobbes notes that many otherwise pious people are guilty of “atheism by 
consequence”. It “is a very easy thing to be fallen into, even by the most godly men of the 
church.”478  
So Hobbes, in effect, tells us what is natural to expect. “Read my arguments. I am 
not known for being a charlatan. If we read the consequences of people’s arguments, even 
the pious get themselves into trouble.” Precisely what Martinich would want us to see, and 
precisely what Curley would tell us Hobbes would say to cover himself.  
The book ends with a segue into Hobbes’ “An historical narration concerning heresy 
and the punishment thereof.” 
Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon was a lawyer by training, who rose to a 
prominent place in English politics. He is also noted as a historian and autobiographer. 
Clarendon “systematically and relentlessly” engages with the Leviathan chapter-by-chapter, 
and while lacking Bramhall’s gift for fiery metaphor,479 is a clear and careful although 
sometimes “tedious” writer.480  
Clarendon says “Mr Hobbes is one of the most antient acquaintance I have in the 
World, and of whom I alwaies had a great esteem” (Survey, 3). This does not spare him 
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300+ pages of scrutiny and criticism. Clarendon is an opponent, although he does not dislike 
everything Hobbes writes. Clarendon’s main line of criticism, which need not concern us 
here in any depth, is that the entire work is “a sly address to Cromwell, that…he might by his 
return submit to his Government” (Survey, 317).481 Clarendon further critiques Hobbes’ 
theory of sovereignty as both betrayal to the Royalist cause and an absolutism to rival “The 
Great Turk”. 
I will reluctantly restrict my analysis to selected portions of Clarendon’s analysis, 
focused on religion. I cannot hope to cover all of the specific issues Clarendon identifies, so 
I hope to indicate a few of the more intriguing ones here.  
In his survey of Chapter 32–4, Clarendon warns us that the “advice of all Divines is 
positively protected against” and that the reader should expect to be shocked (Survey, 195). 
Hobbes’ criteria for a prophet ensures, “Moses was no true Prophet” (Survey, 196). This is 
because “Mr. Hobbes is much concern’d to weaken the credit of Prophets, and of all who 
succeed in the places” (Survey, 197). Clarendon expresses dismay how Hobbes denies the 
authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses, “which the Christian world generally believed to be 
written by him” (Ibid.). Hobbes, “found it necessary to lessen the reverence that was 
accustom’d to be paid to the Scriptures themselves and the Autority thereof…in order to 
allow them no other Autority, but what they receive from the Declaration of the King; so 
that in every Kingdom, there may be several, and contrary Books of Scripture” (Survey, 197–
8). Bramhall had similar feelings.  
                                                
481 This is of course untrue. Cromwell was not Lord Protector when Leviathan was published in 1651. See 
Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, pg. 13. Clarendon’s frustration on this front does seem genuine.  
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Hobbes lacks the gravity to address the Scriptures, and reads them in a “light and 
comical” manner (Survey, 199). He finds in their meaning “a different sense from what those 
Fathers, all other men but himself, have understood them to signify.” (Ibid.). He has 
“traduced the whole Scheme of Christianity in Burlesque” and has subjected the mysteries of 
religion “to a Philosophical and Mathematical inquisition” (Survey, 200).  
Hobbes attempts “to pervert the current sense, and interpretation of some Texts in 
Scripture to his own purpose, and to wrest and torture words to comply with is extravagant 
Wit and Logic.” (Survey, 287). Time and again Clarendon highlights the (1) striking and 
outlandish novelty of Hobbes’ interpretation, (2) how he twists the meaning of Scripture,  (3) 
how he is not a trained theologian, and (4) how he is presumptuous and disrespectful to the 
texts.482 
In sum, Hobbes attitude toward reading the Scriptures, is 
Without any other autority then of his own ungovern’d fancy, which can only amuse men 
with the novelty into impertinent enquiries, or dispose them to believe, that he hath not that reverence 
to the Scripture, or adoration of the Author of it, that would become him to have.” (Survey, 202, 
emphasis mine).  
While Clarendon does not come out and just say it, he certainly seems inclined to 
think Hobbes is not a believer. His tone, his “impertinent inquiries”, his “torturing so many 
Texts of Scripture” (Survey, 205) undermine the respect due to the Scripture and to the 
Prophets. It is natural to assume Hobbes did not have a deep faith in either of those sources 
of authority. (The same is true of his account of miracles, “it may be some men may imagine, 
that he hath a mind to lessen the faith of the greatest Miracles which have been wrought” 
[Survey, 214], again insinuating a darker purpose to Hobbes’ arguments).  
                                                
482 See also Survey, 316. 
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Clarendon sees a similar attack on Christian values in Hobbes’s discussion of heaven 
and hell, “two Pillars for the support of Religion” (Survey, 219). He notes “it may appear 
very wonderful and no less scandalous to dis-passioned men, that after sixteen hundred 
Years, Mr. Hobbes should arise a new Evangelist, to make the joies of Heaven more 
indifferent, and the pains of Hell less formidable, then every any Christian hath before 
attempted to do” (Survey, 219).  
It is not the reign of Christ on Earth which upset Clarendon, as some “Learned 
Men” have thought that way. But, “he seems much pleased with the mortality of the whole 
human Nature…From whence he seems to conclude (if his very words do not make it plain) 
that the soul as well as the body is buried in the grave, at least until the resurrection.” (Survey, 221).    
Clarendon is appalled at Hobbes’ mortalism and his redescription of heaven and hell. 
“This monstrous liberty and license in forming a new faith for himself…may make men 
wonder why he is so severe against Atheists, whom he will not allow to be subjects in the 
Kingdom of God” (Survey, 221–2). Hobbes deflates the horror of damnation by making the 
suffering earthly and finite. For the reprobate, “he hath done them the favor to inform them 
of the worst that they can signifie, and above all, for their comfort hath brought the place 
and situation of it to be upon the Earth, which is so well known to them, that they need 
have no other apprehensions of it then they find reason for.” (Survey, 226). This can only 
encourage licentious and wicked behavior.  
By raising Hell, he also lowering heaven. Hobbes, “is as solicitous to undeceive men 
on the high estimate they have made of the joies of Heaven” (Survey, 227). In heaven, “we 
shall never want, nor be sick, nor die again, which is a very, which is a very vile expression of 
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the joies of life eternal.” (Survey, 229). So Hobbes has softened the punishment and diluted 
the reward for Christian virtue. In other words, he has upset the whole economy of Christian 
behavior. It is no great leap of the mind to imagine that he seeks to eliminate the concepts of 
heaven and hell altogether, and with them traditional models of moral behavior. This goes 
hand in hand with the insinuation of atheism above.  
When Clarendon considers Hobbes’ discussion of Jesus in Chapter 41, he is driven 
to ask him to “forgive those, who too reasonably suspect, that his design is…to perplex and 
disturb, and seduce men, then to enlighten and inform them; and that he assigns the errors 
in every Chapter to do as much mischief as they can, and retracts none of them, least the 
confessing himself to be once deceiv’d, may lessen his power to deceive any more.” (Survey, 
244–5, emphasis mine). This is a familiar charge. But this is coming from the same 
Clarendon who supported a Bill to have Hobbes investigated for heresy, which occasioned 
him to burn some of his papers, as Aubrey tells us.  
Hobbes is guilty of “bare-fac’d denying the Trinity…which he makes no Mystery at 
all, and to contain as man Persons as any Body will assign to it” (Survey, 246). Clarendon 
makes similar work of the passages about Naaman and idolatry that Bramhall fixated 
upon.483 
At the very end of Chapter 43, which also closes Part III of Leviathan, Hobbes tells 
us how he has read the Scriptures, in a passage that can clearly be examined between the 
lines: 
And in the allegation of Scripture  I have endeavored to avoid such texts as are of obscure of 
controverted interpretation, and to allege none but in such sense as is most plain and 
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agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible, which was written for the re-
establishment of the kingdom of God in Christ. For it is not by the bare words, but the 
scope of the writer by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single 
texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly, but rather 
by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men’s eyes, make everything more obscure than 
it is—an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage. 
(L43.24/410)484 
Clarendon observes “I wish with all my heart that Mr. Hobbes did remember, or 
believe his own good rule in the end of this Chapter [43, above], which would have preserved 
him from many presumptions, which administer great trouble and grief to his Readers for 
his sake.” (Survey, 279, emphasis mine). Clarendon asserts that Hobbes did not follow the 
rule as literally stated, that he does cast “Atoms of Scripture” about in “this maze and 
labyrinth of confusion” (Survey, 282), and that he likely did not believe the rule to be valid in 
the first place. Hobbes would then be guilty of seeking his own advantage, and avoiding the 
truth (or most likely, a sound or charitable interpretation of the text).  
Clarendon concludes, with obvious restraint, “I have never read any Book that 
contains in it so much Sedition, Treason, and Impiety as this Leviathan; and therefore it is 
very unfit to be read, taught, or sold, as dissolving all the ligaments of Government, and 
undermining all Principles of Religion.” (Survey, 319).  
Perez Zagorin claims, “Despite the subversive religious ideas he attributed to 
Hobbes, Clarendon at least never accused the philosopher, as did of his contemporary 
critics, of atheism.”485 I would amend this statement to say he never directly accused him, I 
think the text insinuates it fairly enough. 
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What is noteworthy, though, is that Clarendon does not accuse Hobbes’ of having an 
immoral character, aspersions to his arrogance aside. If Hobbes has atheist tendencies, he 
does not display them in the practice of vice. Aubrey highlights this aspect of Hobbes’ 
biography as proof of his piety.  
In the final analysis, Clarendon sees through to Hobbes’ intentions. He clearly grasps 
the implications for morality, Church, and faith of Hobbes’ doctrines in Leviathan. He does 
so by reading between the lines, and teasing out what is too scandalous in Hobbes to be 
stated literally.  Hobbes writes to convert faith to a tool of the sovereign, and to cast doubt 
upon it for those careful enough to read it. Is it really a surprise that a student of Machiavelli, 
like Clarendon clearly was, can have these insights?486  
The Machiavellian Connection  
I believe Hobbes read Machiavelli and was influenced in at least one place by his 
ideas, namely the importance of religion for statecraft.  
Machiavelli writes in the Discourses, that religion is necessary for any society’s strength 
against outside aggressors, “for where there is religion, arms can easily be introduced”.487 He 
notes that it has benefits for internal security as well, for “a prudent individual knows many 
goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others. 
                                                
486 See Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli, pp. 146–154 for Clarendon’s connection to Machiavelli. 
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487 Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996. The citation is from Book I, Chapter 11, Paragraph 1, page 35, hereafter 
cited as (Dis. I.11.1/35) 
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Thus wise men who wish to take away this difficulty have recourse to God.” (Dis. I.11.3/35) 
Machiavelli cites the example of Numa Pompilius as exemplary for this practice.  
Later he observes,  
princes of a republic or a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion they hold; 
and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain their republic religious and, 
in consequence, good and united. All things that arise in favor of that religion they should 
favor and magnify, even though they judge them false; and they should do it so much the more as 
they are more prudent and more knowing of natural things. Because this mode has been 
observed by wise men, the belief has arisen in miracles, which are celebrated even in false religions; for the 
prudent enlarge upon them from whatever beginning they arise and their authority then gives them credit with 
anyone whatever. (Dis. I.12.1/37. Emphasis mine) 
Religion secures social unity and order, whether or not those religious beliefs are true 
or not. A prudent ruler exploits this to his advantage.   
As is his style, Machiavelli cites historical examples where religiously-based deception 
proved very useful to rulers. “Whoever considers well the Roman histories sees how much 
religion served to command armies, to animate the plebs, to keep men good, to bring shame 
to the wicked.” (Dis. I.11.2/34). Religion is thus indispensible for modern rule.  
The Prince echoes these sentiments, arguing that a good ruler must “appear all mercy, 
all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion. And nothing is more necessary to appear to 
have than the last quality,” but that he “cannot observe all those things for which men are held 
good” and must “know how to enter into evil when forced by necessity.”488 Reasons of 
state489 precede and trump religious considerations. The field of politics is distinct from 
religious control according to Machiavelli—Christian morality does not and cannot apply. 
                                                
488 Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Book 
18, pg. 70, emphasis mine. Hereafter, (Pr. Chapter/Page) 
489 The term was coined by Machiavelli’s contemporary and critic, Guicciardini. 
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So, for Machiavelli, religion is important for a ruler, and it functions as a 
smokescreen for his secular, often wicked, motives.  “Religion is to be maintained and the 
founders of religions honored, because religion is the prime means by which the stability of a 
state is preserved, its power increased, and the designs of its leaders fulfilled. In other words, 
religion was important simply as the most potent weapon in the statesman’s armory.”490  
Machiavelli had a low opinion of Christianity, and thought it had weakened his 
contemporaries, made them vulnerable and compliant: 
Our religion has gloried humble and contemplative more than active men. It has then placed 
the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other [Roman 
paganism] placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable of 
making men very strong. And if our religion asks that you have strength in yourself,  it 
wishes you to be capable more of suffering than of doing something strong. This mode of 
life seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can 
manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of 
enduring their beatings than of avenging them. (Dis. II.2.2/131) 
He also seemed to have little regard for any external powers. He notes that “many 
have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by God, 
that men cannot correct them with their prudence, indeed that they have no remedy at all” 
(Pr. 25/98). Yet Machiavelli believes “it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because 
fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike 
her down.” (Pr. 25/101) 
Machiavelli also can be seen to have a grim view of human nature, arguing “truly it as 
very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can 
they will be praised or not blamed; but when they cannot, and wish to do it anyway, here lie 
the error and the blame.” (Pr. 3/14–15). He asserts that “men are wicked” (Pr. 17/66–67). 
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He claims that it is fair to break faith with one’s enemies, writing, “if all men were good, this 
teaching would not be good; but because they are wicked and do not observe faith with you, 
you also do not have to observe it with them.” (Pr. 18/69). Men cannot, in fact, display any 
of the virtues, “since human conditions do not permit it.” (Pr. 15/62). Moreover, “if one 
considers everything well, one will find something appears to be virtue, which if pursued 
would be one’s ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if pursued results in one’s 
security and well-being.” (Pr., ibid.). 
It is easy to see how Machiavelli was taken for an atheist. His contempt for Christian 
virtues and his refusal to submit to Providence, were clears signs of his personal irreligion. 
The Englishmen of Hobbes’ era were well aware of the figure of Niccolò 
Machiavelli; the educated classes were familiar with his writings. Machiavelli was associated 
with a state “policy” divorced from religion considerations of any sort, or what was worse, 
he was associated with “’politick religion’, the principle of religion as a political device.”491 To 
be called a “Machiavellian” meant to be an atheist or a immoral, cynical politician, although 
sometimes it was just an ordinary term of abuse.  
Machiavelli was so widely reviled he was even a popular villain in the theater of the 
Elizabethan age and later.492 That role was later replaced by the follower of Hobbes’ 
principles, the “Hobbist”. “The Hobbist was a stage villain, his ideas a blend of ill-digested 
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Machiavellian and Hobbesian principles.”493 This substitution speaks to the real connection, 
however ill-understood, between the two thinkers in the minds of Hobbes’ contemporaries.  
There is little reason to doubt that Hobbes was acquainted with Machiavelli either. 
Hobbes had been to Italy in the 1630’s and had acquainted himself with Italian thought of 
the time.494 He had the requisite language skills. Hobbes knew French, Latin, and Italian, so 
he could have read Machiavelli in any of those languages. More directly, a popular English 
translation of Machiavelli’s Discourses and The Prince appeared by Edward Dacres, in 1636 and 
1640 respectively.495 Just because Hobbes never cites Machiavelli does not mean he did not 
know him well. Hobbes barely cited anyone. But there are echoes of Machiavelli in places.496  
We should be clear, however. Hobbes was not a mere disciple of Machiavelli. 
Hobbes had plenty of grounds to disagree with notorious Florentine. Machiavelli was most 
likely a republican, Hobbes an absolute monarchist. Machiavelli was a great admirer of the 
Ancients and their city states, Hobbes saw them as outdated and rebellious. Machiavelli 
turned to history and experience for his insights, Hobbes claimed to work from first 
principles and to hold “mere prudence” in disdain.497 Hobbes does not seem to have 
valorized ancient virtue much either, his is a philosophy of shirking self-preservation. Nor is 
he confident that fortune can be thwarted—in fact his determinism eliminates arbitrary 
                                                
493 Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, pg. 139.  
494 Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, pg. 5, see also 4–8. 
495 See Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli, pg. 96, 182.   
496 See Ibid., pg. 194.  
497 See Raab’s summary, The English Face of Machiavelli, pp. 188–200. Hobbes’ relationship to historical 
knowledge is complicated, however. Hobbes translated Thucydides and greatly admired his work. Hobbes 
in his adulthood wrote histories, not just of the revolution (Behemoth, or the Long Parliament) but also of 
the law of heresy, and a verse version of Church History. It seems to be the case for Hobbes’ thought that 
“philosophy is more powerful than history as a mode of inquiry, that philosophy has more explanatory 
power than history.” (D. Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, pg. 21).  
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chance, at least from an objective perspective. Hobbes writes for a wide, literate audience, 
which includes the bourgeoisie; Machiavelli for an elite.  
The men differ in character and experience. Machiavelli was a high-level political 
advisor, and skilled enough in military matters to write an influential treatise on the 
subject.498 Hobbes’ critics routinely attacked his “real world” credentials and excessive 
abstraction. Clarendon writes that “I should be very glad that Mr. Hobbes might have a place 
in Parliament, and sit in Counsel, and be present in Courts of Justice, and other Tribunals, 
whereby it is probable he would find, that his solitary cogitation, how deep soever, and his 
too peremtory adhering to some Philosophical Notions, and even Rules of Geometry, had 
misled him in the investigation of Policy” (Survey, 322).   
Machiavelli views the proper role of religion as essential to making a nation strong 
enough to go to war, as well as for domestic tranquility. Hobbes regards the bellicose uses of 
religion as being a significant problem, and seeks to reinterpret religion along more pacific 
lines as a tool for the sovereign to keep internal order alone.  
But Hobbes does agree with Machiavelli on certain points. He has a similar view of 
human nature: men are greedy and a large part tend toward lawlessness. The presence of the 
latter force even good men to behave in a wicked manner. Hobbes notes that  
because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of 
conquest, which their pursue farther than their security requires, if other (that otherwise 
would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds) should not by invasion increase their 
power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist. 
(L13.4/75).  
Machiavelli thinks similarly about politics.  
                                                
498 Dell’arte della Guerra, 1521. Translated into English as the Arte of Warre, in 1560 by Peter 
Whitehorne.  
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Curley argues that “both Machiavelli and Hobbes teach a doctrine fundamentally 
incompatible with Christian ethics, and that it is, therefore, a mistake to regard them as 
Christians.”499 By this he intends their shared anticlericalism and their moral teaching, as well 
as their instrumentalism of religion for the state. 
Incidentally, but not entirely trivial, is the fact that Hobbes uses the phrase, force or 
fraud (in Italian, forzare o fraude), to describe the virtues of the state of nature, a pairing that 
recurs throughout The Prince.  
Most importantly, Hobbes agrees with Machiavelli that religion is something that is 
necessary for the existence of the state, and that the state must play a role in orienting 
religious dogma to its interests.  
Hobbes notes the apparent contrast between those who use religion for their 
personal glory (the pagans) and those who received knowledge directly from the Christian 
God and sought to instruct society with this information. Hobbes notes that,  
both sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them more apt to 
obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort is a 
part of human politics, and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their 
subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics, and containeth precepts to those 
that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. (L12.12/67)500 
The passage is striking, because even if we understand Hobbes to be writing as a 
sincere Christian, he sees one of the fundamental goals of religion to render the people 
docile to rule. I think that this passage, however, is another example of what Curley would 
call “suggestion by disavowal”. Hobbes will not go so far as a to call Christianity a religion 
                                                
499 Curley, “Religion and Morality in Hobbes”, pg. 99. 
500 The phrase “divine politics” found its way into FC Hood’s famous book, The Divine Politics of Thomas 
Hobbes. 
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like any other, but he will put it so close to pagan religion that we are sure to see the 
comparison. (Much of Chapter 12 contains just this sort of analysis).   
Hobbes, like Machiavelli, uses examples from history to show “the religion of the 
Gentiles was part of their policy.” (L12.21/70). We can see a connection almost identical to 
Machiavelli’s ideas  expressed in the Discourses when we examine the analysis of pagan 
religion in Chapter 12 of Leviathan. Hobbes notes  
the first founders and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were 
only to keep the people in obedience and peace, have in all places taken care: first, to imprint 
in the minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be 
thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit 
(L12.20/69). 
Hobbes cites the very same example of Numa Pompilius and the nymph from Livy that 
Machiavelli does in Discourses I.11 to make his point. Hobbes notes that pagan leaders “had a 
care to make it believed that the same things were displeasing to the gods which were 
forbidden by the laws.” (L12.20.70). Thus, “the common people in their misfortunes, laying 
the fault on neglect or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, 
were less apt to mutiny against their governors.” (L12.21/70). From here, Hobbes quickly 
and quietly segues to Christian religion, arguing that God himself gave laws. The beneficial 
association, expressed in admiring words, between politics and religion in Ancient World 
seems to be more than mere comparison, it seems to be an endorsement by Hobbes. 
We have seen that at every juncture, Hobbes chose theological positions that 
maximized the control of the sovereign, adopting what were clearly idiosyncratic positions 
while keeping to the pretense of religion. Such an instrumental attitude at the bare minimum 
requires an ironic distance from the Christian faith, and a willingness to jettison all but a few, 
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minimal beliefs. Hobbes is certainly not a “Machiavellian”, but he probably picked up this 
idea of civil religion from Machiavelli. Machiavelli was the innovator of this idea, and was 
also commonly understood as such by intellectuals in Hobbes’ milieu. Hobbes puts it to 
good effect. 
Bramhall rightly claimed that for Hobbes, “Humane and divine politicks, are but 
politicks.”501 This of course is the same criticism leveled against Machiavelli by his critics. 
Strauss concurs, “Hobbes’s personal attitude to positive religion was at all times the same: 
religion must serve the State and is to be esteemed or despised according to the services or 
disservices rendered to the State.”502 Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau affirms that “Of all the 
Christian writers, the philosopher Hobbes is the only one who clearly saw the evil” of the 
separation between civil and ecclesiastical power, “and its remedy, who dared to propose the 
reunification of the two heads of the eagle and the complete restoration of political unity, 
without which no state or government will be well constituted.”503 
The audiences  
Who is supposed to read Leviathan and what are they supposed to discover? 
Leviathan, on Curley’s account, has more than one intended audience, that it “is 
intended to be an ambiguous work, to be read by different people in different ways, as all 
displays of irony are apt to be.”504 He offers three examples, a student convinced of certain 
political conclusions on the basis of the religious argument, a student convinced of the 
                                                
501 Bramhall, “The Catching of Leviathan”, pg. 117. The reference to L12.12 (cited above) is fairly clear. 
502 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pg. 74.  
503 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, On Social Contract, Book IV, Chapter 8, pg. 166 in the Norton Edition. The 
observation is not my own.  
504 Curley, “I durst not write so boldly”., pg. 590.  
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political conclusions based on the secular argument, and a censor, who is convinced the 
work is pious. 
Lloyd argues that Hobbes “attempts to rationalize, rather than to cast doubt on, or to 
refute, Christian religion.”505 Hobbes “recognized that his readers believed Christianity to be 
true,” and that he “could never have hoped to succeed in persuading his audience to give up 
Christianity.”506 Leviathan serves to shows us “errors within Christianity rather than to expose 
some alleged error of Christianity.”507 Curley remarks that “this supposes more homogeneity 
in Hobbes’ audience than we are entitled to assume.”508 
Paul D. Cooke argues that there were three readers of Leviathan, only two of which 
were strictly intended. Cooke argues that Hobbes was guilty of “deliberately disguising” his 
teaching about Christianity.509 One set of readers saw through the disguise and were 
appalled. Call them, for now Group 0.510 Obviously, Hobbes did not desire much to be read 
by these sorts. A second set appreciated his philosophically-minded, “prudently ambiguous 
but effective demonstration of the questionableness of biblical faith.”511 Call this Group 1. 
The third set is most important. This last group thought that “Hobbes’s treatment of the 
Bible actually did not appear to involve a disguise.” This was Hobbes’ target audience says 
Cooke, “those who were looking to reconcile genuine Christianity with the new findings of 
                                                
505 Lloyd, Ideals as Interests, Pg. 272.  
506 Ibid., pg. 273. 
507 Ibid., pg. 274.  
508 Curley, “Religion and Morality in Hobbes”, pg. 109.  
509 Cooke, Paul D. Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan. New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1996, pg. 17.    
510 Zero both for being nonstarters and for intended nonexistence in a fully Leviathan-ized universe.  
511 Ibid. 
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science.”512 Call this Group 2. Leviathan  sends a message of radically reformed Christianity to 
those unable to give it up (Group 2) and winks at those who can see past it (Group 1).  
Cooke’s analysis is correct, although I think he is missing one more dimension.  
Lastly, and most importantly, there is also an indirect audience for Leviathan, those 
uneducated, overworked, or semi-educated citizens who would be told what to do by those 
who were possessed of education and authority. Call this Group 3. The religious doctrines 
were especially important for these people in Hobbes’ mind. These were the most vulnerable 
to superstition and abuse by the ambitious few.  
Teaching the correct doctrines is critical. Hobbes tells us that his principles of 
government “have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught, because they cannot be 
maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment.” (L30.4/220, emphasis mine).513 Elsewhere 
he expresses his belief “that men’s disagreements about opinions and intellectual excellence 
cannot be eliminated by arms.” (L47.29/488 [OL]).  
But Hobbes observes that “the common people’s minds, unless they be tainted with 
dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean 
paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them.” (L30.6/221).  
Hobbes argues on this basis: 
They whom necessity or covetousness keepeth on their trades and labor, and they, on the 
other side, whom superfluity or sloth carrieth after their sensual pleasures (which two sorts 
of men take up the greatest part of mankind), being diverted from the deep meditation 
which the learning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also of all other 
sciences necessarily require, receive the notions of their duty chiefly from divines in the 
pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbors or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty 
                                                
512 Ibid., pg. 18. 
513 Lloyd makes much of this passage in Ideals as Interests. Fear of violent death is not, and cannot be, the 
only motivator in the commonwealth.  
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of discoursing regularly and plausibly seem wiser, and better learned in cases of law and 
conscience than themselves. And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, 
derive their knowledge from the universities and from the schools of law, or from the books 
which men eminent in those schools and universities have been published. It is, therefore, 
manifest that the instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth 
in the university. (L30.14/225).  
The educational system is the bottleneck for the control of society, and Leviathan is 
designed to be its chief textbook. Hobbes announces this at the close of Part II, at the end 
of Part IV in the Latin Leviathan, and in the Review And Conclusion (See L31.41/243–4, 
L47[OL]/488, and R&C.16/496).  
So we might say the elites in Group 1 choose Leviathan to be the textbook for Group 
2 who in turn educate Group 3. These three have a pyramidal relationship. Group 0 would, 
as its name implies, shrink to nothing.  
Conclusion 
The interesting thing about the contemporary advocates for Hobbes’ sincere 
profession of Christianity is that they make valid points. The defenders of the Hobbes-as-
atheist position do need to address these objections. The kind of brutal passage-to-passage 
fighting that this engenders  may be messy, but it is important. Sometimes the ironist pushes 
too far. The tide turned briefly against the skeptics, but it seems to be flowing back in its 
traditional direction once more. The sincerity-advocates win several battles, but they seem to 
have lost the war.  
Hobbes is a master stylist and a thoroughgoing student of theology, orthodox and 
otherwise. The presence of so much religious argumentation in Hobbes’ masterpiece is a 
testament to his ability to discover and implement reconciliation between his science and his 
political theory and amenable religious doctrines. Only a genius like Hobbes could combined 
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Calvin and Overton and Archer and make us wonder as to his intentions to this day. 
Ultimately, it was not sincere theology.  
So it is fair to say that the kneejerk reaction, “Hobbes is an atheist” is correct, but 
usually for the wrong reasons. Hobbes does not have two feet firmly planted in the scientific 
age. His was a different time with different assumptions and prejudices. He had to signal his 
skepticism covertly, although perhaps not covertly enough. Hobbes had many flaws, among 
them an overflowing literary style which could be a little too transparent. But Hobbes wrote 
Leviathan under unique conditions, and its “honesty” has given us much to reflect upon and 
grapple with.  
Hobbes’ deepest heresy was his reduction of religion to a department of 
government. But Hobbes’ argument in Leviathan works on two, related levels. The superficial 
level was to square Christianity with materialist, determinist science and absolutist political 
theory. This would move Christians toward a more rational, orderly religion. The deeper 
level was where Hobbes engenders doubt about Christianity in general, and seeks to exploit 
it for the aims of the state in general. And by teaching the teachers the first level, perhaps he 
was setting them up for the next level, but most likely he thought that he could not escape 
“This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in their ignorance of causes (as it were 
in the dark)” (L12.6/64) which is the seed of religion, and thus must be domesticated by a 
religion that is at home with science and most importantly, with unwavering political stability 
and power.  
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